

THE  
Second Part  
OF THE  
PASSIONS.

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Wherein is Treated of the  
Nature, and of the effects of the  
COURAGEOUS  
PASSIONS.

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English'd by R. W. Esq;

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LONDON,

Printed by T. Newcomb, for H. Herringman,  
at the Anchor in the New-Exchange.  
1661.




THE  
Second Part

OF THE  
PASSIONS

Which is Treated of the  
Nature and Effects of the  
COURAGEOUS

PASSIONS

Englished by R. W. E. Esq.



LONDON:  
Printed by A. Newman, for H. Newman,  
at the Anchor in the New-Exchange.  
1761.

The Stationer to the  
**READER.**

**A** Gentleman of quality during these late unhappy times, having betaken himself to a retired life, made it his business to study this our Incomparable Author; and that he might the better imprint him in his Mind, as well as render him beneficial to others who understand not his language, made it his pastime to transcribe into the English the First and Second Part of the Characters of the Passions, which having been formerly severally brought to light, he assiduously perswaded us to reconcile them, and obliged us upon a Review

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*The Stationer to the Reader.*

view to present them this second time in one volume, being confident that they cannot but be grateful to all learned Men, no Man as yet having ever treated of the Passions in his inimitable way, which hath truly gain'd him the reputation of one of the Chief Philosophers of our Age. Among the most eminent wits of his Nation who are his fittest Judges, the One calls him, The most splendid light of the time, and one of the greatest Genius of learning. But he flies higher then Mounsiere de Balse, who tells Mr. Chapelin in two of his Letters to him; in the one, What great matters he expects from the learning and judgment of Our Author; and in another he breaks forth into these expressions, Wishing his Book had been far greater, that his pleasure might have been the more lasting; that he never read any thing with  
more

*The Stationer to the Reader.*


more delight; and that he was sensibly charm'd with the beauty of his Passions. Others (saies he) have given us touches and essays of trash and trumpery, with disguis'd translations, and borrow'd conceits, but he shews us the truth in its original perfect lustre; and were all the parts of Philosophy rendred as intelligible in our language, *Non esset cur Græcia suos Platines, Xenophantes, & Theophrastos invidereamus.* Nor (continues he) do I know why he omitted Aristotle, whose sublime & methodick stile is most remarkable in this Author, which is indeed so very necessary for the search and illumination of the Truth. According to my opinion Celsus his Latin hath not the graces of his French. *Imo vero tersam & elegantem dictionem ipsæ Græciæ videtur mihi ijs manibus formasse quibus, ut vos Poetæ vultis, Domine Veneri ministrant.*


*The Stationer to the Reader*

*miniftrant.* So far he. Give me  
leave to add; his Greatest Glory is  
from himself; His Design him-  
self dares acknowledg the greatest  
and fairest conceivable. Through  
all his Discourses he discovers the  
vivacity of his knowledge, and the  
perspicuity of his judgment, clo-  
thed in a stile of inimitable elegan-  
cie; and in fine throughout he  
witnesseth himself so eminent a  
Philosopher. Nor in the judg-  
ment of the best, can he be denied  
to be Doctor of the Chair. And  
were his Great design but perfect-  
ly finish'd, One age might truly  
boast, That by him alone Philoso-  
phy had been brought to its  
Acme. I shall not cloud him with  
any farther Eulogie; But desire  
thee to read him, and be thankful;  
And so farewell.

THE









# THE CHARACTERS OF THE PASSIONS.

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## CHAP. I.

*What the Characters of the PASSIONS  
are in generall.*



NATURE having destin'd  
Man for a civil life,  
thought it not sufficient  
to have given him a  
tongue to discover his  
intentions; but she would  
also imprint on his fore-  
head, and in his eyes, the  
images of his thoughts; that if his speech  
*happened* to belye his heart, his face should  
give the lye to his speech. In effect how  
secret soever the motions of his soul are,  
B. what

*Of the Passions in general.*

what care soever he takes to hide them, they are no sooner formed but they appear in his face, and the disquiet they cause is sometimes so great that they may be truly called tempests, which are more violent at Shore then out at Sea : And that he who advised a man to consult his glass in his anger, had reason to beleieve that the Passions are better known in the eyes, then in the soul it self. But that which is more wonderful, those actions which spring from vertue and vice, discover themselves in the same manner : And although the goodness or malignity they have, seem to have nothing to doe with the body, yet they leave with it, I know not what kind of images : And even the soul not perceiving what it doth, disposeth the parts in such a manner, that by the plight and posture which they take, we may judge whether its actions are good or ill ; Neither can the understanding work so secretly but the senses must perceive it : If it elevate its thoughts, if it recollect it self, the looks grow fixed, the ear hears not ; in fine, there is a general suspension of sense, and motion : And whether it be that at the same time the soul cannot intend such different functions, or that the inferiour part respects,

spects, and wil not divert its Mistris, we know that this is imployed when the other operates not. Its a most certain thing that the body changeth and varies it self, when the soul is moved, and that this performs almost no actions but it imprints the marks thereof, which we may call Characters, since they are the effects of them, and that they bear their image and figure.

Now, because the first Rule of Physiognomy is grounded on these Characters, and that it maketh use of them to discover inclinations, assuring us, that those who naturally have the same air, and the same countenance which accompanies their moral actions, are inclined to the same actions; The designe which we have undertaken makes us here propose the particular Characters of all the Passions, and after them of Vertues, and Vices: But first we must know wherein these Characters consist and what are the causes of them.

The Characters of Passions, and of habits, being the markes of the motions, and designs of the soul, are also its effects, as is already said; but because there are also two sorts of effects, those which are performed in the soul, and those which are effected in the body; there are also two kinds



## *Of the Passions in general.*

of Characters; the one *Moral*, the other *Corporal*. For if you consider a man in anger, Violence appears in all his actions; his words are full of threats and injuries; he cries out, he runs, he strikes; reason and remonstrances offend him, and he knows no friends but those who favour his passion. On the other side, his countenance is inflam'd, his eyes sparkle, he wrinkles his forehead, his words are fierce, his voice is terrible, his looks are frightful, and his whole behaviour is furious. These then are two kinds of effects, and two sorts of Characters; the one whereof consists in moral actions, and the other in the change and alteration of the body.

Now we must see what these actions are, and what this change is; for all moral actions cannot be used for Characters; otherwise, some would be Characters of themselves, since Passions, and Vertues, are moral actions.

To take away this difficulty, you must observe that the essence of human actions consists in the inward emotion which the object forms in the appetite; and that all those things which are done in pursuance thereof, are but as rivolets running from the same spring. So anger is nothing but a desire

desire of Vengeance; and in the pursuit of that emotion, the soul produceth exterior actions, which may serve to this purpose; as threatnings, blows, and other violences, which we call Characters because they express and discover the alteration and interior motion of the appetite.

But there is also another thing to be here considered; and it is that when we speak of Passions, of Vertues, and of Vices, we are not to conceive them as qualities, or simple actions; but as compleat qualities and actions which are accompanied by many others, and yet, which all tend to one principal end which the soul proposeth. For although love, (to speake properly) is but a simple emotion of the soul, by which it unites it self to that which is lovely; Yet we doe not therein form its whole Idea; we consider it as a Passion that hath beauty for its object, and which to possesse it, employs desire, hope, delight, &c. In the same manner, Justice is a stedfast will to render to every one what belongs to him. But to effect it, she makes use of Prudence, which makes her consider the quality of persons, the time, the place, and all other circumstances. She makes use of Temperance, and of strength, to moderate those

B 3

passions.

passions which often traverse her design; and although they are actions which precisely concern her not, yet she forbears not to appropriate them, because they conduce to her principal end. Now all these borrowed; and posterior actions are also a part of moral Characters; because they design the passion, or principal habit, which is the spring, and first cause whence they are derived.

Its far more difficult, to say wherein the *Corporal Characters* consist, and what intention nature hath in forming them. We see, that every passion carries I know not what air on the face; that vertue sheds into its actions a certain grace, and an agreeable aspect, which is not to be found amongst the vicious; but as we have always called it *The I know not what*, it seems that we are thereby taught, that it could not be said what it was. For I suppose, (as it is true) that the Characters we seek, are nothing but the *air* of which we have but now spoken. Now this is found in so many different things, that its almost impossible to observe what of common they have whereupon we may establish its essence; for it most commonly happens in the motion of the parts, and some have believ'd  
that

that this air was nothing but that motion. But its certain, there is a fixt and natural air wherein the parts move not, and which is no effect of the souls emotions. So that it would be more likely, that this air were nothing but a certain relation of the parts amongst themselves; which happens from the situation they take when they move, or when they rest: But nether is this sufficient; since the colour which that relation compriseth not, partly gives the air to the face; and that ruddiness is one of the principal Characters of shame, as paleness is of fear; this ever encrease the difficulty, since that in defining beauty, we say that its a just proportion of the parts accompanied with a pleasing colour, and with a grace; and that colour and grace are esteem'd as two different things. For grace is nothing but a pleasing air; nay even custome, often applies it to what it is not, when we say a man hath an ill grace; and in this case, grace is the same with air: That we may know then what this marvelous *air* is, where the serenity, and the storms of the minde appear, we are first to observe, that the air of persons is discovered in their pictures; that the grace of a fair face is exprest by colours,

*Of the Passions in general.*

and that consequently, there must be somewhat of fixt, and which flies not away, since there are none but stable and permanent things, which painting hath power over; and that of all visible objects, there is only motion, which subjects not it self to the pencil. Now it is impossible to finde any thing stable, common to living things, and their pictures, besides the figure and colour of the parts. So that it seems this air is to be there placed. But because there is yet another thing in the grace, which the art of painting cannot attain to, and that there is a certain vivacity, which can never be fixt on the cloth; we must with reason beleve that motion serves also to this grace; its that which renders the beauty lively and piercing; without which its sad, dead, and without attraction. We cannot (in effect) doubt but that the motion of the parts gives something to this vivacity, since 'tis a part of its perfection. But because that after it hath ceased, there is yet I know not what which remains on the face, and that we see a certain splendor shine in the eyes, which depends neither upon their figure, motion nor colour; we must necessarily add to all this a certain secret influence, which being sent into the eyes disperseth



sperseth it self over the parts of the face; and without doubt, after having well enquired what it may be, we shall finde it to be the spirits which the soul continually sends into those parts, which leave there the brightness of the natural light they have, and indeed there are faces which neer seem well, and afar off appear very ill coloured, because the spirits animate it not, and that the splendor they give is so weak that the species of it cannot reach far, and so they leave those of the colour more withered. This grace then is in the colour, in the figure, in the motion of the parts, and of the spirits. And yet this doth not say that all these things are this grace: For were they in other subjects then man, they would not please; and green which is the most perfect of all colours, would cause a frightful deformity, were it on a face. It must then be, that as sounds are not pleasing of themselves, but as they are in a certain proportion; so all these things are pleasing to the sight but only because they have a certain relation, and a certain agreement, which pleaseth the eyes, and contents the minde.

To know this concordance, you are to understand that there are two sorts of beauties

*Of the Passions in general.*

ties in man ; The Intelligible , and the Sensible. The first is but the interior perfection, the just connexion of all faculties necessary for a man to perform the functions whereto he is designd; and the sensible beauty consists in the disposition which the Organs ought to have to serve these faculties. So that what renders the figure, the colour and the motion agreeable, is the fitness which those things have with the nature of man. For how fair soever the colour be, how perfect soever the figure of the parts are, how regular soever the motions are, if they are not conformable to his nature, they produce neither a beauty nor a grace ; on the contrary, they cause a deformity, and render the body unseemly. Now although there be but God alone who knows the principle of this conformity, and why the forms have more inclination for one figure, colour, or some other accident then for another : yet there are in our soul secret seeds of this knowledge, which is the cause she pleaseth herself in these objects without knowing the reason ; in the same manner as she findes them displeasing, when that conformity and proportion which they ought to have is wanting.

Some

Some will perhaps say, that I here confound grace with beauty, placing grace in the proportion of the parts, and in the colour, which in the ordinary definition of beauty are separated from grace. But I beleeve there is no inconvenience herein, and that its true that all that is fair is pleasing, and that the proportion of parts being fair, must needs please the sight, and that therefore they are graceful.

And indeed the ancients who in these things were wiser then we, made not this difference, and always placed the graces where beauty was: For although *Aristotle* says, that little ones might be call'd pretty and pleasing, but that they were not to be esteem'd fair; 'tis that he spake of an entire and perfect beauty, which is not to be found in little bodies, for as much as they want that just proportion which belongs to the perfection of man.

Yet there is some ground for the difference which hath been since made between beauty and grace; for as the matter and the form enter into the composition of man, we have placed beauty in the figure and in the colour which belongs to the matter, and grace in the motions which are effects of the soul: not that grace is not in the

the colour and in the figure; or that beauty is not in the motions; but because she is more excellent in these, by reason that the soul who is the principle thereof, is more perfect than the matter, and that action is the last perfection of things. Beauty which ought to be the most agreeable, hath been call'd by the name of grace, although in effect it ought to be common to all that is fair, and that the colour, figure and motion which have all their beauties, ought also to have every one their particular graces.

But to return to our subject; the *grace* is a kind of air and means; nothing more but that conformity and proportion whereof we have spoken. For when the *air* is accompanied with this proportion, its pleasing; so that this *air* in general is in all those things which have a grace, and it may be defin'd, *A certain exterior and sensible quality which is bred from the colour, figure, and motion of the parts.* And if we add that these things are proportionable, and conformable to the perfection of man, it will be the definition of grace.

We are notwithstanding to observe that the *air* appears more in one of these three things in some encounters than in the rest: For that which is fixt and natural, is chiefly

ly in the figure and situation of the parts. That which accompanies the passions, depends most from the motion and the colour; that of vertuous actions is sometimes in rest, because reason hinders those motions which would not besit the moderation and quiet she seeks: such is the grave and modest Mine, such is the countenance of a man who meditates and thinks on great matters: And it may be that even vices which are in excess, have an active and turbulent air; and those which are in the defect, have quite the contrary: so a hot and precipitate man is always in action, and the lazy is immoveable: besides the *air* appears sometime more in one part then in another, and although it be more remarkable in the face then in any other place, yet there is one which belongs to walking, another in the carriage of the armes, and another of the whole body. The French hath been more happy to express those differences then any other language, whatsoever. Not content to say *l'Air & la Grace*, *Air* and *Grace*, it adds *la Mine*, *la Contenance*, *le Maintien*, *le Geste*, & *le Port*, which as neer as we can render them, are, The *Mine*, the *Presence*, the *Behaviour*, the *Carriage*, and the *Port*. The *Mine* chiefly belongs to the face,



face, *the port* to the gate, *the carriage* and the *behaviour* to the arms; the *Air*, the *Grace*, and the *Presence* to the whole body. And as the *Port*, and the *Gesture*, or *Carriage*, denote motion, so the *Mine*, the *Behaviour*, and the *Presence* apply themselves best to rest: but the *air* and the *grace* are common to both of them. However it be, the *air* which is in Passions, and in moral actions, principally comes from motion; but you must know what the cause of this motion is: For upon this knowledge depends the greatest part of what we are to say; and because it will better appear in the passions, we will therefore by them begin the enquiry.

We have already said, and we shall often be obliged to repeat, that Passions are nothing but the emotions of the appetite, by which the soul moves towards good, and estrangeth it self from evil; and as she hath divers organs which may be used to that end, she also employs them, and moves according to her intention: Now the Spirits without question are the first she makes use of, being the most agil, and which take their birth from the same place where she forms her designs; so that we need not wonder that they are the first to execute them,

them, since they seem to be the first who have the knowledge of them.

The soul then sends forth the spirits, and scatters them over all the exterior parts, either to acquire good, or to oppose ill: But when this is too powerful, and she is sensible that she is not strong enough to resist it, she retires them in and brings them back to the heart. Now this flux and reflux brings two great changes, because the humors being drawn along with them, their arrival swells and agitates the parts, and paints them of the same colour of which themselves are: on the contrary, their flight makes them fail, looke pale, and renders them immovable.

Perhaps it would not be unprofitable to examine whether every passion hath a particular motion of the spirits; and whether anger moves them otherwise then shame, love, joy, or the rest which carries them outwardly: Whether Fear retire them inwardly after another manner then Hate, Aversion or Greif. For if this were true, and that we could know these differences, we could with the more facility discover the causes of the alterations they produce. For my part, I beleeve that since in every Passion the appetite hath an emotion and

a particular end, the means it useth ought also to be particular; and that the motion of the spirits must be conformable to the intention it hath, and to the agitation it gives it self: and therefore that that is done in one passion, is different from those which are done in others. So that its very likely that in one they cast themselves with impetuosity, and high boylings like torrents: and in another slide as sweetly as rivers, that some make them overflow their banks, others restrain them in their bounds: that now their course is direct, and presently again irregular. Lastly, That we may say love dilates them, desire shoots them forth, Joy sheds them abroad, Hope holds them fast, boldness drives them, and that anger throws them forth in great boylings gulps, and so of the rest, as we shall more particularly see in the discourse of the Passions; although to speak Truth, our spirit is not clear-sighted enough to discern exactly all these differences, and that in this case the window of *Momus* were very necessary for it. How ever it be, the soul is not content after this manner only to agitate the spirits and the humors in the passions: she also causeth those parts to move which are capable of a voluntary motion,

as

as being those which are the most powerful to seek and imbrace good, and to repel or flye evil; and to speak truth, this motion of the spirits is often a succour very useles to the soul, and which serves rather to shew her precipitation and blindness then to obtain what she proposed to her self; for when they cast themselves into the face, she fancies to her self that it is she her self that runs thither; and when they retire themselves to the heart, its she also who hides her self there, although she be already at the place where she would arrive, and that she abandons not that whecne she thinks to estrang herself; and what benefit is it to a Creature for the spirits and the blood to goe to the encounter of an agreeable object, since neither the soul nor the body come nearer to it, nor are any more united to it, and that the sences only are they which ought to make this union? we may say the same of the resistance she would make to those ills which present themselves; for what relation is there betwixt the spirits and an injury, and what effect can they make to drive back an ill which most commonly is only in opinion, which sometimes is no more or which even is not yet made?

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But

But it is not thus with voluntary motion; for indeed here the hands draw and take what's useful, the body is carryed towards what is lovely; it truly keeps a distance from what's ill, and flies or drives away what incommodes it.

It's true that there are some of these motions where the soul deceives it self as well as in that of the spirits: how many lost steps, ridiculous postures and idle words are there in Passions? to what use are these several motions of the head, those different figures which the forehead, the eyes, the nose, and the mouth form? There may be some relation with the design which the soul proposed, since it's certain that in shame she casts down the eyes, as if she would hide herself, that she lifts them up in Anger as if that served to repel an injury, and that in scorn she lifts up the nose as if she would drive away what she disdain. But it's easie to perceive that herein also she deceives her self, and that the blindness and trouble in which she is, causeth her to use means which benefit her nothing to the obtaining of what she desires.

It is not that she is therefore to be condemned in all these motions; there are  
many



many which happen without any design of hers; which although they are not against her intention, yet she is not the cause of them, 'tis but by a certain necessity that they follow those motions which the soul inwardly excites; for we cannot with reason say, that she proposeth in anger the hinderance of respiration and of speech, the inflammation of the face, and the sparkling of the eyes. But these are effects which follow the agitation of the spirits, which impetuously cast themselves on the exterior parts as we shall say hereafter.

By this discourse we may not only perceive what the causes of those motions which the Passions excite are, but also which those are which make moral Characters, and which make the corporal. For those which the soul employs by a clear and distinct knowledge to obtain the end she pretends in every Passion, make the moral Characters; and those which she useth by a pure instinct, or which happen without any intention of hers, form the corporal Characters. For these latter are of two sorts, the one are by the command of the soul, the other are by necessity, as you will see more particularly in the following discourses.

## CHAP. II.

*The Characters of Love.*

**L**OVE is not only the Spring of all the Passions, but even of all the good and of all the ill which happens to men; without it there would be no Sciences in the world; Vertue would be without followers, and Civill society would be but an imaginary good; it is that which breeds in us the desire of fair things, and makes us possesse them, and by a wonderful incantation changeth and transformeth us into them: to it we owe all the good things we possesse, it may give us those which we want, and if it drive not from us the ills which necessarily accompany this life, at least it sweetens them, nay and even renders them pleasing, & makes them the instruments of our felicity.

But this is it also that corrupts vertue, ruins society, and renders art despicable.

And

And if it hath truly brought into the world these excellent things, it seems it is only to drive them out again. That noble vigor which incites the mind to fair actions, that divine fire wherewith they say the soul is clothed, and which naturally raiseth it towards Heaven, languisheth and dyes under the weight of base and terrestrial things, upon which this Passion fixeth it. In short its this that forms all the tempests which agitate our life there would be no grief, no fear, nor no despair; were there no love; and who ever will nearly consider all the passions, will easily believe that they are but several motions which it causeth, and different figures which it assumes.

Now as there are but few objects which can reach the soul, which are not able to move this passion: And whereas Riches, Honor, Pleasure, and in a word all Goods whether false or true may raise it, we will not here disimbroile this Chaos, and our design gives us not leave to speak of any other kind of love but that which beauty begets in the appetite.

Neither is it a slight enterprize, notwithstanding the helps those great men of the times past have given us, and what

*The Characters of Love.*

endeavour soever we have already made to discover its origine, yet are we constrained to confesse that there is somewhat in it which is divine, whereto our spirit cannot attain; and the same poverty which we finde as they say at its birth, happens also in our thoughts when we would speak of it; so that were it necessary to observe all the effects thereof, we might sooner count the waves of the sea, then the motions it causeth in the soul: neither doth heat produce or corrupt more things in the world, then love causeth both good and evil actions.

In effect its the instrument of that divine Art which Nature hath provided to preserve her most excellent works; without it long since we had no more spoken of Families, of Peoples, or of Commonwealths; and those which were esteem'd the most flourishing, had been but the Assemblies of a sort of wild & savage beasts, had not love sweetned and civilz'd them; for its it that forms us to a civil life, which is the true life of men, since thereby we become liberal, courteous, and generous; it teacheth us to be discreet, obedient, and faithful; it renders us abundant, eloquent, and ingenious; and for that same cause  
the

the wisest man among the ancients formerly, said that he was ignorant in all things but in the art of love, forasmuch as he esteem'd that love is the school of honor and vertue, and that wheresoever it reigns it brings peace, abundance and Felicity. And indeed had it not been altered by men, it had never produced any other effects but those, and we had not been obliged to have added to its Elogies, the crimes of which it is accused, and the ills which at all times it hath done through the whole world: but as the fire how pure soever it be, raiseth stinking and dangerous fumes if it take in a corrupted matter, you are not to wonder if this divine flame being bred amongst those vices wherewith the nature of man is infected, produceth only filthy desires, forms only evil designs, and if instead of the good things it ought to bring mankinde, it cause only troubles, anxiety and misfortunes.

We have not undertaken here to give an account of all its disorders, neither will we stain this discourse with the blood and the infamy it hath brought into Families and States, nor with the sacriledges wherewith it hath violated the most



13  
sacred things : it will be sufficient to say, that its the most dangerous enemy wisdom can have : Forasmuch as of all those passions w<sup>ch</sup> may disturb her, there is only love against whom she hath no defence; those which enter nimble and impetuously into the minde, are but almost of a moments continuance, and reason finds its excuse in their precipitation; those others which move slowly by little and little, she perceives them coming and can either stop their passage, or in that weak condition drive them away. But love slides in so secretly that its impossible to observe its entry, or its progresse, like a maskt enemy it advanceth and seazeth on all the principal parts of the soul, before it is discovered, when there is no means to be found to get him out ; then he triumphs, and wisdom and reason must become his slaves : and 'tis what in my opinion the ancients would have said when they fained Love sometimes to be the Father of the gods, and sometimes that he was a Demon which causeth them to descend from Heaven to Earth : Because its certain that this passion hath mastered the wisest men in the world, and that it was not without cause that *Lai*  
once

once vaunted to have seen more Philosophers with her, then of any other kinde of men. But let us leave these subjects for lovers to entertain their complaints withall, and without inter-  
essing our selves either in the praise or dispraise of love, lets consider from the Port where we are, the stormes it raiseth in the soul and in the body.

The first wound that beauty gives the soul, is almost insensible, and although the poyson of love be already in her, and that its even disperst through all her parts, yet doth she not beleieve herself sick, or at least thinks not her mischief so great. For as we doe not give to Bees the name they bear, but only when they have a sting and wings : so neither is love called love but when he hath his arrows and can flye, thats to say when he is pungent and unquiet. At first we take it for a simple liking, or a complacency we bear to so lovely a Person with whose presence we are pleased, of whom we delight to discourse, whose remembrance is sweet ; and the desires we have to see and entertain her, are so calm that wisdom with all its severity cannot condemn them, even she approves them, and passeth them for civilities and  
necessary

necessary duties : but they are not long at a stand, they by little and little encrease, and at last by the frequent agitation of the Soul, they kindle that fire which was there hid, and cause that flame to encrease which burns and devours it ; then this pleasing image which never presented it self to the minde but with sweetness and respect, becomes insolent and imperious ; it enters every moment, or more fully to express it, it never leaves it, it mixeth with its most serious thoughts, it troubles the most pleasing, and profanes the most sacred, it even slides into our dreams and by an insufferable perfidiousness, it shews it self in them severe and cruel, when there is nothing to be fear'd, or abuseth us with a vain hope when we ought truly to dispair ; then love who before was but a child, becomes the Father of all the passions, but a cruel Father, who hath no sooner produced one, but he stifles it to make room for an other, which he spares no less then the former, at once he causeth a hundred kinds of desires and designs to live and dye ; and to see Hope and Dispair, Boldness and Fear, joy and grief, which he causeth continually to succeed one another, Despight and Anger,

ger, which he makes to flash out every moment, & the mixture of all these passions; its impossible but you must fancie some great tempest where the fury of the wind raiseth, throws down and confounds the waves, where lightning and thunder breaks the clouds, where light and darkness, heaven and earth, seem to return to their first confusion.

But as there are times when storms are more violent and more common, there are also encounters wherein this tempest of Love is stronger, and more frequent. The chief in my opinion are, the presence, and the absence of the beloved person, her love, and her hate, and the concurrence of a rival; and we may say, that these are the five acts wherein all the accidents and all the intricacies of this Passion are represented; at least if there are others, they pass behind the curtain, and out of the spectators sight.

If it happen then that a lover be *absent* from his beloved object, disquiet and fretting pursue him everywhere, he hath no friends but are importunate, the diversifements which were most pleasing to him are troublesome; in short there is nothing in his life which displeaseth him  
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not, but silence and solitude, as if he were possess'd with those strange diseases which makes us hate the light and men; he loves nothing but darkness and deserts, there he entertaines the woods, the brooks, the winds, and the stars, they have nothing as he fancies but what is conformable to the humour of her he loves, and to the pains he suffers; he calls them insensible as she is, and finds them like him in perpetual agitation, and after having a long time tormented his spirit with such like Chimeras, he begins to think of those happy moments when he shall again see that desirable object that he may speak to her, and give her an account of his sighs and of the tears he shed in her absence; sometimes he meditates the complaints wherewith he must soften her rigor, the thanks with which he will receive her favours, and the vows wherewith he will confirm his servitude; sometimes he puts pen to paper, he writes, blots out, tears, and if he have any thoughts which may securely stay on the paper, they are those only which witness the excess of his love and fidelity; and then what artifices doth he not imploy to procure the delivery of his letters? what  
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extravagances doth he not commit when he receives any, or even when any thing that hath but touched the person he loves comes to his hands? he keeps them always joyned to his eyes or to his lips, he makes them his idols, and would not change them for Scepters and Diadems; to conclude, we may say that absence is the true night of lovers, not onely because their Sun as they say illuminates them no more, but also because that all their pleasures are but as in a dream, and at that time all their ill<sup>s</sup> are irritated and augmented.

But lets consider the day which followes this night, 'tis infallibly the *presence* of the person beloved; indeed a lover calls it no other, who beleeves that when he comes neer it, all the beauty in the world is discovered to his eyes; he finds a new heat disperst through his soul, and a certain mixture of joy & astonishment causeth him so pleasant a trouble that he is ravisht therewith and as it were out of himself: then how proud, bold or eloquent soever he be, he must humble himself, be afraid and lose his speech; it avails him nothing to have prepared his courage and his discourse, they prove but so many dreams  
and

and fantasies which vanish at the sight of this light ; nothing but his eyes can speak for him which witness by their looks what an excess of pleasure and respect this meeting affords him ; but what ever is said, that this is the particular language of Love, there is yet another which is much more proper, and which is also far stranger then this : for although there are passions as violent as this, yet is there none which inspires like this, such extravagant and such ridiculous words ; for a lover scarce utters one probable word, what care and what interest soever he employs to make himself beleaved ; all his discourses and writings are perpetual hyperboles ; he burns, he languisheth, he dyes, he speaks of nothing but of prisons, of chains, and of torments ; he calls her he loves his sun, his heart, his soul, and his life ; he swears that he alone hath more love then all men besides, that his passion is infinite and shall be eternal : In breif, all his words are beyond the truth, his designs and his promises beyond his power, and all his actions beneath his courage ; for there is no so base submission which he will not make, there is no service so low or vile which he will not render ;

der; there is no subjection amongst slaves so diligent, so careful and so express as his; he often adores a person that disdains him, courts a confident that betrays him, cherisheth servants that mock him; he must use his enemies with respect, his friends with indifferency, and all the rest of the world with scorn; he must suffer without complaining, he must fear all, desire much, hope for little: in a word he must love his ill, and hate himself. I omit the profuse expence he makes, the dangers he runs through to gain only a word or a favourable look, the transports of joy which a good reception yeelds him, the excess of grief and despair which a disdain causeth, and the furies which jealousy inspires when a rival traverseth his pursuit. When we shall speak of those passions in particular, then also will we shew the rest of the extravagancies which love causeth, although indeed they cannot be all discovered. For besides that there are no disorders in the other passions which are not to be found in this, that its capable of all the follies which can possesse a distracted mind, it hath so many faces and several countenances, that its impossible to take their picture; sometimes

times its violent and impetuous, sometimes sweet and peaceable, in some pleasant and toying, in others peevish and severe, in other bold and insolent, in other timorous and modest; it appears ingenious and stupid, fantastical, light, furious, and in a hundred other fashions, which in my opinion was the cause that some fained Love to be the son of the wind, and of Iris; to shew the wonder and the variety which there was in this passion, and to teach us that his original is as much hid as that of those two kinds of Meteors. But before we undertake to discover it, lets see what change it causeth in the face.

I do not beleeeve that he who first painted Love with a vail before his eyes, intended thereby to shew the blindness which is in that passion, but either through the debility or by the priviledge of his art, he was obliged to hide what he could not expresse: In effect, what colour, nay even what words can expresse all the changes which Love causeth in our eyes? how can that resplendent humidity be represented which we see shine in them? that modest disquiet, that laughing grief, and that amorous anger which is

to be perceived in them; now you shall see them turn this way, and now that, now sweetly lift themselves up, by little and little fall down again and pittifully turn towards the beloved object. Sometimes they dwell on it as if they were fix'd, sometimes they turn from it as if they dazled, sometimes their looks are quick, sometimes sweet and languishing; now they fly out with liberty, and now they steal and escape from between the lids; which seem as if they would shut upon them: In a word, all the motions wherewith the eyes in other passions are agitated are to be observ'd in this: you shall always finde laughter or tears, which sometimes agree & mingle together; although they are sunk and hollow, they do not therefore drie up or lessen; on the contrary they seem bigger and more humid then they were before, unless it be after a tedious grief or an extream despair, for then they become dry, dimm, cast down and set. The forehead in this passion seldom gathers it self; on the contrary it seems as if it were extended, and if sorrow sometimes casts it down, the wrinkles do scarce so much as break its evenness; 'tis there where the redness begins to appear which Love  
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often raiseth in the face, and even then when the other parts are pale, this always retains something of its first colour; sometimes the lips are red and moist, sometimes pale and dry, and they never almost move without forming a pleasing smile, sometimes the undermost is seen to tremble and to whiten with a subtil froth, sometimes the tongue passeth over them, and by a light touch and trembling which it gives, it flatters and tickles them; when it would form words it lisps, and the humidity which the desire raiseth in the mouth, stifles and drowns them: Even the ears are of no use to a lover, he hears not half what you say to him; if he answers 'tis with confusion, and his discourse is every moment interrupted by deep and long sighs, which his heart and his lungs incessantly exhale: If he speak of his passion 'tis with a trembling and softened voice which he lets fall at every stroke by those passionate accents, which desire, grief, & admiration usually form: he grows pale, lean, & he loseth his appetite, he cannot sleep, and if sometimes grief and weariness overtake him, his slumbers are continually interrupted by dreams, which do often more afflict his minde then the true  
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ills which he suffers. When the beloved person presents herself to his eyes, when she is but named, or when any thing awakens his remembrance of her, at the same instant his heart riseth, and is agitated, his pulse becomes unequal and irregular, and he grows so unquiet that he cannot stay in one place, sometimes chills seizes him, sometimes heat fires all his blood, sometimes he feels himself animated with an extraordinary force and courage, sometimes he is cast down and languisheth, and even sometimes he faints; lastly he feels himself stricken with a sickness which laughs at the Physicians skill and which findes no remedy but in death or in love it self. But let's no farther, let us finish this discourse with the artifice of the Painter as it begun, let's hide what we cannot describe, & be content to enquire the causes of those effects which we have now observed in the essence and Nature of this Passion.



## PART. 2.

*Of the Nature of LOVE.*

**O**Ne of the greatest wonders in Love is, that this Passion being so general and so common, and wherewith we may say all knowing men have been touched, there hitherto hath none been found who hath clearly discovered its nature and origine; for after having seen all what hath been written thereof, we may affirm that the love of Philosophers was as well blind as that of Poets: and that he who said it was I know not what, which came I know not whence, and went away I know not how, made not one of the worst encounters: Now although I will not examine all the definitions which are given it; the bounds which I have prescribed being too narrow to permit so long a discourse; yet there are some which are esteem'd the most reasonable, whose defects I must observe

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that I may well establish that which I mean to propose; and you may wonder that I approve not that of *Socrates*, who was more knowing in Love then all the Philosophers in Antiquity; nor that of *S. Thomas* who understood Morality better then any man after him; So that I am oblig'd to tell you the reasons which make me dissent from their opinions, And which make me steer another course then they have done.

For the first, who defin'd Love to be a *desire of Beauty*, he confounds two Passions in one, nay even he destroys them both, since desire moves only towards those things which we have not, and is quenched when we possess them: although Love continue in its possession, and even sometimes therein renders it self more violent; and then if love be a desire it would be no more Love, since we cannot desire what we enjoy; and by the same reason desire would no longer be desire. I know well you will say, that there is no possession so entire and full where desire may not finde its place, and were it but the continuation of the good we enjoy, 'twere sufficient to employ it, and to render it inseparable from Love:

but this escape is unprofitable ; for if the possession be not entire, it supposeth a part which yet we have not enjoyed ; and who wisheth the continuation of a good, considers it not as present but as a thing to come ; and therefore he forms a new Idea of the good he possesseth, and hath a different motive from that which its presence gives, and this is enough to cause two several passions ; otherwise we should confound Love with Hope, and even with all the other motions of the soul, which are often found by one only object according as we consider it several ways.

For *S. Thomas*, who says that Love is a *complacency of the appetite in the thing which is lovely* ; either he takes the word complacency for the sutableness which the appetite finds in the object which the imagination proposeth ; or else for the pleasure and the joy which the object yeelds it ; if it be that sutableness, it is formed before Love ; if it be the pleasure, it follows it : For its certain that when the imagination or the understanding have judged a thing to be good, the first thing the appetite doth, is to agree & consent to the judgment which they made of it ; and although  
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this more clearly appears in the will then in the sensitive appetite ; because the will is free to consent or refuse what is proposed to it , and that consent seems to be an act particular to it ; yet there is in the appetite a certain image of that action, and its likely it approves what the imagination presents before it carries or moves it self towards it ; and this approbation and agreement is the complacency of which we speak ; which is nothing else but the satisfaction and the quiet the appetite takes at sight of the objects which are conformable to it. So light rejoyceth the eyes even before it move the appetite ; and the pleasure they receive in this encounter, is not a Passion nor a Motion, but a certain calm which comes from the conformity of the object with that power : The same happens to the appetite ; when the imagination proposeth any thing that is lovely, it afterwards likes and moves to possess it ; so that this agreement precedes Love, and Joy follows it, as you shall perceive by the sequel.

To form then a definition of Love without these difficulties and defects, we are first to suppose the difference betwixt that Love which is a habit, and that which

## The Characters of Love.

is a Passion ; for being a Motion, when that Motion ceaseth, the Passion also is at an end, and we may say, that there is no more Love ; but the habit forbears not to be there still, which is nothing else but the impression of the beloved object which remains in the Mind, and which causeth that at all times when the thought proposeth it to the appetite, it moves and forms the passion of which we speak ; the Passion of Love is then a Motion, and because Motions draw their differences from the end whereto they tend, we are to observe what its end is. Now as the appetite stirs not but to possess good and fly from ill, we cannot doubt but the possession of good is the end of Love ; but as we cannot possess a thing without in some manner uniting ourselves therunto ; it necessarily follows that Love is *a Motion of the appetite by which the Minde unites it self to that which seems good unto it.*

Its true that at first this will not seem true, because that most commonly in Love the beloved object is absent, with whom it is not likely the soul should unite it self ; but if you consider that objects may be united to the powers by their  
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species and by their images, or by their true beings; and that consequently there is a real union, and another that is not, which the schools call intentional, and which we may name Ideal; you may observe that the union which the appetite makes with the object which the imagination proposeth, is of the latter rank; because the true being of things enters not into the imagination, its their Idea and their image only; and this union is that alone which naturally belongs to the appetite, for that it can no otherwise for its part unite it self to the good which is presented unto it; if it move towards any other union 'tis not for it self that it seeks it, but for other powers which may really unite themselves to their objects: for the the appetite is a politick faculty which works not only for it self, but for all others which are beneath it: and as the imagination is the Center of all the senses, the appetite is it also of all the inclinations which are in the parts; so that the imagination or the understanding proposing to it what is fit, it seeks it for them, and endeavors to procure them the enjoyment thereof; and then if they are capable really to unite themselves with their objects,

jects, it covets their union ; but this hinders not but that it unites it self before with them by a union proper to it, and which is as the principle and spring of all other unions belonging to the soul.

Perhaps you will say that the understanding and the imagination in the same manner unite themselves to what is fit for them, and that therefore Love may be aswel formed there as in the appetite; but the difference is great, because that the objects come and go in the understanding and in the imagination; and the knowledge they have of them is rather gained by rest then by motion, as *Aristotle* says, quite contrary to the appetite which moves it self towards its object and goes out as it were of it self to unite it self thereto; so that the union which is made in the understanding and in the imagination, is purely passive without any motion of its faculties: but that of the appetite is active and performed with agitation, considering also that the union made by the appetite is more perfect then that which is made by knowledge; for as much as the minde may have an aversion from some thing

thing which it hath conceived, which is a kind of separation, and therefore the union thereof is not so perfect as that of the appetite, which cannot endure this division, and which consequently is the most accomplished which can be found in the actions of life.

But if Love be a motion of the Soul to unite it self to what is lovely, it seems as if when it is united thereunto, there then should be no more motion, and consequently no more Love; and as this union may be made in a moment, for that there is nothing can hinder it, it seems as if this motion also were made in an instant; and that therefore Love should not last any longer, which would be a very strange proposition and contrary to the truth.

To answer this objection, you must observe, that there are things which move themselves to attain to some end separate from their motion; and that there are others which finde in the motion it self the end they seek; the first cease to move when they have attain'd their end; But those who have no other end but motion, or at least none that is separated from their motion, never pretend to rest; and as rest is a perfection in those, so 'tis an imperfection



perfection in these ; now the appetite is of this latter kinde, which truly moves to unite it self to what is good, but the union it seeks cannot be effected but in motion, and when that ceaseth it vanisheth ; so that whilest the beloved object is present it must incessantly agitate it self to obtain the end it desires, which is to unite it self thereunto ; and if it chance to rest, it proceeds from that the object is no longer present with it, or at least that it is no more offered unto it as good ; Love then is a motion and a union of the appetite to what is lovely whether absent or present ; because its absence hinders not the imagination from proposing the Idea thereof to the appetite, which is the only one with which it naturally can unite ; its true that working for other powers (as we have said) it stops not at this simple union ; it seeks what is fit also for them ; it desires for the seeing and hearing that their objects may be at a reasonable distance ; for touching and tasting, that theirs may be immediatly united to their organs ; In fine as many ways as things can be united, the appetite and the will with a fit union for them ; and you must confess that the concourse of all those motions makes  
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the Passion of Love compleat and entire, and the first of which we have spoken, although it contains all its essence and its form, yet hath it not all its extent; we may say it is the source, and that the others are the brooks which encrease it.

Lets now see what this particular agitation is, which the appetite causeth to make this union; and in what it is different from that which is to be found in Joy, in Desire, and in Hope, by which as well as by love, it seems that the soul would unite itself to the good which is presented to it. For tis not sufficient for the perfect knowledge of the Passions to say that they are motions, unless you observe the differences of these motions, and unless you make known the different impressions; and the divers progress which the diversity of these objects cause in the appetite.

You must then suppose there is some relation between the motions of the Soul and those of the body, and that the differences which are found in these in some manner happen in the others. For since the effects are like their causes, the motions of the body which are the effects of the Soul, ought to be the images of that agitation

agitation which it gives it self. In effect they say that the understanding moves directly towards its object, that it reflects and redoubles it self on it, that it reenters it self, that it wanders and confounds it self; which are all phrases drawn from sensible motions and which ought to make us beleieve that somewhat like it is done in the soul, and chiefly in its appetitive part, because it is by it that in effect it moves and agitates it self; neither is it to any purpose to say that they are not true motions, but that they only are Metaphorical; for besides that you must confess that all definitions of the Passions where the word *Motion* is always used, are Metaphorical; its nevertheless certain that there may be a resemblance between both although they are of several kinds: But I shall say farther, that to consider exactly the corporal motions, we may say they are not such perfect and true motions as those of the soul, and that they are but gross and imperfect images of them; since its true that in the order of things, those which are inferiours are more noble and more perfectly in the superiors, and that all of them are but copyes drawn the one from the other, whose  
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original is in the Sovereign Idea of all beings.

How ever it be, since that in defining Passion in general the word *Motion* is used, we must necessarily observe the differences of the Passions, and therein employ the differences of Motion, and finde in every of them some particular agitation, which hath an agreement and relation to some of the sensible Motions.

To discover then that which is most fit for Love, we must first know where the image of good is; and whether it dwels in the imagination, or whether it insinuates it self into the appetite; it being certain that if the appetite go abroad to seek it, it ought to agitate it self in another manner then if it comes home to it; its true it is not easie to be decided, and take which side you will, you will finde inconveniences which seem inevitable: For, if the image of good issues not out of the imagination, the appetite which is a blind power can never know it; and therefore ought not to move to unite it self to it not knowing it to be there: To say also that it comes forth of the imagination and slides into the appetite, it will be useless

less there by the same reason, since it only serves to represent things and give notice of them, which the appetite is not capable of; besides its hard to conceive how this image can run from the imagination into another power, because besides that the accidents cannot pass from one subject to another, its the term and formal effect of an immanent action, which hath this property never to go out of that faculty wherein it was produced.

To avoid these entanglings, and that we may no farther engage our selves in the doubts of the schools, we must say that the image which is in the imagination, in effect goes not out of it for the reasons we have discoursed; but as in the presence of luminous bodies, light is shed through the air which environs them; so when this image is formed in the imagination, it multiplies in all the parts of the Soul, it enlightens them and excites after them those which are capable to be moved; Its even very likely that 'tis in effect a refined and purified light, since the images of corporal things which strike our eyes are nothing else but lights as we have shewn in its place; and that there is nothing more conformable to the mind  
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then this quality which is as the middle, or horizon of spiritual and corporal things; however it be, we ought not to doubt but these images are as well multiplied as those of the body, since they are more excellent, and that we have assured proofs of them in the effects of the memory and the forming faculty, which ought necessarily to be imbued with these images, to form parts conformable to the designe which the imagination often proposeth contrary to its ordinary conduct.

But if it be true that these Ideas are only fit to represent things, and give you the knowledge of them, how can they be useful to those faculties which know nothing, as those are of which we have spoken? We must answer that there are two kinds of knowledge, the one clear and distinct which belongs to the senses, to the imagination, and to the understanding: the other obscure and confused, which is in the appetite and in all the other powers, which have a natural knowledge of their objects, and of what they are to do.

Its then true, that the image of good is in the imagination, as a light which sheds  
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its rays into the appetite, which inlightens, and afterwards excites it to move to unite it self thereunto: For although it be multiplyed, and that the appetite be full of the splendor it casts, it contents not it self with this influence; it seeks to unite it self at the Center, and at the spring whence it comes; as we may see it happens to iron, which having received the magnetick vertue moves towards the Loadstone, which is the principle and source thereof, that it may the more strictly unite it self thereunto.

So that its very likely, that to form the Passion of Love, the appetite carries it self strait towards the Idea of good which is in the imagination, and that this motion is like to that of all other natural things, which move thus toward what is conformable to them.

But this breeds great difficulties; for though you may conceive this kinde of motion in the sensitive appetite, by reason that it is placed in an organ different from that of the imagination, and that there is a space between both, where we may fancy that this motion is made; this cannot take place in Love which is formed in the superior part of the Soul, where  
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the will is not separate from the understanding, and towards which consequently it moves not it self, since it's always naturally united to it; moreover I say, were the sensitive appetite only in question, it's hard to comprehend how it could move thus; for there is no likelihood that it should go out of its place and from its organ to joyn with that of the imagination, since all its motions are immanent actions; if likewise it doe not go out, how should it unite it self to this Idea which is in the imagination?

To resolve these difficulties, and answer these seeming urgent reasons, we are to remember that the motions of the Soul, although they have conformity with those of the body; yet are they not altogether like them, and if they participate somewhat of their nature, yet have they none of their defects. For they require not that succession of time, nor that change of place which is alwayes found in those, and which are necessary followers of the imperfections of the matter: they are made in one moment and in one place, at least they do not goe out of that power where they are formed: for you must not think that the appetite in draw-

ing toward good or from evil quits its natural bounds, and that it passeth from one place to another like animated bodies. All these agitations are made in it self; and as water which is shut up in a gulf may move in several manners without issuing out; so this power which is as an abyfle in the soul, may be several ways agitated within its own bounds, and by the different transport of its parts sometimes dash against its bounds, sometimes retire towards its Center; in a word make all the motions which are to be observed in the Passions. It is not then necessary that the will be separate from the understanding, and that there be a space betwixt the two, to cause the motion of which we speak agitating it self in it self, and driving its parts towards the Idea of good which is represented it by the understanding; it unites it self to it as much as it can, and so causeth the Passion of Love; it is just so with the sensitive appetite; for although its principal organ be far from that of the imagination, we must not beleieve that these two faculties are quite shut up in these parts, they disperse themselves through the whole body and are alwayes joyned together, as we will more  
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at large shew in the discourse of Joy. So that the motion which is there made is like that of the will; and in the one and the other, Love is but a motion of the appetite, which directly carries it self towards the Idea of good and unites it thereunto, which is not effected in the rest of the Passions: as we will make it appear.

You have now seen what Love is in general, whence its easie to observe its differences, by the differences of those objects which may move it: for as there are goods of the minde, of the body, and of fortune, and as every of them is honest, useful or delightful: its certain that although the motions whereby we Love all these things are of the same nature, and that in general they have the same end, which is to unite the appetite to what is good; yet are they different between themselves, because these goods are different; so there is a Love of Riches, Pleasures, Honours, and Vertues; in a word, as many as there are kinds of false or true goods, so many sorts of Love there are, of which we have here no intention to speak, because the greatest part of those kinds are comprehended in the virtues  
and



and the vices of which we shall treat hereafter; And because we have restrained our selves to that Love which beauty breeds in the appetite.

This Love may be defined *a Motion of the appetite, by which the soul unites it self to what seems fair unto it*: So that all the diversity that there is betwixt this definition, and that of Love in general, consists in beauty; wherefore we have two things to examine. First what beauty is; in the second place, why it causeth Love; but because this search is extreamly high and difficult, and that it may break the connexion of this discourse, we have remitted it to the end of this Chapter, to speak of the effects which Love causeth in the humors and in the spirits.



## PART. 3.

*What that Motion is which Love  
causeth in the Spirits and in  
the Humors.*

**S**INCE that the motions of the spirits and of the blood are in the Passions conformable with those which the Soul feels in it self : There is no doubt but that Love uniting the appetite to the Idea of the good which is represented to it, produceth also in the spirits a certain motion which seconds its design, and renders this union the more forcible : but as the senses serves us but little to know the difference of these motions, the understanding must supply their defect, and must by discourse shew us what this motion of the spirits is which is the most uniting, since 'tis that which ought to accompany this Passion, to which end you must suppose two things to be most true : The first that the Heart is the chief organ of

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the sensitive appetite ; The second that the Brain is that of the imagination: now as the Idea of good is formed in the imagination, and the motion of the spirits begins at the Heart, the soul must of necessity having a design to unite them to the good it hath conceived, transport them from the place where they begin to move, towards that where they are to meet this object: And because this first birth of Love is from the inward union of the appetite whereof we have spoken; the first motion which the spirits also must drive them to the brain, where it seems this union ought to be ; for the Idea goes not out of the Faculty which produceth it, as hath been shewen; and forasmuch as the spirits carry with them heat and blood, from thence it comes that the imagination of Lovers is heated, and afterwards brings forth so many fair productions, and sometimes too extravagancies, if the motion and heat be too violent ; we may say besides that the paleness which is so common to them, partly comes from the transport of the spirits which are within the brain, which forsaking the face, leave it without heat or splendor: but if the beloved object be presented

presented to the senses, then do the greatest part of these spirits run to the outward parts colouring them with the blood they draw along with them, and which is the purest of the veins as we will shew you anon. Its true there are Passions which mingle with this, and often cause a contrary motion (to that whereof we have spoken) in the humors: But we shall consider here only the effects proper to Love, and not those he borrows from others; so that we may conclude, that the first effect of Love upon the spirits, is, to send them out of the heart, and to transport them to the brain and to the exterior parts.

But this is not enough, we ought to observe, whether in this motion they move either with liberty or with constraint; that's to say, whether they dilate or restrain themselves. For these seem to be the two first differences of local motion: now as there are but two encounters which may oblige the soul to restrain the spirits in their Motion; to wit when either she repels or flies from what's ill; because in the one she hath a care of fortifying her self, and to that end to gather and reunite the spirits; and in the other  
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the flight is not made without a compression which precipitates and confounds them together ; its evident that there are none of these motions in this Passion, which considering nothing but the goodness of its object, it sees no enemy which it would assault, or that it ought to fear ; so that it agitates the spirits with liberty, it dilates them and seems to open them, the better to receive the pretended good, and so the more perfectly to unite it thereunto.

Let's go on and see whether this motion be unequal, and whether it be made with that vehemency which happens in impetuous Passions. Its certain that anger moves the spirits and the humors with more confusion and disorder then Love, by reason of divers and often endeavours which the minde is forced to make to drive out the ill ; and that it is like those Torrents whose waves precipitate themselves one upon the other, and make a stream full of boylings and foamings ; but that Love makes the spirits and the blood slide in the veins, in the same manner as water runs in the Channels of Fountains, or in Rivers, whose beds are large and even ; for Love which dilates  
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the spirits, proportionably enlargeth the vessels, and so giveth them the more liberty, it renders their course less turbulent and confused. But the chief reason of this equality, is, because Love hath commonly no other Passions following it, which have contrary motions, as anger which is always accompanied with grief, and which retires the spirits towards the heart, at the same time when it drives them forth.

For although Joy, Desire, and Hope, which are almost always with Love, diversly move the blood, yet they doe not imprint motions quite opposite, as we shall make it appear; so that it is not subject to that tumult, nor to that unequal agitation which the contrarities cause in fluid bodies; but with what violence soever it be driven, all its parts flow equally and without confusion; and there is no doubt but that secret joy which Lovers feel without thinking even of the beloved object, proceeds from some kinde of motion whose impression remains in the humors after the cessation of the minds agitation. For as Nature loves order and equality in all her actions, when she sees the motion of the blood conformable to her

her inclination, she is sensible of a certain joy whose image or shadow presents it self to our minds, and disposeth us to mirth without knowing the cause; and I beleeve for the same reason, that if the humors were always agitated with this flux, and reflux, which the opposite Passions use to cause, there would not be a moment in Love exempt from grief and perplexity; and that those excesses of joy would never be felt, which so often happen, because that the soul cannot suffer contrary motions, but that she must at the same time suffer some pain, and some kinde of grief. But what shall we say then when these turbulent Passions, as Anger, Fear, and Despair, mingle with Love? ought it to give them place when they enter the minde and dye when they spring forth, seeing its motion is contrary to theirs? truly I beleeve, that the habit of Love remains still, but the Passion ceaseth when another destroys its motion, and principally if it be violent; and indeed a man in anger or possessed with fear thinks not on the beloved object, and at the least the thoughts he hath of it, are stifled by those of revenge or of the danger he would shun. Its true that as these  
Passions

Passions enter instantly into the minde, they commonly go out as readily, when at the same time the first returns, the impression of the beloved object furnishing new Idea's which awaken the appetite, and cause therein a new commotion, which is nothing difficult to beleieve, if we consider that the appetite and the spirits are agitated more easily then the air, And that their motion is in some manner like that of lightning, which pierceth the clouds in an instant, which followes flash after flash, and leaves no trace of the way they made : And if these Passions are weak, they may be well enough compatible with Love, but they diminish its ardor; because the soul dividing it self to several objects, cannot wholly give it self to what is lovely, and because the agitation which this causeth in the humors is hindred, by the flood of those others which oppose its course.

Now let's see what this vehemency is, which accompanies this motion of the spirits, and whether it be as great in this Passion as it is in anger, in fear, and in the rest. For its certain there are some which naturally are not so violent, as Hope, and Compassion, where there  
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never is those extreme transports which are to be observed in the rest. Now you must not think that Love is as the two latter, and that it hath the moderation they have; the sallies it makes, and the tempests it raiseth are sometimes so great that it wracks the minde; and the alteration which all the body suffers in those encounters is an evident witness that the humors are moved with a great impetuosity; the beginnings truly are sweet, and we may say they are like to those peaceable winds which a weak heat raiseth, and which afterwards change into whirlwindes when it grows stronger; for as at the birth of this Passion the Idea of the beloved object makes no great impression in the minde, being if we may so speak, but lightly and superficially printed, so it also causeth in the appetite but a light emotion; but when it hath insinuated it self into the bottom of the minde, and hath rendered it self master of the imagination, then it puissantly raiseth all the moving faculties, and causeth those great storms which often make us lose both our reason and our health.

Yet will I not say when the soul is come to this excess, but that the appetite  
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and the spirits are continually agitated with this violence ; I confess the tempest is not always alike, that it often abates and even dissipates it self ; whether it be that the divers designs this Passion inspires, divert the Soul from its first and principal thoughts, or that all things which are in nature cannot always last in one violent estate, and that the minde is weary to be long stretched towards one object ; whence it happens that the strongest Passions at last become languishing and quiet themselves ; and indeed those great transports of which we speak, are never but when the beloved object presents it self to the imagination with some powerful charmes, as it happens in the first thoughts it hath of it, or when unawares it presents it self to the sence, or when the minde figures new perfections in it, and forms new designs to compass the possession thereof ; for then the Soul being surpris'd with this lovely Novelty is shaken all at once, and drives the Spirits like a great billow which ought to transport it to its offer'd good.

But what if Love moves the spirits thus, it must needs produce the same effects as joy doth ; and that its violence must  
quench



quench the heat of the entrails and cause fainting and synopes as this doth ; it seems that even necessarily these accidents must be in it, since these two passions have the same object, that they are but little separate and that they have a growth alike ; for where Love is, extreme joy ought also to be so : and yet none of those symptoms whereof we have spoken have been observed to be in Love : at least if any such like thing hath happened to Lovers, the excess of those two Passions never was the cause, but it must have been Grief, Despair, and the like ; how comes it to pass then that the Love of beauty produceth not the same effects as Joy doth, or that Joy causeth not the same accidents in this Passion, which it often causeth alone ?

To discover this secret, you must first suppose that these disorders seldom happen, that they have been observable only in old men and women ; and that the joy which moved them was caused either by the gain of some unhoped for victory, or by the encounter of some very ridiculous object, or by the discovery of some great secret in learning, which are joyes which only belong to the minde : In effect, as  
Spiritual

spiritual things have that beyond corporal, that they are more noble and that they enter into the soul wholly without separating themselves ; the possession ought also to be more perfect and the joy the more ravishing : so that it is likely, that the syncopes which are the effects of all violent Passions follow those spiritual joyes as the greatest and most powerful ; and that they rather happen to weak natures, then to those which are stronger and more capable of resistance : the soul then finding herself surpris'd at first sight with these objects, and agitating with precipitation to unite her self to them ; the spirits which follow those motions issue from the heart, and dart themselves with so much violence to the superior parts, that they lose the union they had with their principle in the same manner as water divides it self; being driven with too much impetuosity ; and because the heat ought continually to inspire the parts with its vertue ; and that the spirits only can communicate it when they come to disunite themselves from it ; these influences must then stop, and the sensitive and vital actions which depend upon them, must also cease till their reunion ;

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And because the soul is then quite ravished in the injoyment of that good which she esteems so excellent, she cannot minde to remedy that interruption which is made in the spirits, nor to bring back those which are scattered, or to send others to fill those empty places they left. So that these faintings often last long, and sometimes cause death; heat being quite perished, and nature not having strength enough to repair its loss, nor to recover its first estate.

But this disorder cannot happen in the Love whereof we speak; for that corporal beauty is never wholly possesst, and that there is still somewhat which entertaines Desire, Hope, and Fear: So that the soul dividing it self to several designs, and suffering it self not to be so powerfully transported as she doth in the enjoyment of spiritual goods, the spirits throw themselves not with so much precipitation nor impetuosity, and are not so subject to the division which they sometimes suffer in Joy; and which is the cause of those syncopees of which we have spoken. We shall touch upon this matter again in other places; let's now consider what heat it is which this Passion raiseth, and what humors

hums it particularly moves: Its certain that Love, Joy, and Desire, disperse through all the body a moist and pleasing heat, for as much as the spirits in those Passions stir the most temperate humors whose vapors are sweet and humid; but these humors are sooner mov'd then others; because that the spirits which have a great likeness with the purest and most subtil parts of the blood, as being those whence they draw their origine, ought to mingle and unite with them more easily then with those which are grosser and farther from its nature; & therefore we must not doubt but when they are agitated they first of al draw along with them those parts of the blood whereto they are more strongly tyed, & which being the most subtil, are also the more easie to be moved: Besides that the soul to whom the humors serve as instruments to arrive at the end she proposeth, employs both the one & the other according as they have qualities fit to execute what she wills; whence it is that amongst venemous beasts it moves the venome in anger, and in all the rest it moves flegme and melancholy, because they are the malignant humors which may destroy the ill she assaults: so that

there being no enemies to combat in the Passion of which we speak, it ought not to move any other humors but those which are conformable to the good she would enjoy; So that there is only the sweetest and purest blood which commonly moves in Love, and causeth that sweet and vaporous heat which disperseth it self through the whole body.

PART.





## PART. 4.

*What the causes are of the Characters of Love.*

**B**Ut its time to come to the point we propos'd; from these principles we have established, we must draw the causes of the Characters of this Passion; let's first therefore examine moral actions.

There being no Passion which produceth so many different actions, or causeth so many extravagancies as this, it would prove a troublesome thing to enquire into them all, and besides unprofitable, since the greatest part of them proceed from other Passions which accompany it, of which we are particularly to speak; for which cause we will only touch here the principal; which in my opinion are, *The continual thought a Lover hath of the beloved Object, The high esteem he values it at, The*

## The Characters of Love.

*means he imployes to possesse it, And the extravagancy of the words he makes use of to discover his passion: For there are few actions in Love which may not be reduced to some of these four.*

For the first, although it be a thing common to all the Passions powerfully to possesse the minde, and to keep it fix'd on the object which entertains them; yet there are none who do it more powerfully or longer then Love. For either they are impetuous or turbulent, or else they are pliable and docile; the first are presently dissipated, and the others are to be appeased or diverted by the power of discourse, nay even by other Passions. So the angry ones sweeten themselves by pleasure, and the delightful diminish by affliction; and all of them may change into others more strong, if more powerful objects then those which have raised them present themselves; for a great grief makes us forget a less, and an excess of joy takes away a mean one: But with Love it is nothing so; it hath the propriety to be vehement and long lasting, not to hearken to reason, and can seldom be changed or diminished by the force of what Passion soever; for  
as much

asmuch as the imagination is so wounded, that it fancies there is no greater good to be possess'd, and which can afford it more contentment than its beloved object; so that there is no other, how excellent so ever it be, that can divert its inclination and draw it to it, because the soul never leaves a greater good to seek a less; 'tis in the same manner with displeasure; for if we are beloved, there is no pain nor grief which vanisheth not by the contentment which we receive thereby; and if we are not, as the soul knows no greater ill than that, all others are too weak to dispossess that thought, for which cause it continually considers the good whereof its deprived, it incessantly desires it, and seeks in the possession thereof the only remedy which may cure all its displeasures. But the first origine of all its effects is the powerful impression which beauty makes in the minde; so that in making it appear how the objects of other Passions cannot make it so strong and deep, it will also be manifest why its of a longer continuance, and why it keeps the minde more intent than any of the rest.

Its a certain truth that there is a secret knowledge in us of those things which  
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serve for our preservation; and its likely that this knowledge is gotten by means of some Idea's which nature hath imprinted in the bottom of the Soul, which being as it were hid and buried in its abysses, excite and stir up themselves at the coming of those which the senses present, and so beget in the appetite Love, or Hate, Desire or Aversion. Now as there are but two things which serve to preserve us, the seeking of good, and the flying from evil; its evident nature inclines rather to seek good then to shun ill; and as there are also goods, which are more excellent & profitable then others, she hath a greater care of those of higher, then of these of a lower value; & she forms a more exact Idea, and makes a stronger and more profound impression of them; which being granted, you cannot doubt the preservation of the species being a more general and more excellent good then all others which respect only a particular good, but that it hath oblig'd nature to give the soul a more efficacious knowledge, & a more ardent desire of that then of any other thing whatsoever; and but that consequently she hath powerfully imprinted the Idea of beauty, since its the  
marke

mark which makes that good known, and that charme which excites the soul to its possession : so that exterior beauty entering the imagination, and meeting that general Idea which nature hath graven therein, unites it self, therewith awakens and excites that secret and powerful desire which accompanies it, and applies it to the object it represents unto it ; thence is that strong attention which fixeth a Lovers minde on the person of the beloved, and which causeth in him after the Love of silence and solitude the disgust of all other divertisements which were most delightful to him, and all those visions which a solitary life inspires in a soul agitated with Hope and Fear ; in a word, wounded by the cruellest of all the Passions.

We are now to enquire the source of that high esteem which we make of the beloved object, for from thence issue all the respects, the submissions, the services, and the greatest part of the dialect which Lovers use : and truly its a strange thing and almost incredible, were it not dayly observed, to see Kings submit their crowns and their power to the beauty of a slave ; the wisest men to adore a vitious person, and



and the most courageous to subject themselves to base and feeble mindes worthy of nothing but contempt ; whence can that powerful spell proceed which makes us lose the knowledge of what we are, and of what we love, and makes us have so ill an opinion of our selves, and so advantageous a thought of what we love? we need not doubt but the imagination is the chief cause of this error : As it hath the power to enlarge the images it receives, and to cloath them in the new fantasmies which disguise the things and make them appear quite otherwise then they are ; it sets on the image of that beauty which is represented unto it, what it useth to do in dreams, or on a light Idea which it hath from the humor which is agitated, it forms a hundred several *Chimeras*, which have a conformity with that humor ; for the imagination receiving the image of the beloved object, forms it self on the model of that general Idea of beauty which nature hath imprinted in it, adorning it with the same graces she confounds it therewith, and so makes the beloved person appear more perfect then in effect it is ; and we may further say, that herein it happens as in the sickness of  
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the minde, where the particular error which disorders it changeth and corrupts all the thoughts which have any relation to it, those who are at distance from it remaining still enough reasonable; forasmuch as a Lover may preserve his judgement free in those things which do not concern the person beloved; but as soon as that is interested he becomes a slave to his passion, and judgeth of things according to that pleasing error which it hath inspired into him; in effect, its a wonder that a deformed face, and which we should have judged such, should presently appear full of attractives, as if the imagination had painted it, or at least had blotted out all its defects: But the paint or the perfection it gives comes from that Idea wherewith its filled, and which nature hath afforded to oblige it to enquire the greatest good which can happen to it.

However it be, the soul being abused in the judgement it made of beauty, and taking it for a most excellent good, whose possession ought to render it more perfect, wholly submits to it, and considers it no otherwise then as a Queen who is to command it. For good hath that property  
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that it communicates it self with Empire, and renders it self master of those that receive it; forasmuch as it is a perfection which is in stead of act and form, as the thing which receives it is in stead of power and matter. Now its a certain maxime that the form renders it self master of the matter, otherwise it could not receive perfection.

And consequently beauty must have that predominant quality that the soul which is touched with it must subject herself to its Empire; thence followes all those submissions and respects, all those termes of servitude and of captivity which are so common with Lovers; whence its easie to draw the reasons of the principle we have established; let's now examine the means Love hath invented to possess the good it tends to.

Although Love may subsist in the only union which the appetite makes with the Idea of the beloved object; we may further say, that this union and this Love are not perfect; Love staves not there, but always seeks really to unite it self, but by the communication of thoughts, and by the actual presence which the senses require,

quire, the soul in a manner going out of her self by speech, and the senses serving for channels by which the objects flow into the imagination; so that the soul beleeves that by means of discourse she strongly unites her self to the beloved person, and that it unites it self to the soul by means of the senses: Whence it comes that Lovers wish they may continually see, hear, and entertain those they love; even the kiss wherein they place their highest felicities, hath no other end but to unite their soul to the beloved object.

So that only those parts by which it seems most to communicate it self, give and receive it, as the mouth because its the door of the thoughts, the eyes because they are the channels through which the Passions issue out, and the hands because they are the principal organs of its actions: But amongst all the means which nature hath taught us to attain to this perfect union, there is none more considerable then reciprocal Love; because union supposing two things, the Lover, and the Object, to render it accomplished, both the one and the other must really unite. Now if the beloved  
object

object is capable of loving, it can no otherways unite it self but by Love, forasmuch as the soul unites it self with things which are without it, only by that Passion: wherefore the first care of a Lover, is to make himself beloved, and to that end to render himself grateful; whence it happens consequently that he accommodates himself to the inclinations of the person beloved, that he changeth his humor, his manner of living, that he growes liberal, courteous, neat, and in a word that he doth all what he thinks may make him be beloved.

We are now to enquire the cause of that extravagant manner of speaking which is so particular to Lovers: In general we may say, that the soul in that Passion carrying it self out of its self, carries also other things beyond what they are, and forms thoughts of them beyond the natural expression they should have; whence it is that the good and ill it conceives is alwayes in excess; and if the nature of the thing cannot suffer it, it burthens it with some strange Idea to encrease the meaning thereof, and so builds those bold Metaphors which give to the beloved object the title of the fairest and  
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the noblest things in the world, which of a gentle heat cause a burning fire, of a mean disquiet a torment and a punishment, of a little submission which beauty requires a captivity, prisons, and chains, and so of the rest; whereunto the error of the imagination contributes very much, which being wholly fill'd with that violent instinct which it hath from beauty, beleeves that there is no greater good, nor heavier ill then it expects from Love; so that it alwayes represents them in extremes, and consequently useth more extravagant termes then in any other Passion, considering also that Lovers who commonly employ in their entertainments but very few thoughts, and who are never weary to repeat them, are oblig'd to diversify the termes that they may be the less tedious; which they cannot do but by many Metaphors, which at last become extravagant, being to seek to finde out reasonable ones enough, for the variety they endeavor.

Besides these general reasons, there are yet particular ones for some words, which are always in the mouths of those that love; and when they call the beloved person *Their Heart, Their Soul, and Their Life,*

Life; when they call them *Ungrateful*, *Homicides*, and *Cruel*, and when they so often say, *They dye for Love*: for although all these kinds of expressions seem extravagant, yet they come from a principle which in some sort renders them true; forasmuch as Love keeping the Soul always stretched towards the beloved object, and transporting it out of it self to unite it thereto, separates it also morally from the subject it animates, and in effect takes away from it the remembrance and the cause of all that belongs to it: So that in that respect we may say, that it lives no more in him nor for him, being wholly in the beloved person; that a Lover hath reason to call her his *Heart*, and his *Soul*, since his desires and thoughts which are the noblest parts of *his life*, are alone in her, and that its true that *he dyes*, nay even that *he is dead*, since that he no longer lives in himself. Now as there is but reciprocal Love only which can make them live again; forasmuch as then the beloved person transforms herself in him, and communicates to him both soul and life; if he be unhappy to so high a degree that he cannot be loved, it seems that he hath cause to call her *Ungrateful*, *Cruel*,  
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and *Murtherefs*; since giving himself wholly to her alone, she is oblig'd to acknowledge so high a liberality, and in separating his soul from him she kills him; and it is a cruelty to let him dye whose life she may save. Its true, that to speak really, we may say that there is but a very light shadow of truth in all these words, that the soul operates here as in a dream, and that Platonick Philosophy which approv'd these visions kept intelligence with this Passion, or would console Lovers in the miseries they suffered; let's leave her employed on so fair a designe, and seek the causes of the corporal Characters which we have described.

But we will not here examine whence that great diversity comes which appears in this Passion, which makes it in some either sportful or pensive, in others peaceable or turbulent; & in a word, perhaps two persons have never been found, in whom it hath bin altogether alike; for its evident that it comes from the divers inclinations which the temperature or custome hath introduced into the soul, which draw the Passions to the bend they take, and makes them follow the same course which they are accustomed to; the mixture of other

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Passions

Passions also contribute thereunto, it being impossible that Love should be frolick when its accompanied with Grief or Anger, or that it should be severe when Hope or Joy are of the party : But all these diversities are easie to be comprehended ; let's now to our principal designe.

To follow the Method we have established, we are here to place two kinds of these Characters ; some of which are done for some certain end, others which happen by a pure necessity ; the first are made by the souls command, who judgeth them fit to execute her passion, although they are often unprofitable as we have said, the other are purely natural, and are made without design being only effects which by a necessary consequence come from the trouble and the agitation which is inwardly made.

Those of the first rank, are the motions of the eyes and forehead, the faulting of the tongue, the sweetning and several falls of the voice, laughter, and the behaviour of the body ; All the rest are purely natural ; as for the *Motion of the eyes* there are so many several kinds of it, that its almost impossible to observe them : For as

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all the Passions may spring from Love, and suffer also with it, and every of them causing the eyes to move diversly; It also happens that all their motions meet there: So that pleasure makes them sparkle; Desire advanceth them forward, Grief casts them down, Fear renders them unquiet, Respect inclines them, Despight kindles them, and so of the rest; whose causes we will deduce in the discourse of every Passion; all what we can herein do, is to enquire which are the *Amorous eyes and looks*, and what obligeth the Soul to use them by reason of the great difficulty there is both in the one and the other.

For the first, there are some who believe that amorous eyes are those whose looks are quick and nimble, and which in a moment are cast about on every side; forasmuch as *Aristotle* speaking of lascivious eyes which he calls *μαρυές*, some Translators have rendred *Insanos*, which are properly those wild eyes which are in perpetual motion; But besides that they have not met with the sence of *Aristotle*, and that he would have intimated those which he calls *Devorantes*, of which we are going to speak; its certain that those wild

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eyes



eyes do not become Love, and are more proper for Anger, Disquiet, and the Lightness of the minde then for this Passion; Others think them to be those whose balls lift up themselves up on high, and half hide themselves under their lids, which are the dying eyes, because those who die commonly have them so, as *Aristotle* has observed in his Problems, where he adds, that it also happens in some actions of Love: But at that time the soul hath no designe to cause that motion and 'tis purely a natural effect which followes the excess of pleasure, as we will say in its due place; for otherwise those kinde of looks are marks of Grief and Langour; we might even also say, that they are those urgent looks by which the eyes seem to throw themselves on their objects, and as if they would as they say devour them, which the Latins so happily name *Instantes*, *Procaces*, *Devorantes*, but we have already said that they were bred from desire, and not from Love.

For my part, I beleieve that the eyes in question, are those which the Latins call *Petos*, and which for the same reason they have given to *Venus*; for they are smiling, and send forth their looks as it were

were by stealth, the lids sweetly inclining and half shutting themselves. In effect, there are none which have so much correspondency with the nature of Love as these have; forasmuch as in one look they make known all the principal motions which are to be found in this Passion : for we have made it appear, that Love chiefly consisted in the interior union of the appetite with the beloved object; That pleasure always accompanied it, That Beauty inspired submission and respect; That to Love was nothing but to dye, and that if a Lover possess not the beloved person, Desire incessantly solicited him : Now the look whereof we have spoken makes all these motions appear; for laughter is an effect of joy; respect and submission inclines the lids; the ball which sweetly turns towards the beloved object is a signe of that amorous languor whereof the soul is sensible; and the looks it darts on it, witness the Desire which provokes it : In fine although the eyes half shut themselves, laughter contracting the muscles of the lids, yet we may say, that they shut themselves so, as if the soul would retain the image it newly received the more attentively to consider

it and even that it would quite shut them up, had it not a new one which every moment presented it self, and which it would not lose, but which obligeth it so to divide its cares, as it often doth, between Fear and Anger, where it seems as if at the same time it would see and not see the ill, which it either flees or disdains.

The *Forehead* in love is always clear and laughing, and seems as if it opened and extended it self, which is a mark of Flattery: so that the Dog, which is a flattering creature, hath his always so, when he caresteth any one, as *Aristotle* will have it. Now the word *Flattery* signifies nothing else here, but complacencie and dearness, and not that vice which is the pest of the Court, and of Friendship. You need not then wonder if Love, being complacent and flattering, disposeth thus the forehead. But the first cause of this effect, is the Joy which accompanieth all these Passions; whose property it is, to render the countenance open, calm, and smiling, as in its place we will declare.

Let us pass to another effect, the cause whereof is extremely hid; 't is the *Motion of the Tongue*, which often trembles between the lips, and seems even to tickle them.

them. Now this happens in a great excess of Love ; whether it be, that the ardor which this Passion kindles, dries the lips, and obligeth the Soul to moisten them ; or that the Spirits, which sparkle everywhere, cause the same agitation in that part, which appears in all the rest of those which are very moveable : or, lastly, whether it comes from the vehemency of the Desire : for the same effect often happens to those who see another eat what they ardently desire : And it seems also more befitting the appetite for meat, then any other desire whatsoever, as well as that humidity which comes in ones mouth, as shall be said ; because the motion of the tongue, and the humour in which it moistens it self, serves to taste the aliments, and to convey them into the stomach. But as the Soul hath no distinct knowledge of what it doth, and the violence of Passion troubles and distracts it, it also happens that it employs the means necessary for one designe, in another where they are useless ; and so doth in the desire of Beauty, what it ought onely to do in that of Aliments.

The *sweetning of the voice* signifies the respect and submission of a Lover : and

although it be a necessary effect of Fear, which, straitning the passages, and rendering the motion of the Lungs more loose, makes the voice soft, sweet, and languishing, even very often without any such necessity; the soul hath a designe to form it so, to witness its modestie and respect; knowing, that a strong and vehement voice is an effect of Boldness; and that that which is rude and sharp, follows a harsh humour; which are qualities incompatible with Love, and which a Lover must hide, if Nature or Custom have given him them.

As for what concerns all *the inflexions of the voice*, they proceed from the several motions which agitate the Soul; whether it be that admiration ravish it, or grief oppress it; whether desire transport it, or that some difficulties oppose its contentment: forasmuch as in all these encounters it burdens the voice with particular accents, sometimes raising it with exclamations; sometimes letting it fall with languishings; sometimes cutting it short, and sometimes drawing it out, according to the nature of the Passions it suffers.

Laughter, being an effect of Joy, is to be examined in that Passion, where we  
will



will at large speak of its nature, and of its causes. So that we have nothing but the *Gesture* and the *Behaviour* which seem to detain us. But, if you observe it, there is none particular to love; and that which is there observable, and is so changeable, follows the several Passions which accompany this: for, sometimes Respect renders him modest, Joy and Fear disquiet him, and Sorrow casts him down, and makes him languish; sometimes a Lover is in the posture of a suppliant, or a contented, or of a desperate man; sometimes he walks fast, slowe, or stands still, according as Desire, Astonishment or Grief possess him. So that all his motions going with the spring of other Passions, we are not here obliged to their examination; but we must remit it to the discourse we will make of every one in particular. Now let us to that of those Characters which are purely natural and necessary, and wherein it seems the Soul hath no share.

The eyes are *sparkling* in Love, by reason of the quantity of spirits which flie thither: for it is not to be doubted, but that from them it is, that that resplendent vivacity comes, which is so visible in them,  
since

since they lose it when they retire or disperse themselves ; as it happens to those who are possess'd with fear , or who die. But what addes to augment this lustre w<sup>ch</sup> appears in the eyes, 'tis, that the Membrane which invirons them, being swelled and extended by the confluence of those vapours and spirits , becomes more smoothe, and consequently more shining ; and that there is still over it a certain humidity , where light resplends and sparkles.

But whence proceeds this *Humidity* ? Is it not that the heat and agitation which the spirits cause in the brain, liquifies and makes the humours flow over the eyes ? for even Tears are so caused in Joy : Or rather, that those subtil vapours of blood, which the Soul drives with impetuosity, flie out , and presently thicken, by reason of the coldness of the air , and of the Membranes. And indeed, here the eyes are hollow and sunk , though they still seem great and humid ; which would not be , if this humidity came from the humours which fall from the brain ; for they would fill the parts which are all about the eye , and would keep it lifted up : And therefore this humidity must come from

from within, and the muscles and fleshie parts which inviron it must shrink : for as their substance is soft, and is made of a very subtil blood, it falls and dissolves presently ; whence it happens, that the eye sinks : but its body remains still full, moist, and sparkling, by reason of the vapours and spirits which incessantly gather there : Unless it be at last, when the long continuance of the Malady, Grief, and Despair, have quenched the natural heat, which makes the eyes lose their splendor and vivacity, and become obscure, dry, and set ; as we will shew in the Chapter of Grief, where we will also give a reason for Tears which are so common to Lovers.

The *redness* which love so often makes appear on the forehead, hath a cause to be discovered, of no small difficulty : For although it be easie to say, that the blood riseth into the face in all those Passions wherein the soul drives out the spirits, yet there are those which carry it rather to one place then to another : The redness which Choler excites, begins by the eyes ; that of Shame, by the extremities of the cheeks and ears ; and that of Love, by the forehead. And 'tis from this diversity

sity, that the cause of this effect is most difficult to be found out. Yet I think that we may say, for what concerns Anger, that the eyes being the first wherein the Passions appear, are also the first sensible of the motions of the Spirits. Now as the blood boils in Anger, and as the Tempest which agitates it drives it with disorder and confusion to the exterior parts, thence it comes that the spirits which run to the eyes draw along with it the waves of this agitated blood, which swells their veins, and makes them appear red, in stead that in other Passions they carry with them the purest and most subtil parts of the blood, which cannot cause this effect. And it is therefore true, that Anger causeth redness to arise in the face sooner then any other Passion, and that it begins to discover it in the eyes, because the blood follows the spirits, which gather in that place rather then in any other. As for Shame, you must know, that the Soul, which is moved therewith, at the same time forms a designe both to resist and flee the ill; and we may say, that, fleeing, she assaults it; for which cause, it forceth the blood to the face to drive it away; but Fear at the same time makes  
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it retire back ; whence it happens , that the extremities of the cheeks and ears grow red, as in its place shall be more amply discoursed. Let us now examine the redness which Love brings into the Forehead. Should it not proceed from Joy , wherein the spirits , after having united themselves to the good which the soul conceives , overflow the neighbouring parts ? For, if it be so, the forehead must first resent it. Or else the Imagination being placed in the fore-part of the brain, that part is heated by the continual agitation of the spirits , and, after its alteration, communicates it to the forehead, wherewith, as Physick teacheth, it hath a great sympathy. And indeed, since paleness which appears in the rest of the face, happens often from the transport of spirits into the brain, its very likely , either that there is a reflux made on the neerest parts, or that they are sensible of the heat which they there cause : whence it happens, that they are less pale and wan then the rest. Now although this redness be particular to Love, that of other Passions forbears not to encounter therewith ; and it may happen , that a Lover may blush for Shame, for Anger, for Joy, or Desire, according



according as those Passions mixe themselves with this; but this is no place to speake of them.

The *lips* are often red and moyst by the arrival of the vaporous blood which sheds it self in the face, and which so easily colours those parts, by reason of their softness and the delicacy of their skin; and this chiefly happens at the beginning of those motions which are so frequent in this passion; for at last those parts grow dry and pale, whether the heat consume the sweetest and most subtil parts of the blood, or that the spirits in their retreat carry them back again inwardly, and so leave paleness and driness on the lips.

But whence chanceth it that *the under lip* sometimes trembles; you must not beleeve it an effect of Fear or of Anger, since it happens in the highest heat of Love; its then very likely that the spirits which the Desire drives in a crowd, sparkle in those places, and cause that part which is very moveable, and without that support which the rest have, to shake, and 'tis in that encounter that it sometimes *grows white* with a subtil foam, the humidity which riseth in the mouth, and which sheds

sheds it self on the lips being agitated by these spirits.

The *tongue falters*, because that the soul which is distracted with Passion thinks not upon the words it is to form, and retires the spirits which should serve for that action to those places where she is employed ; whence it happens that the tongue stops or loosely moves it self, and that infirmity looseth the speech, or if we do speak, it is with pain and stammering, whereto the quantity of humors also contributes, which through Desire fill the mouth ; for it hinders that the tongue cannot so easily turn it self, and that it strikes not the voice clearly ; Besides the distraction we now speak of, is also a cause that Lovers hear not half what others say, and that their discourse is commonly confused & extravagant : Even the *sighs* wh<sup>ch</sup> every moment cut one another, owe their first original to that great attention of spirit which diverts the soul, and makes it lose the remembrance of the most necessary actions of life ; for sending not spirits enough to cause respiration, the lungs beat but slowly, and the heart draws not that help which is expected from their service ; forasmuch as they furnish

furnish not it sufficiently with air to temper that fire which this Passion kindles, and that they discharge it not often enough of those fumes and vapors which the agitation of the humors raiseth there: Now after this disorder hath continued some time, and that at last it might ruine all the natural ceonomy, the soul being urged by necessity awakes again, and seeks to supply its defect by these great and extraordinary respirations; and indeed sighs are principally begot at the issue out of some thought which hath forcibly detained the minde, and not whilst it was employed therein.

The *face grows pale*, whether it be that the spirits retire within the brain as we have already said, or because that in the progress of this Passion the stomach grows weak and the blood changeth; for since that the diversion of the spirits diverts also the heat & vertue which ought to pass into the stomach to cause digestion, you must not wonder if it become languishing, if the aliments change into crudities, and if the blood it makes be impure, since that the last concoction corrects not the defects of the former.

But what helps forward this disorder,  
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is the continual ardor which this Passion kindles in the blood, and the several agitations which Fear, Grief, and Anger, at every moment excite; for that dissipates the spirits and makes the faculties become languishing, and the humors enflame and corrupt themselves, which at last grows to that Erotick sickness which the Physicians place in the ranck of folly and fury. The blood being then in this condition retains no more nether its vertue nor its natural colour; It becomes useles to the nourishment of the parts and no longer communicates that pleasing vermilion which formerly it bestowed upon them, and so they must needs become pale, lean, and withered.

By the same reason the *appetite is lost*, because that the beloved object occupying all the thoughts of the Soul, takes away its care of all the functions of Life; the spirits being also diverted no longer bear into the stomach that sentiment which causeth the appetite: In fine, the disorder which is in the humors, and in all the natural parts, hinders this from performing its function.

*Sleep* being the rest of common sence, & of the spirits, seldom happens in violent  
H                      Passions,

Passions, detaining the Soul and the body in a continual agitation ; but Love endures it less then the rest, because that besides the tempest it raiseth, it at last corrupts the blood, whose vapours are sharp, and which consequently want that sweet humidity which lulleth the Senses.

Its true, that langour and weariness sometimes procure it, because the soul knows that life cannot subsist without it, and that after so great a dissipation of spirits its necessary to repair them, to which end it gathers them together and stays them ; For although this moist vapor which commonly provokes sleep happen not here, as we said but now, yet must we not beleeve that sleep can come by no other means ; it hath two ordinary and natural causes ; the vapor which stops the passage of the spirits, and the soul which binds and stays them ; now here being no vapor to produce this effect, necessity obligeth the soul to labour it alone of her self.

But this sleep is interrupted with *dreams* which continually agitate the minde ; forasmuch as the imagination which in that condition loseth not the liberty of working, and being full of those

images



images which Passion suggests, turns over continually, confounds and augments them, so that they always present to it things greater then in effect they are, and afterwards form in the appetite more powerful motions then the true objects would do.

The remembrance or the unexpected arrival of the beloved party swells the heart and the pulse, because the soul dilates the organs to receive the good, and to send forth spirits to its encounter; a great difficulty upon this occasion is proposed, to wit, whether *Love have a kind of pulse proper to it alone?* for that some have vaunted the discovery of this Passion by the beating of the arteries: But without stopping at the contests which are formed hereupon, we will boldly say that there is no more reason to give one which is proper to Anger, and to Grief, then to Love. That the heart can no less resent the motion which this Passion causeth in the appetite then it can that which the others excite, and that the organs moving conformably to the intention of the minde, this part must be otherwise agitated in Love then in other passions, since it hath a different designe from what the o-

thers have. Its true, its hard exactly to discover this difference, because men have made no just observation thereof, and perhaps it is impossible to make it; for that the heart is shut up in the Center of the Body, and that it suffers motions, which it communicates not with the arteries; yet amongst such kinds of pulses as have been observed, we may yet find some one which particularly belongs to Love. To understand this, you must know that the heart hath many motions which are common to several Passions; for it dilates it self in Joy, in Hope, and in Anger; and contracts it self in Grief, and in Fear, and in Despair; in some it goes quick and with violence, in others slow and languishing, and its certain these general differences cannot all alone mark those which are proper to every Passion; but as Physick teacheth us that there are twenty kinds of simple pulses, and that they may diversly mix the one with the other, every Passion may finde in this great variety, that kind which is proper to it: thus the pulse of Anger is not only great and lifted up, or quick, or frequent, or vehement, but it is composed of all these differences: That of Fear is quick,  
hard,

hard, unequal, and irregular; That of Joy is great, rare and slow; That of Grief is weak little flow and rare; and as they say, these are the kinds of pulses which are proper to these Passions, we may also observe in the same manner one proper to Love; and indeed therein the beating of the arteries is great, large, unequal, and irregular; it is great and large, because the heart opens to receive the good which presents it self as was before said; it is unequal and irregular, by reason of the several Passions with which this is continually traversed; for as we do not here speak of that simple and imperfect Love which is yet but in the soul; but of that which is compleat and finished and which hath already made impressions on the body; it is impossible but Desire, and Fear, Joy, and Grief, should at every moment confound themselves with it, whence consequently happens the unequal motion of the heart and of the arteries; and this is chiefly to be observed at the remembrance or unexpected arrival of the beloved person.

For after this first elevation which is made at this encounter, it changeth a hundred wayes; it appears little and languishing,

guishing, and immediately returns to its first vehemency; from swift and light, it becomes slow and heavy, and all at once it reassumes its first quickness, which it loseth again in an instant, and passeth thus from one difference to another, without order and without proportion.

There are but very few Characters which remain to be examined, whose causes are not very evident; For the *disquiet* comes from the divers agitations which the soul feels; the *shiverings* and *the ardors* follow the flowing and ebbing of the Spirits; forasmuch as Fear and Grief, which retire them within, take away from the exterior parts the heat they had, even as Joy and Hope restore and augment it, and as Boldness and Anger gather the spirits together, strength also increaseth, as it diminisheth when Joy dissipates, or Grief stifles them: There remains no more difficulties to be found but in the *Syncopes* and *Extasies* which sometimes happen to Lovers; but we have already shewed that Love could not alone cause Syncopes nor faintings, but that it must be Grief, Despair, or Joy.

For the *Extasie* its true it may proceed from Love, yet we must observe that the

word

word hath divers significations ; the Physicians often take it for an extreme alienation of the spirit, such as those have who are frantick or mad ; sometimes for that strange disease which they call *Catoche*, which all at once takes away the use of sense and motion, and keeps the body stiffe in the same posture in which it surpris'd it ; there are some who beleeve that the true *Extasie* is made when the soul doth no action in the body, whether it dwell there, or that indeed it issue forth for a time ; as it happens in those which are posses'd, and in those who are ravish'd by the spirit of God ; but that whereof we speak is nothing else but a certain ravishment of the soul, which takes from the body the use of exterior sense and motion, the imagination and the understanding not forbearing to operate, which happens by a strong attention which binds the soul to the beloved object, which makes it lose the care of all animal functions, and which imploying all the spirits in that thought, hinders them from flowing to the organs of sense and motion ; and this ravishment may sometimes Pass to such an excess that the vital faculties may



receive no more influence from the  
soul, so that respiration will cease, and  
that there will be onley natural vertue  
to sustain life.

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PART.

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## PART. 5.

*Of the nature of Beauty in general ;  
and why it begets L O V E.*

**A**Lthough the Senses were given to the Minde, to help it to know things, yet it seems that those things which are the most sensible, are the least known : And I know not whether it be a grace, or an artifice of Nature, to bring those things neereſt our Senses, which ought to be furtheſt from our Mindes ; and, by that exterior knowledge, to recompense the little progress we might make in that which was true and essential. However it be, its most evident, that we are sensible of nothing in the world more then of Beauty, nor nothing is more difficult to be known : the greatest men, who have been most sensible of its effects, were ignorant of the Causes thereof ; and we may say, that  
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it hath made them lose their Reason, when they were but touched with it, and would have discoursed of it : For, some have said that it was a just proportion of the parts ; others, that it was the form of things ; in fine, that it was the splendor and glittering of Goodness it self: But this last definition is equivocal, and metaphorical ; and the other cannot be applied but to the Divine beauty, which is the source and model of all Beauties ; forasmuch as in the Unity and infinite Simplicity of God, there can be no proportion or form.

That we may therefore steer a more certain course then what hitherto hath been followed, and that we may not wander in so vast and difficult a matter ; we must consider, that things are not esteemed fair, but as they fall under a very distinct and exact knowledge : So that there are only the objects of the Understanding, and of Seeing, and of Hearing, to which we allow Beauty ; because that all the Knowing faculties are those which most perfectly judge of their objects, and are the least mistaken in them : And these same objects which we judge Fair, are also esteemed Good : for we do not onely  
say,

say, A fair minde, a fair speech, or a fair colour, but they may be also called good. But the objects of the other Senses, and all the other powers, may onely be stiled Good, and can never deserve the title of Fair: for, it were a ridiculous thing to say, that heat or humidity, sweetness or bitterness were fair: Whence we must necessarily conclude, that all what is Good, is not Fair; but all that is Fair, is good; and therefore, that Fair is a *species* of Good. Now as Good is not good, but as it is agreeable; the Fair, since it is good, must be agreeable to something; and therefore if what is fair serve but for an object onely to the knowing faculties, we must necessarily conclude, that Fair is *that which is agreeable to the intelligent faculties*, as good is agreeable to what ever it be. Now because Knowledge hath no other object, but the essence and the truth of things, Beauty must needs be of that kinde; and the objects must be the fairer, where the essence and the truth are best exprest: for which cause, Souls are fairer then Bodies; and the Understanding, which knows interiour things, is more capable to judge of Beauty then the Senses, which know onely the exteriour.

Whence

Whence it also happens, that Beasts are seldom moved by Beauty, because Sense onely works in them; in stead that in Man the Understanding concurs to his action, and penetrates further into the Nature and Essence of its objects. And we experiment in our selves, that those things which we do not greatly heed, and whose nature we do not well know, seem less fair unto us; and that its onely for Masters in an Art to judge of the beauty of a work, because they alone have the true knowledge thereof.

We do not therefore say, that Beauty consists in Knowledge onely: for it would then follow, that things would not be fair until they are known; although it be most true, that God would not cease to be infinitely fair, although he were not known. And there are things whose knowledge is equally clear and certain, which are not equally fair: for, the Understanding distinguisheth the Natures as more or less perfect, in the same manner as the eyes and ears judge that there are Colours and Harmonies the one fairer then the other. Now as things are sensible, not by reason of our sensibleness, but because they can make themselves sensible;



ble ; and as the essence is not good, in that it communicates it self, but in that it can communicate it self : so Goodness is not fair because it is known, but because it may be known. So that Beauty is nothing but Goodness in that order and essential relation it hath to Knowledge ; that is to say, that it can communicate it self to the intelligent faculties. And, in my judgement, we are so to understand *Plato*, when he says, that Beauty is a glittering and splendor of Goodness : for as the brightness of light is that which renders it visible ; the brightness of goodness is that also which makes it known ; and this brightness is no other but the act whereby goodness resplends, enlightens, and communicates it self to the knowing faculties. Now because there are two kinds of Faculties, the Intellectual and the Sensitive, there must also be two kinds of *Beauty*, the one *intelligible*, the other *sensible* : And because that in either kinde there are subjects which are fairer and more excellent some then other some, we must, on the foundation we have established, observe the cause of this difference. It is true, it requires a higher meditation and a longer discourse then our designe

signe will permit : but we will onely touch on the principal, and on what is necessary to understand what we shall say in consequence of Humane Beauty.

Suppose then that Beauty is but an effect of Goodness, so far as it hath a relation to the knowing faculties ; and that Goodness is nothing, also, but the being and perfection of things, so far as it can communicate it self, as the School teacheth : those things which have more of being and of essence, must be better, fairer, and more perfect : And we know they have more of being, when they have more unity ; and, in that unity, they have more power and different vertues. So God hath an infinite perfection, because that in a most perfect and most simple unity, he hath a power to do all things. The intelligences, which are the most simple and the most active of all creatures, are also the most excellent. Even amongst Bodies, the mixt are more perfect than the simple whereof they are composed : the Animate more than the Natural ; and those which have a Reasonable soul, more than those which are onely Sensitive ; Because that in comparison of those, they have more different vertues, and more actions,

actions, and therefore divers degrees more of essence. Thus much for what concerns Intelligible Beauty. But in Sensible objects, the perfection is not absolutely considered, as in that: it must depend not onely from the being they have, but also from the organs of the Senses which receives them, and from the fitness they ought to have with the bodies where they appear. So the Light, which is most resplendent, is more perfect than all Colours; but, in respect of the eyes, Green is more, although even that colour is displeasing in some subjects. Now the cause of this diversity first of all comes, for that the Senses having been given to creatures for their preservation, they must not destroy them. And as their action is performed by the impression which the objects make on their organs, if this impression is not proportionable to them, their action will be imperfect: So that it ought to be strong enough to give knowledge of the thing, but not so violent as to corrupt the organs. Whence it is, that the Senses cannot judge well of their objects in their extremity; as the eyes of too great a light, or of darkness; the ears of a too violent sound, or  
of

of silence : And *Aristotle* says, that neither of them are sensible, because that this makes no true impression, and that the other destroys the organ. So that there are onely those objects which are between both extremities, which can make a just impression proportionable to what the Senses require. It is not therefore that all the objects equally touch the Senses ; there are some amongst them which are more perfect, and more agreeable then the rest : Green is fairer then Grey or Black ; the Eighth in Harmony is sweeter then the Fourth : But the cause of this difference is extremely obscure ; yet if you observe what we have said of the perfection of Intelligible things, you will finde that it depends from the same principle.

For it is certain, that Colours and Harmonies have their beauty from the proportion they have ; and those which have it the most perfect, are also the most agreeable. Now proportions have the more perfection, the neerer they are to unity, and the more they are in that unity composed. So the Diapason, which is the most pleasing of all simple harmonies, is made in a double proportion, to wit, of  
two

two to one, which is the most perfect of all simple proportions, because it is nearest the unity, nothing being nearer unity than the number of Two; and is the most composed: for, what is twice as much more, is more composed than that which is but once and a half, or once and a third part, as the other proportions, which are the Diapente and the Diatessaron. It is the same with Colours: for, the proportions which make perfect harmonies; make also, as *Aristotle* says, fair colours. For which cause, Green, which is the most agreeable of all others, is to be in the same proportion with the Diapason; and that of Blue and Purple with that of Diapente and Diatessaron. But seeing we have examined these things in their place, it sufficeth to shew, that Beauty, and the perfection of Sensible things, is deduced from the same principle as that of Intelligible things, to wit, in that they have more unity, and that in this unity they have more powers; in a word, from that they have more of a sensible being.

It is easie, by this Discourse, to perceive, that Light, considered as in it self, is the fairest thing which can be presented to our sight; but that Green, in respect of  
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the organs, is yet more pleasing then it. It remains onely to discover why this colour renders not all those Bodies fair wherein it is. To this end, you must remember that things work not but according to the powers they have, and that these powers follow onely the degrees of their being. Now as there are things which cannot work without matter, it is evident this matter ought to be fitted and proportioned to their actions and their powers; and this proportion makes *corporeal Beauty*, which is nothing but a *just joyning together of all the dispositions which are necessary for bodies to perform those functions whereto they are ordained*: So that all the material qualities, how excellent soever they be, will render the subjects wherein they are, deformed, if they are not proportionable to the essence, and to the interiour vertue which they have. So the Round figure, which is the most perfect of all, because it is the simplest, and comprehends all the rest, cannot accommodate it self with the actions of all the parts of the humane body, which would be monstrous and horrible, had it onely that figure. It is the same of the fairest Colours, which have no conformi-

ty with the temperature of Man, and which would make an extreme change appear in the humours, if they were visible in the face. The tone even of the voice, which in men ought to be stronger and more resounding, were a defect in a woman, because it is not conformable to her temper, which ought to be proportionable to the natural power of her sex. This is then the reason which shews, that the beauty of Sensible objects is drawn, not onely from their absolute being, and from the relation which they have with the organs, but also the connexion which they ought to have with their subjects.

I speak not now of the particular sentiments we may have of Beauty, nor why Red is more esteemed then Green, the Brown hue more then the Vermillion, and Blue eyes more then Black : We have no room here for the examination of these things ; we do but touch on generals ; and we think we have satisfied our designe, when we have said somewhat more of Humane Beauty, because it is that which causeth the Love whereof we speak.

There are several sorts or divers degrees of Beauty in Man : For first, there

is the Intelligible, which is essential, or accidental : the Essential is considered in the Species, or in the Sex ; the Accidental in the Habit, and in the Actions. Lastly, there is a Sensible and Corporal Beauty.

The reason of this is, because the species of every animal hath its beauty in it, which is nothing but its being and its essence, wherein are comprised all the powers and vertues due unto it. But because that amongst these powers there are some which are destined for the entertainment of the Species, which would be lost with the life of the creatures, had not God given them the vertue to ingender their like ; and that generation cannot be, unless there also be an active and a passive power : it was necessary that there should be two Sexes, between which these two powers should be divided. And forasmuch as Sensible beauty is nothing but an assembling together of all corporal dispositions necessary for the powers to perform their functions, every Sex must also necessarily have different dispositions, since they have different powers: And thence is the source whence the difference comes of Male and Female-beauty,

beauty, which is not onely to be found in some parts, but in the whole body: Because the first qualities being the principal dispositions of these two powers; and heat and driness, which amongst them are the most working, being obliged to accompany the active power, as cold and humidity the passive power: it must needs be, that all the mass of humours must taste of these qualities: So that the temperature of the Male being hot and dry, and that of the Female cold and moist, it follows that all the parts of either Sex ought to have different dispositions and beauties.

But forasmuch as Man hath Understanding and Reason beyond all other creatures, and that that faculty, being naturally capable of all things, cannot have its perfection, but by possessing them, it must acquire dispositions necessary to attain this perfection; and these are the Intellectual and Moral habits, which cause that accidental and acquired Beauty of which we have spoken, and which receive their last accomplishment in the actions they ought to produce: for, the end is the last perfection, there being nothing absolutely perfect without an

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end;

end ; and Action being the end of all things.

This is what we can say in general of the Name of Beauty, and must be known, before we seek the cause which obligeth us to the love thereof : For although some have said, we should not ask, why Beauty pleaseth, and that it was as much as if we would know why Fire warms, That it is its Nature, and the essential propertie it hath, whereof there is no reason to be given ; yet all have not been of this opinion : *Plato* did not believe that this enquiry was unworthy of his *Socrates* : And there is no body who doth not freely confess, that if the knowledge may be attained, it must needs be very rare and excellent. Now although I do not altogether disapprove this thought of *Plato*, who says that the beauty of created things ravisheth us, because it is a ray and an image of the Divine beauty, which, being Sovereignly good, necessarily inspires love, when it makes it self known : yet, as there are several things to be supposed in this opinion which the School of *Aristotle* will not admit, and that at last we must always come to that, To know wherefore the Sovereign



raign Goodness is amiable ; we are obliged to take another way, which may lead us to these Supreme truths.

We must then say, that what is good and convenient to a thing, perfects it ; for it adds what it wanted, and in some manner also augments its being, giving it what it had not, and uniting what was divided. And this is the foundation of all the inclinations which are to be found in Nature, and of the love we have for all that is truly and apparently good.

Now as in the Knowing faculties there is nothing at all of what they ought to know, the Understanding and the Senses being to their Objects what the Matter is to the Form ; when these Objects unite themselves to these Faculties, they give them a perfection which they had not, and of which they were capable : And the knowledge they have of this perfection, is the cause of the agreement they find therein, which is afterwards followed by that Love and Pleasure which the Appetite forms, when the Understanding and the Imagination have proposed it as a thing good and convenient for them.

But forasmuch as there are Objects which cause more love and pleasure than

others, they must necessarily much more perfect the knowing faculties, and it is those infallibly which are the most perfect, to wit, those who have the most of being and of essence as we have said; because they do much more fill the natural capacity which these faculties have to know the extent of that being which serves for their object. So it is onely God who can fill the understanding and give a perfect Love and Joy to the Will, because it is he alone that possesseth all being; and consequently those things which have the most of it, perfect them proportionably, and cause also by their knowledge a greater satisfaction and a greater pleasure: It is not but that often less perfect things do more content the Senses and the Understanding; but this proceeds from the error which their ill inclinations give them, which commonly come from the temper, from custome, and from weakness of spirit.

Now forasmuch as knowledge is a good which respects not onely the faculties which exercise it, but also all others to which it may be profitable, because that the Senses were not given to the creature for themselves, but for the preservation

servation thereof, and that reason is a light which lights not it self alone, but also all the other vertues which are in man, hence it is that the knowledge which the Senses & the understanding have of things, which in som manner are useful to the creature, perfects these faculties; because that being destined to its service they at last attain the end whether they tend, when they operate for it, and in that respect they acquire a perfection which in some sort is more excellent then that which respects them onely being their last end, and the mark nature proposed for them; even thence it is that the eyes esteem fair, all which makes the goodness of aliments known; and the colour of the wine or even of the water is for the same reason more pleasing for a thirsty man to behold, then the fairest green of the fields; In a word, all what the understanding and the imagination know of seeing and hearing, being the observers of what is profitable or agreeable, is esteemed fair, and perfects these faculties; forasmuch as their perfection consists to know what is for our use; it is thus that corporal beauty ravisheth the soul and the Senses; because it is the mark of that  
interior

interior power which ought to render us more perfect ; and its principally in this sense that we may truly say, that beauty is the flower and splendor of goodness. But before we shew how this power ought to render us more perfect, we must observe what we have already said of these powers ; for there are those which respect the nature of man in general, and others which are proper to the sexes.

These have their particular dispositions which make the male and female beauty, and which being nothing but the instruments which they are to use in the performance of their functions, are also the marks which make known whether they may be well or ill done ; for certainly a male beauty is nothing else to our Senses, but the mark of a good constitution of the active power in generation, in the same manner as a female beauty is the signe of a passive power to all that is necessary for the performance of that function. Now as generation is the most natural and most excellent of all the operations, which are common to creatures, for that it in some manner renders them eternal, it in some sort also approacheth the  
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Divine perfection and renders them like their cause and principle ; we cannot doubt but nature hath imprinted in them a most powerful desire, and also endued them with a knowledge which may serve to this inclination ; its true, that this knowledge is obscure and hid, and that it is to be found in our selves without the help of discourse, and even without our thinking of it ; and indeed it is in the same rank with that which nature hath inspired in all the things of the world who know without understanding what is useful for them ; for even in the actions of the Senses and the Understanding we perceive that there are objects, which are more pleasing to us then others , the reason whereof is unknown to us, and we have nothing to say, but that there is in our souls a certain spring of Understanding, or rather that it is the Spirit of God which hides it self in his works, and drives things to that end which is fit for them. For as an Artist manageth the action of natural things to the end he pretends, & as we must ascribe all that order which appears in the artifice to his knowledge, and not to the things he useth, which are incapable of that knowledge ; so in all the things



things of nature, where we perceive so many marks of admirable wisdom, we must not beleeve that it is from them that it proceeds, but that it is the Spirit of God which flowes in their effects, which gives the order and the motion, and which guides them to the end which he hath prescribed for them.

However it be, it is by this obscure and hid knowledge, that corporal beauty presenting it self to our Senses, the soul knows it for the mark of the natural power of that Sex wherein it is; & at the same time that secret and powerful desire which it hath to perpetuate its species, awakens and forms in it that Love which afterwards agitates it with so much violence.

Yet do I know very well, that an ill-favoured person, may cause the same motion in the soul; and that it is not always true that beauty is the certain mark of the perfect disposition of the powers which serve for generation; and to conclude, that it may affect those who are of the same sexe to whom this motive is useless.

But as for unhandfomeness, we have shewed

shewed in the Treatise of the Love out of inclination, that although that this Passion seems not to draw its origine from Beauty, yet there is in the soul a certain Idea of perfection contrary to that which the Senses represented, which causeth this admirable charm. For the two other Objections which remain, we must confess, that Nature suffers defects in particulars, because she doth not always finde the matter obedient; whence it happens, that there are parts which remain imperfect: and because we often abuse the gifts she bestows, employing them in things contrary to the end which she proposed her self.

There is amongst men another kinde of Love, which corporal beauty also may move, but whose motive is different from that whereof we speak; for it respects not the sexe, but all the species; which being to have its vertues and its powers, ought also to have those corporal dispositions which are to serve it.

Now these dispositions are natural, or acquired: The natural are those which come from our births, and which render men capable of the functions of the Understanding: for, as all what is in Man is  
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destined for the service of that faculty which is mistress of all the rest, since it cannot know things but by the intermission of the Senses, and the Senses cannot operate if their organs are not well disposed; of necessity the parts of the body must have some proportion and agreement with the Understanding: and then the Soul, which sees by this secret sentiment, of which we have spoken, that it is the mark of humane perfection, pleaseth it self in this object, and forms that love which unites it to the good it knows. 'Tis thus, that well-form'd men are delightful to the sight, because that the corporal beauty which they have, is a signe that they are naturally fit for the most perfect actions of the Minde; and the knowledge which we thus have of their vertues, makes us love them as an excellent good, which ought to render us the more perfect: For there is no vertue without doing good, either by giving us example, and obliging us to its imitation, or by the good things which its effects bring to every one of us in particular, and to all that society for which Man is born, and to which all vertues, as well Intellectual as Moral, are as a foundation. As  
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for those dispositions which are acquired, they also mark the acquired virtues and powers, such as those habits are which are known by the Characters we here discourse of; that is to say, by their actions, as well Intellectual as Moral, and by the air, by the carriage and behaviour of the body, which makes one part of the corporal beauty: for, as there is a certain grace which accompanies virtuous actions, when it appears to our eyes it makes us believe the virtues are there, and so forms that love which we have naturally for them.

It is not but that these marks are often deceitful, and that they often make us love subjects which we ought to hate; But it is from that the Knowledge, which causeth this love, is as we have said, obscure and confused; it carries away the Appetite before discourse can examine it, and so makes us love an imaginary good. Yet whatever the error be, the Imagination and the Understanding always finde their perfection in the knowledge which the Senses afford them, because they do not believe they are deceived; and they think to discover, by that sensible beauty, that good which ought to accompany it, and  
whose

whose possession might render us more perfect : wherefore they finde it agreeable, and propose it to the appetite as an object worthy of love, and affording pleasure.

These are the principles which may give to us the knowledge of the name and effects of Beauty : For, to examine all what could be said in particular, we should need whole Volumes ; and these Subjects being too elevated, would tire the spirit with the length of the Discourse, and would cause us to disgust a thing which ought never to be distastful. There is but one difficulty in this subject, which we dare not leave without examination ; and the resolution whereof is nothing easie to finde : For, those who are esteemed fair in one Climate, are not so in another ; and, even where ever it be, a face which may seem fair to some, will appear ugly to divers : Whence some have believed, that Beauty is neither a true nor real quality, and that it is but in opinion onely : but no man can disavow, but that the proportion of the parts, and those other things which make beauty, are true and real, and are qualities which ennoble the subject where they are, and  
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satisfie the minde and the sight. Now since Nature proposeth always to it self perfection, and that there is but onely one true perfection in the order of all things; it must needs be, that she designed a particular beauty to every species, which ought to be the Model of all those which particulars may have: And as the Humane body is the best tempered of all others which are in Nature, it is probable that this perfect being ought to be in the most temperate Climate. But whence comes it then, that it is not acknowledged in other Climates; but on the contrary, there that is esteemed fair, which in this is esteemed ugly? For, the blackest amongst the Moors are esteemed the fairest, the most short-nos'd amongst the Chinois; and so of the rest.

For my part, I belive we must say that the Climate gives a certain disposition to the body, and makes it change in temperature; and that such a temper gives such an inclination and such a power to the Minde. Now because the bodies ought to be proportionable to the powers, it is a necessary consequence, that the bodies in those Climates must have the marks of these inclinations. So that Beauty consist-

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sisting in the proportion which the bodies have with their virtues and powers ; and Men having such powers in certain Climates, they must esteem those fair which have those marks, because that these inclinations are as it were natural and common to them : so that they judge of Beauty according to their natural inclination, in the same manner as in temperate Countries there are those found who judge diversly of Beauty, by reason of the particular temper they have, which carries their judgements to prize what is conformable to them.

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CHAP.

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## CHAP. III.

*The Characters of Joy.*

**A**lthough Nature seem avaritious of Pleasure and of Delight, and that mingling it always with Grief, she makes us beleieve that she affords it us but with regret and restraint ; yet must we confess that there is nothing in the world, wherein her liberality and magnificence appear more, and we may say, that all her other presents are debts which she pays, but that this is purely a grace and favour of hers ; for although she gives a being to every thing, that she hath a care of its preservation, and brings it to its end, she is obliged thereunto ; and there is nothing in the Universe, which may not with justice ask her what is necessary for the perfection of its being ; but as action is  
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the end and perfection of all things, when they are arrived there they can exact nothing from nature, who hath acquitted herself of all she owed them, and if she contributes any thing, it is by favour and not by obligation; so that causing always delight to flow on those actions which are conformable to it, and in a manner crowning them with it, we ought not to doubt that it is a singular effect of her munificence, or the better to express it, the sum for all the graces she could bestow.

Knowing also how pretious it was, she hath onely communicated it to the most noble and the most excellent things; she esteemed those without knowledge unworthy of it, and that Sense and Reason onely could deserve it; even as if it were a good which ought not to be possessed but in heaven, she would not permit it to be pure and perfect here below; she hath mingled it with cares and with pains, she hath brewed it with tears and hath caused it to begin or to finish alwayes with grief.

But as the Sun ceaseth not to be the fairest and most profitable thing in the world, although it hath blemishes and suffer eclipses: So how imperfect soever  
pleasure

pleasure be, by what mixture soever it hath been weakened, yet ought it not to hinder us from prizing it as the most excellent and most desirable thing which could ever happen to mankind; and we may truly say, that it is [the light of all other good things, and that were it taken away from our lives, it would be nothing but horror and confusion; our life it would indeed rather be a continual flood of ills than of yeers; the Senses would rather serve for gates of grief than of knowledge; knowledge it self would pass for an affliction of spirit, and vertue for a grievous servitude. Its pleasure onely which sets a price on all things, and which renders them delightful; at least they appear not good, but by so much as it is found mingled with them; and did not the soul hope to encounter it in all it acts, it would remain languishing and immoveable, it would be without action and without vigor, and we must speak no more of life, of happiness or of felicity.

Certainly, to see the effect, it causeth, as mistress and despencer of all good things, calling back those which are past, making us sensible of those which are not yet,



rendring even melancholy, tears and dangers pleasing; we must confess that with reason Nature is called the great Magician, and that pleasure is the most powerful charme she useth to produce her miracles; In effect, its a charm which makes all the illis which assault us vanish, which lifts us up beyond our selves, which changeth us into other men, and from men transforms us into Demy-Gods; but we often use it as a poyson, which quencheth all that is Divine in our Souls, which renders our mindes brutish, and makes us like, even inferiour to beasts.

For although the pleasures of the body are of themselves innocent, and that they were given us for inticements to the most necessary and most noble actions of life, yet when we pervert their use, and when we do not render them obedient to reason, they rebel against it, pull it out of its throne, precipitate it in dirt and mire, and stifle all the seeds of vertue and understanding which are born with it.

Neither is there any thing wherein wisdom hath more been imployed, then to seek the means whereby to shun so dan-

dangerous an enemy, who flatters at its admittance, and afterwards causeth every where trouble and confusion, which fills the Soul with blood and flames, the Body with grief and infirmity, and leaves nothing behind it but repentance.

We will not propose the counsels and advice she hath given on this subject; we should bring hither all those lawes, which Physick, Morality, and Religion have prescribed; at least there are but few which were not made either to prevent or correct the disorders which sensuality may cause; yet we think to second its design, by shewing the deformity which the excess of this Passion produceth in the Soul and in the Body.

The Picture of voluptuousness cannot be made without representing many figures, besides that there are joys which have no commerce with the body, and which are to be found in the highest part of the soul: those of the Sense are so different amongst themselves, that as many pleasing objects as there are which may move them, we may say that there are also as many several sorts of Pleasures: And truly, whoever would designe the

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portraiture we undertake according to the order of the Senses, and describe the pleasure which every of them may be sensible of, the invention and the composition could not be ill; but we may not use it without prejudice to other designs, wherein we are to imploy the same touches, and the same colours which this requires; for if we stayed to express the Characters of Pleasure, which is in tasting and touching; we must necessarily also describe those of Gluttony, Drunkenness, Impudency, and so of the rest, whereof we should make particular Tables; wherefore without parcelling these things, we will chuse what is common to all Pleasures, dividing this discourse into two parts; the one of which shall treat of a serious Joy, where laughter is not to be found, and the other of a laughing puffed up Joy, which is nothing but the Passion of Laughter.

Joy is not amongst those Passions whose beginning is weak, and whose progress is vehement; it hath all its force and greatness from its birth, and time serves for nothing but to weaken or diminish it; as soon as it enters the Soul it transports it and carries it out of it self, and

and the ravishment it causeth is sometimes so violent that it takes away the use of the Senses, makes it forsake the cares of life and often lose it; but although it come not to this excess, yet it is alwayes known by that puffed up impatience, which appears in all its actions, that it hardly can contain it self within its bounds, that it makes escapes and endeavours to goe out.

For the thoughts and words of a contented man are not to be stopt; he dreams onely of his good fortune, he speaks continually of it, and if he be not interrupted he hath nothing in his heart which he carries not on his tongue; he discovers his most secret designs, and so makes his joy an enemy to his rest and to his contentment.

If he is silent, you must entertain him with discourses onely which favour his Passion; how divertising soever others are, to him they are importunate; he breaks them at every moment, and it brings in alwayes somewhat of his transport: or at least his little minding of them, seems a signe of his scorning them, or a reproaching that they interrupt his Pleasure.

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But if you speak of the subject which begot them, if you admire his happiness, if you witness a fellow-feeling with him; then, how angry or severe soever he be, he becometh complacent, he caresseth, embraceth, and often, by ridiculous civilities and favours, he forgetteth the respect he owes, or loseth that which is due to him.

The first that comes to him, is made his friend and his confident; he takes counsel of him, he follows his advice; and it often happens to be a childe, a servant, or an enemy whom he trusts with his secret, and with its conduct. In this blindness, he approves all what is proposed to him to the advantage of his Passion: Whatever vanities he nourisheth, whatever successes he flatters himself withal, there is nothing in his opinion which he ought not to believe, and may not hope; as if all things were to respect his pleasures: He believes that there are none which dare traverse them; he sees the dangers which every way environ them, without starting at it; and with a blinde confidence he believes himself secure, when his loss is often most assured: So that we may say, that there is no man so credulous  
with



with so little appearance, so bold with so much weakness, nor so unhappie with so much good hap.

He would make us believe he were content, he perswades it himself, and in the mean time his desires betray his designe and his contentment : for they are irritated by the enjoyment; and carrying themselves onely towards those goods which he hath not, they render those useless which he possesseth, and even of his joy cause the subject of his disquiet. Pleasure hath that property, that although we enjoy it, it forbears not to make it self desirable; so that it is never content, and that it is rather weary of the good which entertains it, then fully satisfied therewith. But we have spoken enough of the trouble it moves in the Minde: let us see what it causeth in the Face.

There are some pleasures of which we may say the Soul is jealous, which it seems she would possess in secret, and which she dares not communicate to the Senses : But what care soever she takes to hide them, she cannot do it so well, but she must discover something; her retreat renders her suspected; and when she would hide, 'tis then she the more discovers

vers her self : For, the looks become fixt and staid ; all the body is immovable ; the Senses forget their functions ; in fine, there is a general suspension made of all the animal vertues. And although at first we might doubt whether it proceeds from astonishment or grief, which often produce the same effects, 'tis afterwards discovered by a certain gloss which remains on the face, and by I know not what sweetness which it leaves in the eyes, and by a light image of smiling which appears on the lips, that these troublesome Passions have no share in this transport, and that it comes from that inward joy, which ravisheth, and as it were inebriates the soul.

But when Pleasure hath the liberty to disperse it self abroad, and that the Senses bear a part, and that the Minde and the Body seem to enter again into commerce and intelligence ; then it is easie to know the agitation which is made in the soul, by what appears in the exterior parts : You see on the face a certain vivacity, a pleasing disquiet, and a laughing boldness. Pleasure sparkles in the eyes, sweetness accompanies all their motions ; and when they happen to weep, or to cast forth  
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some dying looks, you would say, Laughter confounded it self with Tears, and that Jollity mixed it self with Languishings : The *Forehead* is in this calm and serene, the eye-brows are not lifted up with wrinkles nor with clouds ; and it seems as if it opened , and every way extended it self. The *Lips* are red and moist, and are never forsaken by smiles ; and that light trembling which sometimes happens to them, would make one think they danced for joy : The *Voice* becomes greater then ordinary ; sometimes it is resounding ; and it never goes out but with earnestness : for there is no *Passion* so talkative as Joy ; how barren soever the *Minde* be, what heaviness soever there be on the tongue , it makes one speak continually : and nothing but its own violence sometimes stops the mouth, and at once cuts short the speech. To conclude, all the face takes an extraordinary good plight ; and from pale melancholy and severe, which it was before, it becomes ruddy, affable, and pleased.

The rest of the body is also sensible of this alteration: A sweet heat & vapor sheds it self thorow all its parts ; which swells, and gives them a lively colour : even they  
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become stronger, and do their actions more perfectly then they did before. In effect, of all the motions of the Minde, there is none more a friend to Health then this, so as it be not extreme. It drives away sickness, it purifies the blood and the spirits, and renders, as the Wise man says, our yeers flourishing. As soon as it enters the *heart*, it swells it with great beatings; it lifts up the heart by long respirations. In the Arteries it causeth a large and extended pulse. And yet although all these motions are made slowly, and without vehemency, those of the other parts are made with precipitation and vigour. The head and the eyes are in a continual agitation: the hands move without ceasing: we go, we come, we leap; we cannot stay in one place. But it sometimes also happens, that the violence of this Passion takes quite away the use of Sense and Motion; it quencheth natural heat, it causeth syncopes, and in a moment bereaves one of life. Let us then examine how it can produce so many effects so contrary and so wonderful.



## PART. 2.

*Of the Nature of Joy.*

**S**OME perhapes may think it strange, that Joy which speaks so much of it self, hath not as yet told what it was ; but you may much more wonder that Philosophy, which promiseth us the knowledge of all things, falls short in this ; although there be nothing which endeavours more to make it self known then Pleasure ; It penetrates to the bottome of our soul, it environs it on all sides, it solicites it by all the wayes of its knowledge ; it is the end of all its desires, the crown of all its actions, and yet for all that its nature is unknown to it, and the greatest understandings which have enquired it, are not agreed under what kinde it ought to be placed.

For some have said that Pleasure was nothing but the rest and tranquillity of the



the minde; others that it was a Passion in which the Soul operated not; and amongst those who have ranked it amongst actions, some did beleieve it proceeded not from appetite but from knowledge. In fine, there having been some who not daring to put it in the rank of other Passions, have said it was the principle of them, others that it was their gender, or their first species.

Had we not banished from our designe the wrangling and the Criticisms of the Schools, we should be obliged to examine all these opinions, and to seek in their ruines foundations whereon we should build the definition and Idea of Pleasure: But since we have not that liberty, and that we should render delight importunate and unpleasing by the length of the discourses we should use, without advising with any we will consult the thing it self, and see whether it will discover it self to us after having hid it self to so many excellent spirits.

We say then that we need not doubt, but that Pleasure is a motion of the mind, and that its impossible to conceive a calm and rest in the tempest which it raiseth in our thoughts, in our spirits, and in our humors;

humors ; as those things doe not move of themselves , it must be the minde which agitates them, and she gives her self the same shake which she imprints in them ; For it is evident that effects being like their causes, the motions of the body which are the effects of the minde, ought also to be the images of the agitation she gives her self ; I know well that the Schooles will not call these agitations true motions ; but that stops us not, it will suffice that they are such as the soul can have, & that pleasure is one of that order.

But yet as she hath two parts which may be moved, we might doubt to which of the two Pleasure belongs ; for although all the world confess it is a Passion, and consequently a motion of the appetite, yet it seems that there are some which are proper to knowledge, since the Senses and the understanding finde a complacency in the objects which are conformable to them, even before that the appetite is moved ; but also as we have already shewed in our discourse of Love, that this complacency is no true pleasure ; and that the *Demons* which are capable of that acceptableness, cannot be touched with Joy, which yet they

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ought most perfectly to have ; if it come from knowledge alone , we must then stick to the common opinion, and with it say, that Pleasure is a motion of the appetite, since its good which moves that part of the minde, and that pleasure hath no other object but the same good.

Yet this raiseth another difficulty ; for if it be true that the soul ceaseth to move when it arrives at the end whereto it tended moving to possess a good the possession ought to be the end and term of its motion : So that the pleasure which comes alwayes after the possession is rather a rest then a motion of the appetite ; and yet if we were agreed that possession is the aim and end of the motions of the minde, we would say that that onely ought to be understood of those which it employs to arrive thereunto ; for although it bear it self not towards the good it possesseth, it hinders it not from agitating to taste it again, and from being ravished in the enjoyment it hath had ; but to speak more exactly, possession is not the last end which the soul proposeth ; it is the enjoyment which is the perfection and accomplishment of the possession. For it is certain we possess things which  
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we enjoy not, and we may say that the good renders it self master of the Soul when it presents and unites it self unto it, but that she becomes mistress of it when she enjoys it : After all this we can never say that rest is the end which the soul proposeth to it self, since the end is the perfection of things, and that there are some which must be always in action to be perfect : Now the soul is of this kinde, she never tends to rest unless out of weakness, and it is therefore necessary that Joy and Enjoyment be in motion ; let us then see what an one it is.

To discover it, we must observe that Pleasure and Joy are never formed in the soul, till after the good hath inspired Love therein ; for as the first motion of the appetite towards good is to unite it self thereunto, and Love consists in this union, it is impossible that any man should fancy any other motion which could be posterior to that ; and therefore if Pleasure be a motion of the soul towards good, it ought to presuppose Love & always come after it.

Now as this Love always precedes, it follows not that it must always accompany it ; there may be obstacles which may hinder the appetite from moving to

form this Passion, and grief perhaps may be so great that it may employ the whole soul, that it will not admit the least ray of Joy; but its also certain, that if there be nothing which retains the appetite, it always goes from Love to Pleasure, because the soul unites it self to good, but to enjoy it, and it is impossible it should enjoy it but by Pleasure; and to speak truth, enjoyment is nothing but pleasure which we finde in the possession of goods; and according as enjoyment is more perfect, it is also the greater and the more excellent. What motion can the appetite then suffer in pleasure and enjoyment beyond that of Love, whereby it unites it self to what is good? certainly it is a thing very difficult to conceive, how these actions should pass into a power which is quite blinde and hid in the bottome of the soul; they must be extremely obscure, and what light soever the minde can bring, they suffer themselves to be seen not without a great deal of trouble; yet since we have engaged ourselves to shew the difference of the Passions, by the difference of corporal motions, we must necessarily, to know what Joy is, finde in sensible things a kinde of motion



motion which may resemble the agitation which the Minde suffers in this encounter. As it happens then in the Passion of Love, that the Appetite carries it self towards the beloved object, that it runs thither, and unites it self thereunto; we may say, that this motion is like to that of fluid bodies, which run toward their centre, and think to finde their rest there: but because when they are there, they for all that stop not, they return, and scatter themselves on themselves; they swell, and consequently over-flow. So, after that the Appetite is united to its good, its motion ends not there; it returns the same way, scatters it self on it self, and over-flows those powers which are neereſt to it. By this effuſion, the ſoul doubles on the image of the good it hath received, mixeth and confoundeth it ſelf with it, and ſo thinks to poſſeſs it the more by doubly uniting it ſelf thereunto. Nay, even as the Appetite ſwells, and thinks by this reflux it cannot contain it ſelf within its bounds, and is conſtrained to diſtil it ſelf into that faculty which acquainted it with the knowledge of the object; ſharing with it the good it hath received, and by that means making all

the parts of the soul concur to the possession thereof, wherein perfect enjoyment consists : For, since the soul hath no other end, but perfectly to possess the good, and that, perfectly to possess it, it must have the knowledge of that possession ; the Appetite having no knowledge, cannot alone make it enjoy what it loves ; the Imagination and the Understanding must contribute : and then, after they have proposed the good to the Appetite, and that the Appetite is united thereunto, it returns to the one and to the other, and gives them an account of what it hath done, to the end that by uniting their functions, the soul may unite it self to its good in all its parts, and that it may make for it that circular motion which is natural to it, and wherein the accomplishment and perfection of its operations consists, as the Platonick Philosophy teacheth. After all, if it be true that the Soul and the Spirits work in the same manner in the Passions, we may not doubt but that the motion which the soul suffers in Joy, is such as we have said, since that of the spirits is altogether like it : For, after Love hath carried them to good, they scatter and over-flow themselves on the  
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the organs of the Senses, as we are about to make known : So that we cannot miss in saying, *That Joy is an effusion of the Appetite, whereby the Soul spreads it self on what is good, to possess it the more perfectly.*

I know that the definition of *Aristotle* is quite different from this: for he says that it is a motion of the Soul which suddenly and sensibly puts it in a state agreeable to Nature. But the place where he proposeth it, shews sufficiently that he had no intention to render it very exact, treating in that place but with Orators, and not with Philosophers. And truly, whoever will neerly examine it, will finde nothing less then the essence of that Passion. How many of those motions will there be found, such as he hath observed, wherein Pleasure will never be ? All natural actions, do they not put the soul in a state agreeable to its nature ? and may they not be suddenly and sensibly performed without being for all that delightful ? The Passion of Love, is it not so formed, and is it not an estate agreeable to Nature, to unite it self to good, and to possess it ; and yet Pleasure need not always accompany it ? And may we not then say, that it is not Joy which makes this

condition agreeable to Nature ; but rather, that it is that which breeds Joy ?

Besides, what need we say it is a sudden motion , seeing the Appetite hath none that are other ? For, if it happens that the soul moves not so readily in some Passions, that laziness comes not from the Appetite, but from the faculty which proposeth that good with too much difficulty, and too loosely commands the pursuit thereof : Being a blinde power , it goes but as 'tis led ; and as soon as the command is given, it obeys, and moves in an instant.

It is true , there may be obstacles on that side , which may hinder it from so readily obeying ; as, when there are contrary Passions to those which the object ought to inspire ; for an extreme grief will never suffer Joy to form it self in the Appetite : But also , when the hinderance is away , it quickly moves , and always in a moment produceth the Passion as perfect as the knowledge and motive was which it proposed : For , if Love hath weak beginnings , 'tis because the good is weakly represented , and the progresses it makes , are new motions of the Appetite , caused by the representation

tion of new Ideas and new perfections.

In effect, we may say of all the consequences, and of all the increase of Passions, that they are as the flame and the light, which entertain and augment one the other every moment, by an infinite many reiterated productions; that which appears, being not that which was before, and which even presently will be followed by a new: for, all of them succeeding thus one the other without interruption, seem to be but the self-same thing which hath preserved and entertained it self.

So it is in Joy, and in all other Passions; they form themselves all at once, and pass in an instant: they are also renewed every moment, causing thus a continual flux of divers perfect motions, which last as long as the knowledge solicites the Appetite to move.

It is then true, that the Appetite hath no motions which are not sudden; That nevertheless it begins to move it self rather at one time then another, by how much the faculty which commands is diligent or lazie, or because there is some contrary motion which retains it: And that is easie to be conceived, by the example of the Eyes, which see things in an  
instant,



instant, although to see they sometimes them open quicker or slower ; and even after being open, they may have some indisposition which may hinder them to act.

I know that the Physicians seem to use the same definition with *Aristotle*, when they say that Pleasure is a quick and sensible motion which puts Nature in an estate which is agreeable to it ; and that if the objects make not a quick and sensible impression on the Senses, or if they do not make it proportionable to Nature, they can never cause Pleasure. But it is easie to perceive, that the Motion whereof they speak, is not that of the Appetite, where Pleasure consists, and that it is but the cause thereof : for, before that the Appetite moves, the objects must make such an impression as we have said ; and then the Soul, which feels it, and which sees what is its good, sheds it self on it, to possess it the more perfectly, and so forms that pleasure, which is augmented by the effusion of spirits, as we will anon declare. I stay not to examine how grief sometimes happens in this quick motion which moves Nature to an estate convenient for it ; as when we put our hands to the fire when they are extremely cold ; that concerns

cerns the Passion of Grief : It will suffice here to observe, that those objects which make not this ready impression, do not cause Pleasure ; because that insinuating themselves by little and little, Nature accustoms her self unto them, and feels not the change which happens to her ; wherefore, not knowing the good which she receives, the Imagination proposeth it not to the Appetite, which consequently is not moved thereby. We are even thus tir'd with the most agreeable things, after having too long tasted them. But of this more amply at the end of this Discourse.

Let us continue again the thred of that Discourse which we have left, and say, that although all the motions of the Appetite are made suddenly, yet it is true, that of all the objects which move Passion, there are none whose arrival so quickly and so easily moves the Appetite, as Joy. And this comes in my conceit, from that the object of Pleasure is the good, so far as it is already loved : for we have already shewed, that Love always precedes Joy ; so that being already united to the Appetite by the means of Love, there is nothing in that respect which hinders the motion

motion which that power ought to employ to relish it. But it is not so in the rest of the Passions, whose objects are to be examined by the Knowledge, before they are proposed to the Appetite. And as there are but few Goods or Evils which are pure, so there are always found many things which diminish their goodness or their ill, and suspend the judgement we ought to make of them. But to move Joy, this examen is useless: the Appetite already possessing the Good, all its counsels are taken, all its doubts are raised; and of necessity it ought to move at the same instant when it united it self to its enjoyment, wherein Joy and Pleasure consist.

But 'tis to penetrate too far into the secrets of the Soul, and to stay too long on things which have no stay. Let us leave these imperceptible motions, and see whether those which are made in the humours and in the spirits, are more easie to be discerned.

Yet before we begin this enquiry, we shall do well to say somewhat of the Object which moves this Passion. For although we have already said it was Good, we must examine out of what consideration

tion it merits that quality, being assured that out of divers respects it causeth divers motions in the soul.

As then good, forasmuch as it is amiable, is the object of Love; so forasmuch as it is delightful it is that of Joy; neither is it powerfully delightful, but when it is loved, for that Pleasure presupposeth Love; so that good forasmuch as it is loved, ought to be the true object of Joy; perhaps you will say, that desire also presupposeth Love, and that good must be loved to be desired; it is true, but desire demands another condition, to wit, absence which never happens in Joy, where the good must be alwayes present; for when past things, or those which are to come delights us, it is an effect of the imagination, which renders them present, and makes them pass for such as they are in thoughts.

For the rest, by the word Good, we must not onely conceive what is truly and apparently good, but even also the ills which we have eschewed: It is thus, that the memory of the paines we have suffered, and of the dangers we have escaped is pleasing, forasmuch as it is good to have been delivered from them; it is thus that  
venge-

vengeance is so sweet; because that by overcoming the ill, we no more fear the assaults thereof; it is thus, that tears are sometimes delightful, because they discharge nature of an unprofitable burthen, and that it even seems as if the grief which excited them, runs and slides away with them.

You must besides observe, that good being a thing agreeable to nature, this is as wel to be understood of depraved nature, as of that which is perfect; for a sick man takes pleasure in things which are contrary to him, and a vitious man finds contentment in his debauches, because they are conformable to his corrupted and irregular nature.

Now after this to examine by retail all what may cause pleasure, besides that it would wrong both our design, and the Reader, both which ask for brevity, we may easily know it were but to lose time and words.

It will then suffice to say, that since good is the source of all the sweets which this Passion causeth to flow into the soul, and that it is nothing but what is fit for our nature, and what perfects it, it must be that the good which makes us the  
more



more perfect, raises also the greater & the more solid pleasures: Now as we are composed of two parts, of soul and body, and as that is incomparably more excellent; and therefore it follows that the perfection which it acquireth is also more excellent, and that the goods which cause it, are the most noble and the most delightful.

But because the goods of the body are for the preservation of the species, or of the individuals, and that that is more considerable to nature, as being the most common or the most general good; from thence it is that the pleasure which accompanies it is the sweetest and most sensible of all others; and by the same reason, the objects of Tasting and feeling delight most, because they are the Senses most necessary for life, and without which the creature cannot subsist.

It is true that the objects of Seeing and Hearing may contest the prehemineny, being more noble than those base and material qualities which respect the inferior Senses: But if we consider that there are almost no creatures, which delight themselves with the beauty of sounds and colours; we may confess speaking generally, that the objects of Tasting and  
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Touching are the most delightful ; and yet that in Man those of Seeing and Hearing have the advantage, because that those two Senses having a great affinity with the Understanding, and being chiefly destined to its service, their end is also more noble & necessary then it is in beasts, where they are for no other use, but to preserve the animal life which they have.

From all these considerations, it is easie to deduce the principal differences of Pleasure : For it is either Intellectual or Sensible, Pure or Impure, True or False. True Pleasures are those which are pure, to wit, which are not linked or mixed with Grief ; and they are those which are fit for Man, in the most perfect condition that Nature could place him. Such are the pleasures which are found in Contemplation, and in the exercise of Vertue : such are those which follow the actions of a secure Health, and the functions of Senses perfectly disposed.

Now these Pleasures have this property, that they are long lasting, that they never tire, that they may be relished at all times, and that Grief never precedes nor follows them : For a man who is in a state of Natural perfection, is never weary of  
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Meditation, nor of performing good actions : Life is always sweet and pleasing to him ; and the Senses are always disposed to receive their Objects with Delight.

Some may now say, that Eating and Drinking, and other natural actions, are convenient for the perfect nature of Man, which yet cause also disgust : For Musick, and the sight of the fairest things, at last tires the ears and eyes ; and the sweetest flowers wherewith *Venus* was ever crowned, as *Pindarus* says, at last become importunate and displeasing. It is true : But we must also remember, that all these things being futable to Nature, ought to have the conditions which perfection requires : they must be moderate in quantity and quality : the circumstance of time, place, and persons, must meet. Besides, that the greatest part are not of themselves convenient for Nature, but onely by accident ; that is to say, they are onely convenient, by reason of the irregularities which preceded them whose remedy they are. So eating and drinking cure hunger and thirst : so rest and sleep cause labour and weariness to cease. In a word, the greatest part of our actions afford pleasure onely because Nature

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empties or fills it self, and corrects the one with the other ; wherefore the pleasure which follows them is not absolutely pure nor real, but onely by accident : whence it is that it tires, that it lasts but little, and that we are not at all times capable to taste it, as those which are absolutely pure.

But let us leave these Moral Speculations, and, without staying any longer on things which are notorious to all the world, let us seek new ones, and see whether the Tempest which this Passion excites in us, will not throw us into some unknown Land, and make us know the motions of the Spirits which act as the wandering Stars, whose courses and periods have not yet been observed.

PART I.



## PART 3.

*What the Motion of Joy is in the  
Spirits.*

**I**N all kinde of Motion, we must always  
fancie two terms : The one where it  
is to begin, the other where it ought  
to finish. If the Spirits then move in  
Joy, it seems they ought to come from the  
heart, since it is their source ; and thence  
they move themselves towards what is  
Good, wheresoever it presents it self to  
the soul. Truly, could Joy form it self all  
alone, the motion of the Spirits must be  
so made, and must by it be issued out of  
the heart to the meeting of what is good :  
but because it never comes but with Love,  
which ought always to precede it, it is he  
who ought to cause that motion, whereto  
Joy contributes nothing : So that we  
must seek another for it, conformable



with that of the Appetite. In a word, we must discover how the Spirits in some manner disperse themselves, even as that doth in this Passion: This will not un- easily be conceived, after having observed how Love carries them towards Good : for when they can go no further, they must either stop, or return to their source, or disperse themselves. They cannot stop themselves, since they follow the then-disturbed agitation of the soul : they cannot return to the heart, since nothing but the presence of Ill can constrain them thereunto : They must then overflow and disperse themselves. And the Soul, which employs the same motives for the motion of the Spirits as for her own, takes care to make them move so, that they may be the more united to Good, as we have before said : For, by this effusion, they dilate themselves in their organs, and, occupying more room, they think to touch the Good in more of its parts.

But where can they disperse themselves ? To understand this, you must remember, that Good toucheth not the soul, but by its presence, and that it is Knowledge onely which renders it pre-

sent.

sent. Now this Knowledge is made by the Understanding, and by the Imagination, or by the Senses: And as the Imagination is seated in the brain, and the Senses in their particular organs; so Good must be in the one or the other of them, and consequently Love must carry the Spirits to those places, and Joy disperse them in the same precincts. For, if Good be only in the Fancie, and that it toucheth not the exterior Senses, all the Spirits arrive at the seat of the Imagination, and disperse themselves in the brain: But if any of the Senses possess this Good, then the Spirits which ran thither disperse themselves also on their organs, and carry thither heat, redness, and vivacity.

This effusion augments the Pleasure of the Minde, by reason of that sweet and temperate heat which runs thorow the parts, which flatters and tickles them: So that those Pleasures which are accompanied with this corporal agitation, are greater, and more sensible, then when they are without it. Nay, even after the emotion of the Appetite hath ceased, the agitation of the Spirits continuing, leaves the soul in a certain confused Joy, which comes not from the object which at first

touched it, but from that tickling which the Senses made known unto it, as a thing conformable and convenient for their nature.

And this makes me believe that all those secret Joys which we feel without knowing a reason of them, come from the same cause, and that there must necessarily be something which disperseth the Spirits, and which inspires Pleasure in the soul; whether it be the knowledge it hath of the tickling of those parts, or whether that all the differences of the motions which it employs in every Passion, being known unto her, she sees this to be fit for Joy, and at the same time forms a delightful object, as we said it happened in that love which is out of inclination.

You will perhaps say, that this effusion of Spirits may often be without Pleasure; That Anger which casts them into the face, that Grief which draws them to the diseased parts, and that the Fever which drives them everywhere with impetuosity, afterwards disperseth them, and causeth the same alteration which Joy imprints on the body; and yet that the Soul is then sensible of no pleasure.

But we may two ways answer this :  
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First, it is true, that the most delightful objects are often diverted by little griefs, from making an impression in the soul. This motion of the Spirits which is so secret, and which the Senses can scarce discover, ought to be far less powerful against great obstacles which cause these troublesome encounters. But supposing they did cause pleasure, it is so weak, and so light, that it is stifled by the least sensible inconvenience. For it is an observable thing, that although it seems that the Sensitive Appetite at the same time cannot suffer contrary Passions, it is not absolutely true, since we evidently know, that the tongue is pleased with agreeable savours, whilst the heart is full of bitterness and grief. And the reason of this is, that the Sensitive Appetite is not shut up in one part onely, as the most part of the other faculties are; it is dispersed thorow all the organs of the Senses: and we may say, that its stock and root are indeed in the heart, but that its boughs and branches are extended thorow all the body: For its a general and necessary power to all the parts of the Creature, and it must have been communicated to all, that Motion might not be far off from

knowledge, and that the Soul might not languish in expectation to possess a good, or flee from an ill, when they were once come to her knowledge: Nature having made for the appetite what she made for the pulse whose principal organ is the heart, and yet which forms it self in all the arteries, where even it is sometimes found different from that which agitates the heart.

Which being so, Pleasure may be in one place, and Grief in another, although they are in one part incompatible: But it is also true that when Passion is raised in the Centre, and source of the appetite, that which is in the little rivulets is very weak and seems to vanish, although the Spirits cease not to agitate in those places where it was formed, whence these secret feelings of Pleasure follow, which often steal themselves from the knowledge of the understanding, nay even of the imagination.

This is the first answer which may be made to the proposed objection; now for another which pleaseth us more, as being better fitted to our designe, for we will show how every Passion hath a particular motion



motion of the spirits; and that then if the effusion be in others as well as Joy, there must be some difference which renders it fit and particular, and which is not to be found in the rest.

We must then confess that Anger, Grief, and Terrour, and divers other exterior things may disperse the spirits, but by violence, and as a tempest which scatters the rain, and transports it here and there with impetuosity; in stead whereof Joy sweetly disperseth them, and makes them distil on the parts as a sweet dew; now this causeth many different impressions on the Senses: For the spirits which are driven with force, which precipitate themselves one on the other cause a troublesome sentiment to nature, and rather provoke it then flatter it; but those which disperse themselves as themselves, and sweetly insinuate themselves into the parts, tickle and content it: Considering that in those Passions which have ill for their object, the spirits keep themselves united & contracted to assault or flee from it; whence it is that they are piercing, and offend the parts they light on; but in Joy, wherein they dilate themselves to embrace the good  
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it must needs blunt their point, and make them lose the impetuosity they had before; So that what effusion soever there is in Anger and in Grief, its never accompanied with pleasure, because it is not like that which is with Joy; to avow this, we must onely consult the countenance of a joyful man; for you will finde therein I know not what kinde of a more pleasing vivacity, a clearer and purer splendor, and a sweeter heat then in all the Passions we have made mention of; by reason that the purity of the spirits is not changed by those sharp and darksome fumes which are raised in the rest, and that their motion is more free, more equal, and more conformable to their nature; it might be asked whether this effusion of spirits be onely made in those places where Good is presented to the soul, and truly its there only necessary for it, since they onely disperse themselves to possess this good, and that good toucheth it nowhere but where it makes it self known; yet it is true that it abundantly pours them into the intrails, and that when Joy is high, there is no part which it over-flowses not; for which cause the heart and the lungs loosen themselves as *Hippocrates* says,

says, we are sensible of I know not what pleasing emotion which moves all the interior parts, and a sweet heat and vapor, which disperseth it self through the whole body: Now this happens according to my opinion, from that the sensitive soul hath not always a clear and certain knowledge of its object, and being charmed by that of Joy, she fancies that she ought everywhere to encounter it, and that she ought also to send spirits every way to entertain it: or rather the urgency which presseth her forwards to the quick enjoyment of the presented good, is the reason she drives them on all sides, without choice or order, or so much as discerning the places whether they are to move.

This shall suffice for the knowledge of the Motion of the spirits in Joy; in pursuit of the examen we have already made in the Treatise of Love. But one difficulty remaines which the former discourse hath bred, and whose resolution will give some light to the obscurity of this matter; for we have said, that the spirits are not agitated here with violence, and that their motion is always sweet and calm; although this seem not  
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to agree with the transports, the ravishments, and the excesses which are so common in this Passion, and which cannot be conceived without a violent agitation of the spirits: And in effect, when we compared this motion with that which is made in Love, we were not afraid to say, that they were driven in Joy as a great wave, and that it seemed then as if the soul would cast it self wholly and all at once before its object: So that it being not to be done without violence, and having certified that there was none in the effusion of the spirits, we cannot escape the reproach to have spoken contrary to Truth, and against Our Selves.

Yet it is very easie to answer this Objection, remembring, that Joy and Love are inseparable; and that these two Passions being for that cause often considered as if they were but one onely, these Motions were also confounded with their effects: so that Love drawing the spirits from the heart, and driving them out, we commonly say, that Joy also transports them. And as this motion is made with violence, and causeth troublesome accidents, the same thing may be said of Joy: For thus we discoursed of it in the former

mer Chapter, where we did not absolutely compare Love with Joy, but onely the love of Beauty with the love of other things wherein Joy causeth faintings and synopes, confounding, as commonly they do, these two Passions in one: But here, where we make an exact Anatomy of them, we separate the motions of the one from the other, and conclude, that the transport of the spirits towards Good, is a particular effect of Love; and that the effusion which follows it, is that of Joy. So that if there be violence in the first motion, it proceeds all from Love; Pleasure hath no share in it; and how impetuous soever it be, it must break and soften it self, when the spirits begin to disperse themselves; otherwise Joy would destroy it self, by that troublesome sensibleness which that impetuous and turbulent motion would excite in the parts. But  
 Yet it follows not, that because this effusion is not violent and impetuous, it must be made slowly: for the spirits are such stirring and subtil bodies, that they without resistance penetrate everywhere: and their motions are so quick, that nothing in Nature could be found to compare them to, but Light: and it is by  
 that



that also that we can make appear how they disperse themselves in Joy: For it in a moment insinuates it self in Diaphanous bodies without violence, and without confusion runs thorow all their parts; without constraint dilates and extends it self: and we might say, that had these bodies any knowledge, they would be sensible of an extreme pleasure in that sweet, although sudden effusion of Light. So is it with that which is made in Joy: for after the soul hath carried the spirits towards its Good, and that she believes she hath united them together, she leaves that pressing, that disquiet and precipitation which she caused before that she might arrive there: and, thinking she can then with security enjoy the good she possesseth, she with liberty dilates her self, without hinderance extends her self, and in an instant penetrates all the parts of her object; causing the spirits to move in the same manner, which she finds always obedient to her command. It is true, that in pursuit thereof there is a great dissipation of them made, which the soul takes no care to repair, being wholly employed in the enjoyment of the good she pursued, and being as it were

were charmed and ravished with her good fortune ; whence those weakneses follow, those faintings, and those other actions, of which we have already spoken.

The Character of Joy.

YOU have seen what we had to say of the nature of this Passion, before we entered the gates of those Characters which make it appear. We now expect to find the several effects, and enquire why Joy is so extensive to mind and to body, why it makes so much in itself, why it makes itself to be felt, even when it is produced, and why it is so soon weary of the Good which begets it. For these are the most observable effects which it produces in the Mind, and whence it seems the less to be felt when the Gates of its Power are shut.

There are Passions which will always speak, and others which love to be silent. Sorrow, commonly accompanied with despair, and tears, Joy, boldness and anger, and



## PART. 4.

*The causes of the Characters of Joy.*

**Y**OU have seen what we had to say of the nature of this Passion, before we enquire the causes of those Characters which make it appear. Let us then now examine first the Moral actions, and enquire why Joy is so talkative, so vain, and so credulous; why it confides so much in it self, why it makes it self to be ~~br~~ *br* ~~uffed~~, even when it is present, and why it is so soon weary of the Good which begot it: For these are the most observable effects which it produceth in the Minde, and whence it seems the rest proceed. Let us seek then the causes of its *Prattle*.

There are Passions which will always speak, and others which love to be silent. Silence commonly accompanies grief, despair, and fear: Joy, boldness and anger,  
and

and generally, all those which move towards Good, or resist Ill, are given to Talk; but none so much as Joy: all the rest seem to drive out their words, and cast them forth with violence, as if they were a burden which the soul would discharge; this dispenseth them with liberty, makes them flow with pleasure; and we may say, that it is rather abundance then constraint which sends them forth. Indeed, Joy is full of babble, is pleased to talk, and always findes wherewith to entertain its chat.

The reason hereof is easie enough to be discovered, if you consider, that words being the images of the thoughts, to say many things, divers thoughts must form themselves in the Minde; that they must have liberty to issue; that the organs must be disposed to expresse them. Now as Imagination is the source of the thoughts, and that it is more or less fruitful, according as it is more or less active; and that all its vivacity depends from that of the spirits which serve it in its operations: it is necessary for great talkers, that the spirits should be extremely active, and that the organs of the speech should be very moveable: And therefore, since it is

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heat which renders the spirits active, and that humidity renders the body supple and pliable; these two qualities must be found in those who speak much: And besides, the Judgement must not be so strong as the Imagination, that it may not severely examine the thoughts, that it may not withhold them, but that they may all freely vent themselves. This is the reason why young folks and women, the sanguine and the flegmatick, talk more then others; why wine, good chear, and folly, provoke talk so much; and why birds most commonly sing when they woove, because being naturally provoked to get their young ones, their blood works, and becomes fummy, their spirits increase and kindle, and afterwards agitate the Imagination and the organs of the voice.

Which being supposed, it is easie to know why these Passions which move towards Good, or resist Ill, cause us to speak more then the others do; Because in the designe they have to go out, the Spirits must carry themselves to the Brain, and to the exterior parts, which augments the heat, and disperseth the humors, & in pursuit moves the Imagination,  
and



and makes the organs become more moveable: So that all these dispositions meeting with the weakness of the Judgement, which accompanies all the Passions, a great flood of words must necessarily follow there: And chiefly in Joy, since by it the Soul dilates and diffuseth it self, and that there is nothing whereby it can more disperse it then by speech, which is the true flowing of the thoughts; besides that the Imagination is freer in this Passion then in the rest, in which either the absence of the good or the presence of the ill constrain it, and involve it in cares which it hath not in Joy, possessing its good with security and confidence, without distraction, and without finding any obstacle to stop its conceptions, or hinder the issue of them.

For what concerns *Confidence*, as 'tis a Passion which perswades us that ill is far from us, and that although it should present it self, we have power enough to overcome it; we need not doubt but those who are joyful and content, are of the same belief, being in possession of Good: For Good hath that property, that by its presence it estrangeth ill, and fortifies the soul in the enjoyment there-

of: because that in perfecting of it, it in some manner increaseth it, & makes it appear greater & more vigorous then it was: Considering that being wholly occupied and ravished in the enjoyment of Good, and not minding those difficulties which may traverse its designs, it trusts that it can have no ill success: and filling it self thus with good hopes, it believes and undertakes all, and nothing seems difficult unto it. But what foment its audacity the more, 'tis the heat it stirs up in all the parts: For, as this quality is the principle of all the vigour they have, the Soul, which perceives how she hath enlarged her self, perswades her self that her strength is also increased, and consequently imagines that she is the more secure, having so much assistance both to assault and resist Ill. Now because this vain Confidence is a kinde of Pride, which lifts up the Minde above it self, and flatters it with an imaginary excellency, thence it happens that the Joy thereof is commonly *Insolent* and *Presumptuous*, that it loves to be flattered, and easily falls into the praises of it self, being, as it is, so babling, and so greedy to express it self.

Yet

Yet, this presumption hinders it not from being *Complacent, Facile, and Credulous*; although pride render men opinionate and untractable; because that entertaining it self but with the vain hopes it conceives, and justling onely those which oppose them; it willingly hears those which favour them, and is easily perswaded by their flattery; its confidence making it fancy all things possible; besides the possession it hath of good, is that which produceth and foment it; it follows the qualities of good, which is to communicate it self; and so consequently renders it self sociable, easie, and complacent.

But how can joy leave in the soul a *desire of it self*, seeing it is there present; and that it seems it is a thing incompatible with that satiety which we said it brought? To resolve this difficulty, we must suppose that pleasure may be present two manner of ways, when it actually toucheth the soul, or when memory calls it back to the thoughts; necessarily begetting desire; forasmuch as its conceived as a thing which is no more, and which yet leaves in the memory all those allurements which render it desire-

able: the other being actually present cannot in that respect be wished for ; for, that desire moves only towards those things which we have not ; but only then what we conceive something which we do not yet possess : as when we desire the continuation of it, or that the delightful object doth not wholly, or all at once present it self to our knowledge ; and then what remains to be possess'd, entertains and enflames the desire.

Now the object presents it self not all at once, either by its own defect, or by that of the power which receives it ; for there are things which we cannot enjoy but by a succession of time, and which must be several times retaken, to get an entire and perfect possession of them. Thus an excellent discourse, a sweet musick lecture, the delight of eating and drinking, require time and several repetitions to be thoroughly possess'd : But there are others also which depend not on time, and yet wherein the soul must employ it, to have a perfect enjoyment of them ; whether it be by reason of the difficulties it meets, as in the enquiry of Sciences ; or by reason of their excellency that they cannot all at once be comprehended, and  
where-

wherein it always findes new subjects of admiration : Such is the knowledge which we have here below of Divine things, which cause that torrent of delight to flow into the will, which never quencheth its drought, and always leaves it an ardent thirst, which even Eternity it self cannot quench.

Thus see yon have how Pleasure can beget desire ; let us now see how it can cause *Satiety* ; It is evident, that things may satisfie two wayes, either when they no longer flatter the Senses with pleasure, or when they disgust them ; False Pleasures, as those of the Senses, become distastful and importunate ; because they are not absolutely convenient for nature, they surpass the natural capacity of the powers, and their use weakens and corrupts the organs : but those which are pure and true do never disgust, because they never exceed the natural reach of the Soul, but they perfect it, and instead of burthening and weaking, they ease and fortifie it : It is true, they may give a little, because the minde being a lover of novelty, and finding it no longer in an object whereto it hath long applied it self, it also findes not that satisfaction which it



took at the begining, and seeks by change to nourish its desire and inclination. But we have spoken enough of these things wherewith Moral Philosophy is full; let us examine the Characters which Joy imprints on the Body.

Of all the many Characters which Joy imprints on the body, There are the looks onely, the serenity of the forehead, Laughter, Caresses, and disquiet, which are caused by the Souls command; all the rest happen without her thought, and have no other cause but the agitation of the humors which necessarily produce those effects.

For the Looks, there are three kinds common to this Passion, for it renders them sweet, dying and unquiet; we will say, what is the cause of these last, when we speak of the disquiet, and impatience which appears in all its other actions.

The Looks are *sweet*, either because they are modest, or because they are laughing; and these are proper to Joy, which causeth the lids to fall a little, and contract themselves; and which fills the eyes with a certain pleasant splendor. Now this splendor comes from the spirits  
which

which arrive in those parts; and the motion of the lids is effected by smiling, and by the design which the soul hath to preserve the image of the desirable object, as we shewed in seeking the causes of amorous Looks; so that we have onely these which are called *dying*, which require a long examen.

We have already said in the discourse of Love, that they were called so, because those which dye cast forth the like, lifting up their eyes on high, and half hiding them under their lids. But that seems very difficult to conceive, that Looks which accompany Languor, Grief, and Death, should be found in the excess of Pleasure.

Yet as there are several things contrary which have common effects, because they have common causes; it may also be that this kinde of Look findes the same cause in Grief, and in Joy, in the pangs of Death, as in the ravishment of Pleasure. Let us then examine the reasons why they are to be found in these troublesome Passions, that we may see whether there be any which may be accommodated to Joy. First we need not doubt but

but Grief lifts up the eyes on high, and looks up to heaven, as the place whence it expects help to drive away the ill which afflicts it : For Nature hath given that instinct and inclination to man, to have recourse to superiour powers, when he believes himself abandoned by the rest : So that without minding it, his mouth invokes them, his eyes turn towards them, and his arms are lifted up to crave their assistance. It also happens that this Passion, which would flee the ill which presents it self, gathering up within it self, draws along with it all the more moveable parts, and so retires the eyes in, as if it thought to hide it self, by hiding those organs whence she seems most to shew her self. Or rather, it comes from that the parts, being void of spirits, which the force of Grief dissipated or transported elsewhere, they of themselves repossess their natural situation, which is to be a little lifted up : For it is certain, that the situation of the parts, when they rest, is more natural then that which they have in action, wherein there is always some kinde of constraint : And we must consequently believe, that the eyes which take that site in sleeping, seek it as the most

most calm, and most natural for them : So that it seems the looks become dying in Grief, as they do in Sleep by the flight of the spirits which leave the eyes to their rest. Death may also cause this effect, by the convulsion which often accompanies it, and which makes the nerves retire to their origine ; or, by reason of weakness, cannot retain the parts in that tension which their action requires ; so that the lids fall, and the eyes are lifted up, taking again, as we have said, their natural situation. Of all these causes, there is onely the gathering up of the Soul, and the drawing back of the Spirits, which are to be found in Joy, and from whence these dying looks may take their birth : for they have no assistance to implore, nor convulsion to fear. But in the transport which the enjoyment of Good gives the Soul, it often quits the exterior parts, gathers the spirits inwardly together, or carries them elsewhere ; and so forsaking the eyes, leaves them the liberty to regain their natural situation, which makes them appear languishing and dying.

*The Forehead is serene*, when it is smoothe and without wrinkles ; and this smoothness comes from that all the muscles are extend-

extended, and equally draw it out on every side; or from that they are all at rest, and leave it in its ordinary situation. Now it seems that Joy causeth a serenity of the forehead in both manners: For it is certain, that as it hath the property to dilate and disperse the soul and the spirits, it seeks to do the same in all the parts of the body: So that because the muscles cannot move but by contracting themselves, it never intends to move those of the forehead, since it would cause a motion contrary to its designe, chiefly, their action being not necessary in this encounter, as that of the eyes might be, and of the tongue, and of others which it agitates in this Passion for particular reasons. The Forehead then remains calm, and without contracting it self. On the contrary, it seems to open, and on all sides to extend it self, by reason of the spirits which rarifie the parts, and makes them appear the larger. Yet because that in Laughter the forehead becomes smoothe by the stretching of the muscles, which equally draw it upwards and downwards, it might seem that Joy which causeth Laughter, caused also that tension, and brought that serenity to the forehead as well by moving



moving as by flacking the muscles. But in the following Discourse we will shew, that it is not Joy which produceth that effect, but the Surprise, which is the true cause of Laughter. 'Tis not but that the Soul without that Surprise may extend the forehead, by contracting the muscles; but then it is a feigned and forced serenity, as that of Flatterers, of which *Aristotle* says, that the Forehead is ἀτενές, that is to say, stretched, and not contracted, as the Translators have explained it: for it is the Muscles which are contracted, but the Forehead which is extended and made smoothe by their contraction.

All *Caresses* are not properly effects of Joy: Take but away the serenity of the countenance, the smile, and the sweetness of the eyes, the rest proceed from the Passion of Love, which subjects the soul to the good which it conceives, and fills it with a desire to possess it: For the offers of service, respectful complements and civilities, are so many marks of submission which it renders to the perfection and excellency of the person it loves: and the embraces, kisses, and amorous looks, are witnesses of its desire, and of the care it takes to unite it self thereunto.

For

For *Laughter*, although it seem to be a particular effect of Joy, yet it is not always to be found with it : And when it accompanies it, it owes not its birth to it alone : there are other causes which contribute thereunto, and which excite an emotion in the Soul quite different from that of Pleasure. So that we were not afraid to call it a *Passion* ; not considering the outward motion onely which appears on the face, but that which the soul inwardly suffers, the nature and effects whereof we will examine in the following Chapter.

There remains now the *Disquiet* and *Impatience* onely, whose causes we are to enquire. But we must first observe, that they are not in all kinde of Joy : there are calm Pleasures, wherein the soul feels nothing of Impatience ; wherein we may say, she rests in her motion. Such are those which accompany the exercise of Vertue, the knowledge of the Sciences, and the possession of Supernatural good. In a word, pure and true Delights do never disquiet the soul ; they always leave a calm, and a pleasing serenity : And although they often moves desires which agitate it, we may say, they are little windes

windes which purifie it without causing any storms ; or, that they are like those sweet smoaks which the flame raiseth, which nourish it in stead of dissipating it, and which rather entertain the equality of its motion, then disturb it. But it is not so with false delights : As by little and little they make themselves felt and seen as a remedy for grief, there must, until they are wholly possess'd, always remain somewhat which is displeasing in the Minde. And then you cannot wonder if Impatience accompany the desires it hath to be delivered from it, and to see it self enjoying that perfect pleasure wherein the end of its grief consists. But it foresees not that its contentment is to finish there also, and that as soon as it hath an entire possession of the Good it seeks, it will be disgusted : So that being not to be satisfied, it cannot but suffer perpetual disquiets ; seeking what it cannot finde, and meeting what it never sought. Besides, all these vain hopes which Joy inspires, breed divers designs : and as it runs from one to another, without stopping at any, it is impossible, in this agitation, but that all its actions must appear unquiet, its discourse without order, its  
looks

looks inconstant, & all the body in a continual motion ; whereunto also the sparkling of the spirits contributes, which tickles the nerves and sollicitates the parts to move themselves ; considering also that those Pleasures cannot be had, but by the action of the corporal powers which at last tire themselves, disquiet must accompany them, since its an effect of wearisomeness.

These are the Characters which Joy imprints in the body by the souls command : Now let us see those which are caused without her ardors, and which by a necessary consequence, proceed from the agitation which is made in the humors, and in the spirits.

The *vivacity of the eyes* comes from their splendor and motion, which are the undoubted signes of life and vigour, since death renders them obscure and fixt : as the Spirits then disperse themselves in Joy, and as they are luminous and active, the eyes which abundantly receive them, and which are transparent, and easie to move, become agile and resplendent ; besides that the humidity which is spread over them, being agitated by the motion they make, the light becomes more trembling,  
and

and causeth a certain moving luster, which strikes the sight with several rays; and presents to the imagination the motion and noise which the sparkes of fire cause at their birth whence they are said to crackle: Now this *humidity* may come from two causes; either because the lids in shutting themselves crush the humors they contain, and render the eyes moist; as we will more particularly shew in the discourse of Laughter; Or because that heat and the spirits open their passages, and dissolve those humors, which afterward runs on the parts and make them moist: nay even if the brain be very moist, thence they draw rivulets of tears, which are as they say quite different from those which Grief useth to move, not only in their cause, but even in their quality; for they are cold in Joy, and hot in grief; although it seems as if the contrary should happen, since Joy heats, and Grief cooles; and that hath even obliged some to say, that the teares of Joy were warm; but it is easie to agree, and give a reason for the difference; by saying, that the tears which Joy sheds, are truly cold in comparison of others; but that they seem colder, because they run down a  
 O face



face which that Passion hath heated by the effusion of spirits : On the contrary, those of Grief are colder in effect ; but as they fall on the cheekes, which the flight of spirits hath deprived of heat, they seem to be hotter ; in the same manner, as hot water affords divers sentiments of hot and cold, according as the hand is hotter or colder. But of this more exactly hereafter in the discourse you have of Tears.

For that *redness, that good case, and that vaporous heat* which appears through the outward parts, they also proceed from that effusion of spirits, which draw along with them the blood, and the sweetest vapours which raise themselves in the veins, and swell the parts they arrive at, colouring them vermillion, and inspiring them with a sweet and moist heat.

The *trembling of the lips* comes also from the Spirits, which abundantly flowing into those parts which are soft and suspended, agitate them with the motion they have, and make them appear trembling, as it happens to leaves which are shaken with the winde, or with rain.

The *voice grows fuller*, because the muscles which serve to form it are loosned  
by

by heat, and give it a greater and larger passage; it is true, that it sometimes becomes *sharp* and *shrill*, but that is the effect of a vehement laughter, which contracts the muscles, & streightens, the conduit of the voice; or else of impatience, or some other impetuous Passions which mingle themselves with it, and oblige the soul to drive it out with violence: it often *stops it self* all at once by the souls ravishment, which causeth it to forget the most part of its ordinary functions, and leaves the organs of the voice without motion, and without action.

In fine, it is from thence that all natural vertues draw their force and vigour; for as they do not work but by the assistance of the spirits, when they come and shed themselves on the organs, they must necessarily grow stronger, and their functions must be done more perfectly: so there are no ill humours which may corrupt the purity of the blood, seeing the vertue which concocts them is always mistress of them, and that which expels them findes them obedient: for the spirits melt them and send them to the surface, and open the passages to let them out: So that it is true, there is no Passion  
 O 2 which

which is so great friend to health as Joy, so as it be moderate : for if it be excessive, it changeth all natural oeconomy, it quencheth the heat of the intrails, and at last by *Mortal Syncope*s, or by *incurable languors*, it causes even the loss of our lives. We have already touched the Reasons in the former Discourse, where we shewed, that Love and Joy carried the spirits abroad with precipitation ; it often happens that in the violence of that transport they lose the union which they should have with their principle, whence follow Faintings and Syncope*s*. For I doe not esteem that the dissipation of the Spirits, as is commonly said, is the principal cause of those actions, since so many watchings, so many toyles, so many sicknesses, which dissipate them more then any Passion whatsoever, cause not these sad Symptomes ; but according to my opinion it comes from that they disunite, and separate themselves from the heart ; and that the Soul being unable to animate the separated parts, or communicate any vertue to them, the actions which they ought to do must cease by this separation which the vehemency of their motion caused. This is the cause why water  
cast

cast on the face, oft-times puts away those faintings, and sends back the straggling spirits to the heart, which would not be, were they quite lost: It is not but that here they make a great dissipation, as they abundantly disperse themselves on all the parts, and principally on the outward; and the soul, which is wholly occupied in the enjoyment of good, takes no care to continue the course, and to produce new ones, it must necessarily make a great loss of them, and consequently, natural heat must diminish; whence comes weakness, and the languishing of the parts, the corruption of the humours, corroding diseases, and at last death. It might be demanded, why Joy causeth death rather than Love or Anger: but we have shewed this in the particular discourse of the Passions.

There remains nothing now but the *Motions of the Heart, of the Arteries, and of Respiration* to be examined, which are all alike in this; that they are great, rare, slow, and without vehemency, unless this Passion be excessive; for then they become little, weak and frequent, and even often they quite cease to be. The hearts motion then is rare and slow, because the

heat is not vehement, having sent it with the spirits towards the outward parts. So that having no need of any great refreshing, it hasts not so much to move; considering that also the soul, which is ravished in the enjoyment of good, minds not the motion of the heart, but as it is urged by necessity; whence it comes that it moves slowly, and with great intervalls. But to supply its negligence, it every time very much opens, and extends it, recompensing its neglect by the greatness of its motion. Now because there must be always some vigour, thus to open and extend that part, when the violence of the Passion hath dissipated its forces, the motion of the heart must become weak and little, and the necessity it hath to move for the generation of spirits, renders it quick and frequent, because it cannot supply its slowness by the greatness of the motion: So that if the weakness be extreme, it loseth also its swiftness, and so becomes slow and rare, and at last quite ceaseth. The same is done in the Pulse, and in Respiration; for they have the same customs, and the same causes with the hearts motion, as Physick teacheth us.





## CHAP. IV.

*The Characters of Laughter.*

**I** Know not why *Socrates* heretofore said, that Man was a ridiculous creature : But I know, if any reason can make it credible, we need go no further to seek it, then in Laughter it self ; since there is nothing so ridiculous, as to see him who undertakes to control all Nature, and who believes himself to be her Confident, to be ignorant of what is most proper and familiar to him ; To laugh at every moment, without knowing wherefore ; and to know neither the subjects nor the motions which form this Passion. For all the great men of the past ages, which have enquired the causes thereof, have freely confess'd that their mindes were incapable of that knowledge ; remitting

us to that Philosopher who laughed continually; and that it was hid in the same depth wherein he had enclosed the Truth.

Now although we do not think ourselves clearer sighted then they, yet our designe having obliged us to handle this Subject, we are constrained to go beyond them, and to undertake a thing wherein they lost their courage. But what success soever we have, the Discourse cannot but divert and please us: for, if it do not discover the nature of Laughter, yet it will at least augment the number of ridiculous things.

To begin therefore according to the Order we have hitherto observed, we must first draw the picture thereof, and then enquire the causes which produce it.

Now as it may be weak, mean, or vehement, it is certain that we are chiefly to observe the Characters of the later, because that in all kinde of things the Greater is always to be the measure of the Lesser, because its effects are more sensible then the others: nay, we may even say, that there are no Passions, how violent soever, which cause such great alterations in the body as this doth.

For

For if you consider the Face ; The Forehead extends it self, the Eye-brows decline themselves, the Lids contract themselves at the corners of the eyes ; and all the skin about them becomes uneven, and wrinkles it self all over : the Eyes extenuate and half shut themselves ; they grow sparkling and humid ; and even those from which Grief could never draw a tear, are then obliged to weep: the Nose crumples up, and grows sharp ; the Lips retire, and lengthen themselves ; the Teeth discover themselves ; the Cheeks lift themselves up, & grow more firm ; and sometimes the middle of them sweetly hollows it self, and forms those delightful pits wherein the Poets lodg'd Laughter with the Graces : the Mouth, which is forced to open it self, discovers the trembling and suspended Tongue ; and the Voice which issues, is nothing but a piercing and interrupted sound, which cannot be stopped, & which ends onely with the loss of our breath : the Neck swells, and shortens it self ; all the Veins are great and extended ; a certain sweet splendor disperseth it self over all the face ; and how pale or severe soever it be, it must needs grow red, and appear content.

But

But all this is nothing in comparison of what the other parts suffer : The Brest is so impetuously agitated , and with such suddenly-redoubled shakes, that we can hardly breathe, that we lose the use of speech , and that it is impossible to swallow whatsoever it be. So pressing a pain riseth in the Flanks, that it seems as if the intrails were torn , and that they would unfold themselves. In this violence, we see all the body bend , and wreathe , and gather it self together. The Hands are set on the sides , and press them forcibly ; sweat gets up in the Face ; the Voice is lost in hiccoks , and the Breath in stifled sighs. Sometimes this agitation gets to so high an excess , that it produceth the same effects as Medicaments do , that it puts the Bones out of joynt , that it causeth syncope , and in fine, that it gives death. The Head and the Arms suffer the same throws with the brest and the flanks ; but you may perceive how in these morions they throw themselves here and there with precipitation and disorder ; and that after they have been cast from one side to the other , as if they had lost all their vigour. The Hands become feeble , the Legs cannot support them-

themselves, and the body is constrained to fall.

These are the principal parts which usually form vehement Laughter : For, to describe all the diversity of motions; air, mine, and the posture it puts every one in, were as much as if one would delineate all Men at once : since there is not one who in laughing makes not some particular face ; And it is certain, that there are as many kinds of laughter as there are different faces. Even that interrupted sound which accompanies it, is so divers, that two men are hardly to be found, who shall have it every way alike.

For the Mean Laughter, it causeth almost the same alteration in the face, and agitates the breast and the flanks in the same manner as vehement Laughter ; but 'tis with far less violence. It also takes not away respiration nor speech ; it onely renders the voice grosser. Even sometimes it causeth it to pass the nostrils, and make an interrupted bellowing. Neither doth it cause grief or languor in the parts, or any of those troublesome accidents which are in the other.

To conclude, the Smile, which is the weakest & the least of all, causeth no alteration



ration but in the face, and chiefly on the lips and eyes: for the lids a little contract themselves, the eyes sweeten, and the lips lengthen out themselves, without obliging the mouth to open, and without changing either the voice or speech: Even often it is onely observable in the lips, as when it comes from disdain, or from dissimulation, or from some sickness.

To discover then the source of all these motions, we must first see what those things are which move us to Laughter: for, being as the Object and the Matter, they are also the first Causes which contribute to its birth. Yet is it not a thing so easily determined. And it seems as if Nature would render it self ridiculous in ridiculous things, having made them so far distant the one from the other, and so different amongst themselves, that it is almost impossible to finde any general notion, or common reason, which may reduce them under one kinde.

For we see that Laughter comes from pleasant and facetious actions and words, from admiration, despight, scorn, caresses, tickling, and even from some sicknesses. And as at first it seems as if there were no relation between all these things,  
we

we may easily believe that Laughter is an equivocal word, which marks effects of a different nature ; and that that which comes from the most part of these Objects, is feigned and lying, and hath no real form of Laughter.

In effect, all those who have spoken of it, have placed them under divers kindes ; some more, some less, according to the several motives of that Laughter which they fancied in ridiculous objects : (I take here the word ridiculous, for all what moves Laughter.) Now because the resolution of this difficulty wholly depends on the knowledge of this motive, and that it is impossible to discern true Laughter, or those objects which are truly ridiculous, if we know not the principle, and the reason why it moves it ; we must examine the opinions which have been on this Subject, that we may chuse the most reasonable, which may serve for a foundation to know the nature and the effects of this Passion.

But we must first observe, that Laughter which is made by the convulsion of the muscles of the face, was never taken by any for a true Laughter, being a thing against Nature, whereto the Will never  
con-

contributed, as it doth in all other things: Such perhaps is that which succeeds the wounds of the Diaphragma, and that which that herb of Sardinia causeth, which is called *Apium risus*, whence the Proverb is of the Sardinian laughter. Even they say that Saffron, the Tarantula, and some other Potions, produce the same effect. But perhaps the Laughter which is caused by these later, is no true convulsion, no more then that which arrives in doings, and in the fits of the Mother; and that it may have the same motive as true Laughter hath, as you will see hereafter.

This being supposed, we might at first suspect, that those objects which cause Laughter, are those which are pleasing and delightful; because that Laughter and Tears being contrary, they must have contrary causes; and therefore that Laughter comes from Joy, since Tears proceed from Grief. In effect, it seems that Laughter is never separate from Pleasure; and even those who force themselves to laugh, endeavour always to appear merry and contented. Yet because all pleasing things do not move Laughter, that even it happens not when  
Joy

Joy is at the highest; and that Beasts, which are affected with that Passion, are not capable of Laughter; we must hold it for undoubted, that that then is not the general motive, and that the Reasons to maintain this opinion do onely prove that the objects ought onely to be pleasing, but not that they are therefore ridiculous. And if Scorn and Indignation cause a true Laughter, it is most likely that acceptableness and pleasure are not always to be found with it.

This consideration hath made some think that Admiration was the cause of Laughter, and that when any wonderful thing presented it self to our Mindes, it at the same time formed this Passion, and that for that cause Man onely laughed, because there was none but he that admired; That facetious words and actions were ridiculous, because they are new, and that Novelty is the source of Admiration; That, in fine, ignorants and fools laughed more than wise men, because they finde more things to be admired than they did. But although at first this opinion take the Minde, yet doth it not satisfie it; and hath its difficulties as well as the former: For, there are divers  
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This consideration hath made some think that Admiration was the cause of Laughter, and that when any wonderful thing presented it self to our Mindes, it at the same time formed this Passion ; and that for that cause Man onely laughed, because there was none but he that admired ; That facetious words and actions were ridiculous, because they are new, and that Novelty is the source of Admiration ; That, in fine, ignorants and fools laughed more then wise men, because they finde more things to be admired then they did. But although at first this opinion take the Minde, yet doth it not satisfie it ; and hath its difficulties as well as the former : For, there are divers  
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things wonderful, and which we admire, which do not make us laugh : even if admiration be very great, it hinders Laughter. And it is to no purpose to say that it ought to be mean and light to move it, since it often happens that we laugh at those things which we very much admire. Indeed, the address which a facetious man hath to represent the actions, the words, the gestures of another, to tell jests, to make subtil and ingenious encounters, is no less to be admired than that of a Painter who makes some excellent designe, or of a man who seriously relates very fine things : Why then doth the admiration which that causeth, excite Laughter, and that of this hinder it ? Are there not an hundred kinde of things which are new, which are admired with mediocrity, as the most part of those are which are rare, which yet cause not Laughter ? On the contrary, are there not some which seem to have lost the grace of a novelty, and which cannot beget admiration, which yet are ridiculous ? He who tells a good tale, is often the first that laughs at it ; and yet it is neither new nor admirable, seeing he knew it before. As there are then ridiculous things which  
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are marvellous, and others which are not so, we must seek the cause elsewhere than in Admiration.

Many, to shun these difficulties, have joyned these two opinions together, and said, that Joy and Admiration was the true motive of Laughter; and that if there are wonderful things which move it not, it is because they are not agreeable, in the same manner as the agreeable are not ridiculous unless they are marvellous. But it is certain, that the greatest part of the inconveniences which we have observed, are herein also to be found; and that there are divers things which are pleasing and wonderful, which never move Laughter. Is there any thing so fair or so admirable as the Sun? All the diversities of flowers and fruits which the seasons bring us, all the treasures which the earth affords us, all those master-pieces wherewith Art furnisheth us, and all those rarities which strangers send us, Are they not delightful? do they not oblige us to admire them? Yet was never any body seen to laugh at the sight of all these things.

Others have imagined that all these opinions might be maintained with modification;

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dification ; that it was true, to speak absolutely, Joy and Admiration did not cause Laughter, but when they were recreative, that is to say, when they were not serious, and that they happened in Plays ; then they move it ; and that Nature requiring these divertisements, to refresh the Minde and the Body, and give them new forces, it by that exterior motion made the pleasure appear which it there searched. But are there not Plays and divertisements which do not cause Laughter ? And should we reduce them to facetious things, how should we finde them in ticklishness, in the encounter of friends, in indignation and in anger, and even in the admiration of serious things ?

This is what the Philosophers have left us touching ridiculous things ; But since they do not satisfie us, let us see what the Poets and Orators have said on the Subject : for the Ridiculous is the object of Comedy ; and the Orator is sometimes obliged to employ it in his Discourses. *Aristotle* and *Cicero* must be consulted about the business. The first, treating of Comedy, defined what was ridiculous to be A deformity without a grief.

grief. And truly it seems, that what we call Ridiculous, is an imperfection which in appearance causeth no ill to him who hath it : For, did we think it would cause any, it would not move Laughter, but Compassion. And this deformity is observable in all what's done or said against the custom, expectation, or opinion of the Wise.

As for *Cicero*, he confesseth there is deformity in the ridiculous ; but he will have another condition then that which *Aristotle* observed : For he says, that its Nature consists in representing ugly and deformed things with a good grace. And if there are words and actions to be found which delightfully discover the defects of others, they will infallibly move Laughter.

These two Opinions have without reason been followed or rejected by many Philosophers. For those who say it comprehends not all ridiculous things, and that there is no ugliness or deformity at the first sight in persons which are dear unto us, in tickling, and in divers other serious things which make us laugh ; lastly, that an impertinent performs actions and discourses with an ill grace,



which are extremely ridiculous : Those, I say, are deceived as well as others who in general seek the nature and essence of what is Ridiculous, binding themselves to these definitions, as if they perfectly express it, and perplexing their minds to excuse the defects they meet in them: for it is certain, that neither the one nor the other consider the Ridiculous but in relation to the Stage or the Bar; that *Cicero* observes that which befits an Orator, and that *Aristotle* comprehends all the ridiculous Subjects which may serve in Comedy. So that the Objections made against them are vain and weak, forasmuch as tickling belongs no ways to the Theatre, no more than impertinencies done with an ill grace are not admitted into the Rules of Oratory. And indeed, to shew you that *Aristotle* did not discourse of the Ridiculous like a Philosopher, and that he enquired not its essential form, he hath not mentioned those deformities in those places where he examined the causes of Laughter. And were we to suppose it, would it not be useless to know the nature of this Passion? What reason is there that an object should move Laughter for being deformed without grief?

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I know well that there are some who have said that Laughter was composed of Grief and Joy ; that that proceeds from deformity , as Joy comes from that it is without Grief ; and that in the combat which these two Passions give the Minde , are formed those contrary motions of the heart, of the Diaphragma, and of the other parts, which appear in Laughter. But what likelihood is there that Sorrow should have a share in this action ? How can it cause a violent agitation, or subsist so long with that excess of Pleasure , being so little and so light as it is figured ? What Grief can we be sensible of at the meeting of persons we love , in the relation of good news, or in some ingenious encounter ? And we must not say that the *Smile*, which these objects move, is no true Laughter : for the one differs not from the other , but in that one is greater or less, and we see every moment, that the same object moves Laughter in some, and but Smiles in others.

These are the most considerable opinions which have been on this Subject, which in my opinion are all wanting, in that they suppose that there are divers kinds of ridiculous things and of Laugh-

ters ; and that there can no general notion be found , which can be equally common to them : for I cannot imagine that Nature, who is so regular and so uniform in all its other actions, should forget it self in this ; that she would give several causes to one effect ; and that it being true that all kinde of Laughter hath somewhat that is common , the soul should have no general motive for so common and general an action.

We must then endeavour to discover it, and if we do not succeed, use the same excuses which the difficulty of the enquiry afforded those who made it before us ; since perhaps, there is nothing in nature whose knowledge is more hid, then that of this.

Whereunto that we may attain, we must first consider : that we never laugh, but when the soul is in some manner deceived, and surpris'd ; as may be seen in all the ridiculous actions which *Aristotle* calls deformities without grief ; since they are all against the custome, against the expectation, and against the sence of the Wise.

It is the same thing in the unexpected encounter of a pleasing thing,  
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and in an injury which we receive from a man we did beleve ought not to offend us; in the good, or in the ill, which happens to those who are worthy of it: For there is therein every way somewhat, which by its novelty surpriseth the minde, which is to be found even in tickling, whence it comes to pass, that we laugh not when we tickle our selves, because we are not new, nor strange to our selves.

Yet this surprise must be light; for if it be violent, it astonisheth the minde, and so powerfully averts it, that it cannot go to the outward parts to make them move. So that objects which are very wonderful, and extremely pleasing move us not to laughter, but to ravishment and extasies, as terrible ones cause fear and astonishment; 'tis not that we say that the lightest surprise is that which moves laughter the more; it is onely to be understood, in comparison of that which astonisheth or ravisheth the minde; for it is evident that the greater, so as it do not disturb and carry away the spirit, will cause the more vehement laughter; making not only the muscles of the face move, but even those of the flanks and breasts, as in its place hereafter.

*The Characters of Laughter.*

This surprise must also be pleasing, and those ridiculous objects must produce some kinde of Joy in the soul. It is manifestly sensible in facetious things, and in the encounter of friends : and we never seek the occasions of laughing, but for the pleasure we think to finde therein. And although we may doubt of that Laughter which indignation, scorn, and anger sometimes move ; yet we will shew, that nevertheless there is still somewhat which affords contentment, either true or feigned : for it is certain, there is a lying and dissembled Laughter, wherein effectually there is no sensible pleasure, and in which we onely feign we receive some ; which is very common in flattery and complacency. Often, even although the object be pleasing, the soul will finde in it more pleasure then it is capable to yeeld, and so moves, and, as they say, tickles it self into a Laughter.

But what I esteem most considerable to understand the nature of Laughter, it is, that we seldom use it alone, and that the most part of those objects which powerfully excite it in company, move it not at all in a solitude ; so that it seems company affords somewhat to its production, that  
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the soul will make it appear that she is surpris'd ; which would be needless, were there no witness of what she would do : so that she ought not to move Laughter when we are alone. And if in company there happen a pleasant surpris'e which moves it not , it is because she will not make it appear ; as when there is somewhat that displeaseth her , or when prudence or dissimulation hinder it. Yet must we not believe that she makes use of laughter as a mark taken at pleasure , such as those are which proceed from our choice and invention ; but as a natural mark , which hath a necessary connexion with the emotion she represents.

To know what this connexion is , and the particular reason which obligeth the Soul to use this motion rather than another , to mark the surpris'e she is in ; you must suppose that in all surpris'es the Soul retires , and reenters her self , the encounter of an unthought-of thing opposing it self to the liberty of her thoughts , and forcing her to recollect her self the better to discern the presented Object : and then if she intend to make her condition known , she must , according to the Law which proportions the organs and the effects

effects to their causes, stir up in the outward parts some motion like unto that which she suffers, and consequently cause the muscles to retire towards their origine as she retires and recollects her self in her self.

Now because the Minde may be surprised by troublesome objects as well as by pleasing ones, this retraction of the muscles may be as well with grief as with joy: and indeed, you see that in Tears the lips and some other parts of the face retire in the same manner as in Laughter. Whence it is, that there are persons in whom it would be difficult to discern at first sight the one from the other, so like they are to one another: which hath made some think that Nature, who begins our life with crying and tears, made an essay, and designed these touches which were to be perfected in Laughter, which is never formed before fourty days after birth. Yet as we can never say that the retraction of the lips, which accompanies grief, is a true Laughter; so we must thence conclude that Laughter consists not in the simple motion of the muscles, but that there is also a certain air which Joy sheds over the face, and which causeth

causeth the principal difference.

However it be, Laughter being principally destin'd for conversation, the objects which particularly respect it, are those also which the most easily cause Laughter: Such are the actions and facetious words which comprehend all what is uncomely and deformed, light hurts purposely done or received out of folly, cheats of small consequence, jeers; in a word, all deformities without grief: for all these things move Laughter, forasmuch as they mark the defects of those qualities which are necessary for conversation; as, of a good grace, of decency, of advisedness, of kindness, and of the rest: the Minde finding it self surpris'd, when it sees contrary actions to those vertues which are the foundations of society and of a civil life.

All the difficulty which there is herein, is, to know why the Soul would have the surprise it suffers in these encounters appear; for it seems as if it were a defect, which she would do better to hide then to discover. In effect, it is a badge of Ignorance, to suffer our selves to be surpris'd with a Novelty, as it is a mark of Malice to be pleas'd at the defects of others: Whence  
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it is that Wise men laugh seldomer then others , because that they are neither Ignorant nor Malicious; that few things are new to them , and that they easily excuse imperfections. Yt if you consider that Man is naturally a lover of himself , that he always pretends excellency and superiority ; we will not think it strange, if, seeing the defects of others , he seeks to testifie that he is exempt from them , and so would make you believe , by the surprise and astonishment they give him, that he is more perfect then they are. Now if a man laugh at his own defects, it is the same as when he is angry with himself : for , the trouble which these Passions involve the Minde in, hinders it from discerning the objects which move it, and make it esteem that strange , which is its own. However it be, this reason is general for all ridiculous deformities , and for all things which we scorn : It may even sometimes be applied to that laughter which Anger and Indignation move, forasmuch as either of them supposing some injustice , either in the offence received, or in the good or ill which we see happen to those who are unworthy of it ; the Soul, which testifies the astonishment  
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it causeth, would also silently perswade, that she is not capable of those ill actions, and that she is too just to do good or ill to those who deserve it not. And it is evident, that in this thought she findes herself tickled with some secret joy which accompanies this pretended excellency; but it is small, by reason of the displeasure which goes along with these Passions; the thought of the present ill stifling it even almost at the same time that it is formed: whence it also happens, that this Laughter is light, and of a short continuance.

Now if in these encounters we are sensibly touched with any pleasure, we need not doubt but that all the objects which cause Laughter are not pleasing, as we said at the beginning of this Discourse. All the difference which there is therein, is, that the Pleasure which follows them hath divers principles: To some, it comes from self love, and from that proper excellency which the soul is glad to make appear: to others, it comes from the love of benevolence, and respects society, which requires the communication of goods and pleasures: For when we laugh at the sight of a friend with caresses and com-



complacencies, we endeavour by that natural language to perswade that the persons, the actions, and the words are pleasing to us, and that we esteem them, either by reason of the excellency they have, or for the pleasure or profit they afford us.

You will perhaps say, that all these conditions are not in Tickling, since that instead of moving Joy, it causeth Sorrow; That there are few persons which apprehend it not; and therefore that it is not likely that Laughter which comes from it, should be accompanied with pleasure; and that the soul should use it for a mark of that pleasant surprise which she is sensible of. But if these Reasons were good, we must banish Pleasure from all the Passions; the object of Love would no longer be pleasing, because that is pungent and unquiet, and that there are but few who fear not to be found therein. We must even say as much of Joy, since it causeth faintings, and that we fear the excesses thereof, and that sometimes it causeth death. I must confess that Grief mixeth it self with these Passions but as a stranger, having no share in their birth or preservation; they owe both the  
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the one and the other to Pleasure; and when that is no more, then they must necessarily dy. Whatsoever we will believe, we cannot doubt but there is Pleasure in Tickling, since it is never made but by a delicate touch which flatters the Senses: For we cannot say that that kinde of Touching can hurt them; since it provokes sleep, and that by harder pressing the parts we harm them not. On the contrary, you must allow it for granted, that the soul is pleased with that kinde of touch, and that it is ranked amongst the caresses; since we never expect displeasure from those who tickle us, but esteem them always as our friends; So that Laughter which accompanies that motion, is a witness that the soul will return the pleasure it receives, and that the person which moves it is grateful to her. Perhaps also that that excellency whereof we have spoken contributes somewhat thereunto; forasmuch as the sense of Feeling being the mark of the good or ill quality of the Minde, and that accordingly as that is more perfect, men are also more sprightly, as Physiognomy and experience teach us, Man by a natural instinct is pleased with Tickling, and forms a Laughter  
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to signifie the perfection of his Senses and of his Minde.

This then is the nature of this Passion, whence in my opinion it is easie to draw the motive of ridiculous objects : for although it seems we have the same Sense with those who have placed the ridiculous amongst new and pleasing things; and that the same absurdities which we have observed in that opinion, are to be met in ours : yet if you observe what we have said, you will see a very great difference ; because that we add to novelty a circumstance which they have omitted ; to wit, that the soul will witness the surprise which that novelty gives her : so that there are new and pleasant things which do not make us laugh ; forasmuch as the soul intends not to discover the sense it hath thereof ; so when we are alone, and fancy some merry matter, we usually do not laugh at it, but onely when we relate it, because then the minde designs to witness the surprise it caused.

I know well it will hereupon be said, that we often laugh alone, and that there are objects which are so powerful that they draw Laughter from the wisest and most solitary men ; and that it is common  
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for Fools to laugh in the same manner. But this Truth destroys not that which we have established; forasmuch as all this happens from the error of the Imagination, which diverts it self from the end Nature had prescribed it. And there are few effects in the Passions, wherein the same disorder may not be: For Example, the Voice, which was given to creatures to shew forth the motions of their Soul, doth often go away through the violence of Grief: Even there are persons who speak and complain when they are alone; and yet it is against the institution of Nature, who destined the voice and speech for instruments of society, and to serve for that communication which creatures ought to have together. Now all this proceeds from the disturbance the soul feels, and which makes it wander from the way it should keep.

And without doubt, the laughter which is observed in doatings, comes from the same source; the Imagination forcing ridiculous objects, which afterwards move the Appetite to produce Laughter. For although it be difficult to comprehend how she can figure any pleasant thing amongst the griefs those evils produce;

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and that Reason, which is sometimes at liberty in these encounters, sees nothing which contents it; that she even confesseth this Laughter to be forced, and yet that she cannot hide it: it is nevertheless very true, that there is still a secret pleasure, either in the superiour part of the soul, or in the sensitive. For the alienation of the Minde takes away from frantick persons the sense of ill, and giveth liking to the Ridiculous Chimera's which are there formed, to move Laughter: So that if Reason be not hurt, the Pleasure must be hid in the Senses, and unwittingly to the Understanding it causeth that commotion there. The Imagination discerns not always exactly the Pleasure which the objects form in the particular Senses, either because it is distracted or surpris'd, or because the impressiion they make is secret; although still the spirits, the humours, and the bodies agitate themselves powerfully. So the first motions of Passions happen in the Minde unawares: and there are divers things which move us, which we can hardly say whether they are troublesome or graceful: we must not then wonder if we sometimes laugh without knowing the cause thereof; it is  
sufficient



sufficient if the Senses have a confused and secret knowledge to stir up afterwards that motion in the Appetite : for there is so strong a connexion between these powers, that the one is no sooner touched by the object, but the other represents it. In this precipitation, the Soul hath not time to discern what it doth; and the parts are sooner touched, then she is advised of it; and she is not then able to stop the shake which she hath given her self; the spirits and the humours having received the impression thereof, whose impetuosity cannot be so suddenly stayed. And hence the difficulty comes to hinder Laughter when it is vehement, although it be a voluntary action; in the same manner as it happens in other Passions, wherein the Soul suffers the same violence as he who runs into a precipice: for although he gave himself that motion, it is no more in his power to stop it; he must abandon himself to the swinge he hath taken, and to that steepness whence he hath precipitated himself.

What remains of most importance, is to know why, of all creatures, Man onely laughs, since it appears that other beasts also may be surpris'd with Novelty: and

it is not impossible but that they may have a design to shew how sensible they are thereof, since they make other things known by their voice and by their actions. But as there are but two motives which oblige Man to witness the surprise which ridiculous objects cause; to wit, his own excellency, and civil society; it is certain that the first is useless to beasts, who are never touched with glory or with vanity. And for Society, it is so imperfect amongst them, that it respects but the necessities of the body, to which indeed they work in common, but yet it is but for their particular interest; so that there is no communication of the pleasure which every one resents; considering that the novelty of agreeable things surpriseth them not, to speak properly, no more than they do men who are quite stupid; because they do not discern whether things are new or no, considering them but as if they had always been present, although, for to know them new, we must imagine they were not always so.

And it is for that reason, that children laugh not before the fourtieth day: for the Soul, which is as it were wholly buried,

ried, and as it were drown'd in the great quantity of the humors they have, is capable of no knowledge, but according as humidity diminisheth these lights encrease, and so by degrees she gets the power of laughing, beginning by a smile; and after being capable of vehement Laughter. Perhaps some will say, that the excellency wherewith man flatters himself, and the love of society, can no more reach a childe at forty days old then other creatures, being not of a condition to minde either of them; & therefore that they then are not more capable of laughing then beasts are, if there be no other motions but those for laughter.

But it is not necessary exactly to know those things for which we have a natural inclination; for desires being born with us, carry us also by the pure instinct of nature to the enquiry of those goods; and from the time that our soul hath the liberty to act, she produceth actions which shew the secret sence she hath of her own excellency, and of her being destined to a civil life. Now as beasts are capable of neither of them, they have also no share in this instinct, whose source is hidden in the intellectual parts of the

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Soul, and can come from no inferior power : for although there are some kinds of Laughter, which seem wholly to depend from the sensitive, as that which comes from tickling : it is certain that without the influence of the Reasonable Faculty, the Senses cannot produce that effect ; its light insensibly disperseth it self on all its actions, and the neighbourhood they have therewith alwayes communicates somewhat of its perfection, which still serves to shew that beasts are not capable of laughter, because their Senses are deprived of that brightness, and of that influence which Reason causeth to flow in ours.

Before I finish this discourse, I must tell you by the way, who those are who are most given to laughter ; it is certain, that young folkes laugh more willingly then old ones, women then men, fools then wise men, sanguine then cholerick, flegmatick then melancholy ; And this comes from that laughter being made by a pleasing surprise, which we would make known, those are more easily surpris'd, & are naturally merrier then these : For the spirits which move quick, and which consider not things are most easie to be deceived ;

ved; and those who are the most merrry, are the most easily touched with pleasant objects, and are more fit for conversation then others who are severe and serious: Yet as there are divers sorts of ridiculous objects, that some respect our proper excellency, and others society; that there are some which require a great knowledge, as quaint jeers, and others wherein a mean one is onely requisite: So there are also some persons which are more easily touched then others; the young and cholerick laugh rather at the defects of others, then the old and the wise, being naturally insolent and proud; fools& ignorants observe not jests, or witty encounters, women and those of a sanguine, complexion are more fit for the laughter which caresses occasion, because they have a natural inclination to flattery.

After having thus discovered the nature of laughter, and of ridiculous things, we shall easily give a reason for all the effects which this Passion produceth on the body; for there are none which proceed not from the surprize, and Joy which the Soul resents: the splendor of the eyes, the redness of the face, and tears come



chiefly from Joy ; all the rest come from surprise which contracts the muscles towards their principle ; the soul using that exterior motion to shew that which it suffers interiorly ; because as we have said , she retires into her self when she is surprised ; so that this contraction of the muscles is as the spring of all the other effects of laughter : And perhaps there is no other made by the souls command, all the rest being of necessity and without design : For it is very unlikely that the soul should intend to form all those plights and wrinkles which are to be at the corners of the eyes, to hold the eyes half shut, and the mouth open to render the voice piercing and interrupted, and so of the rest. But these are effects which by a necessary pursuit accompany the motion of the muscles.

The better to understand this, you must remember from what we have already said, that when the surprise is light, the muscles of the lips, forehead, and lids onely move ; because the Soul intending to make the emotion it feels appear, useth this as the most manifest and most sensible motion : But when the Surprise is  
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great, it moves all the muscles of the face and brest ; and in fine, if it be very vehement , there are none in the whole body which are not moved.

Now as there are but few muscles which have not their contraries, and that there are some which lift up a part, or carry it on one side ; there are also those which bring it down , and draw it on the other side : And yet in this contrariety of motion there are some stronger then others ; the actions they are to perform requiring more or less strength : From thence it comes, that in Laughter you see the parts take that figure which this contrariety of motions gives them. So the *Mouth* keeps half open , because the muscles which serve to open and shut it, each moving his way, it must necessarily retain that figure ; and even it must appear more shut then open, because the muscles which serve to shut are the strongest. So the *Forehead* remains smoothe and stretched, being equally drawn upwards and downwards. The *Eyes* also are half shut, because the muscles which incline the lids , are stronger then those which lift them up ; and so consequently the wrinkles are formed about the temples, the  
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skin, which is delicate and fleshless, being drawn by the motion of those muscles, and constrained to grow uneven. The *Nose* shrinks up, and grows sharp, because the muscles which lift it up, having no contraries, have always the liberty to lift it up, which cannot be done, but that the skin which covers them must wrinkle, and the extremity of the *Nose* appear sharp. The *Lips* lengthen out themselves, because the muscles which draw them on the side, are stronger than those which contract them; and even the upper lip stretcheth it self more than the under, because its muscles are more powerful. The *Tongue* shortens it self a little, and suspends it self, being equally drawn on either side. The *Neck* contracts and thickens it self, because the muscles shorten when they retire themselves. The *Cheeks* for the same reason lift themselves up, and grow firmer; and, in some, a little dent is formed in the middle of them, the skin being tied in those parts by some small veins which restrain it whilst the surrounding parts lift themselves up.

Before we seek the causes of the breasts and flanks motions, and of that interrupted

ed voice which appears here ; we must observe that the muscles do not retire themselves in a vehement laughter by an uniform and continued contraction, but by several girds and shakes ; whether it be that in the designe the Minde hath to witness its surprize, it moves it self, and redoubles its struglings ; or that the novelty of the object sollicitates it, and by fits represents it self unto it, as it changeth to be in other Passions, wherein every moment the soul animates and transports it self by those new Idea's which the object forms in the Fancie.

This then is the reason why those redoubled motions appear in Laughter, and chiefly in the flanks, by reason of the Diaphragma which is there situated, and which is extremely moveable. And because the agitation is violent, it causeth also a pain in this part, whither the hands cast themselves, as if they ought to ease it. For although they unwittingly do it, Nature who takes care for the preservation of its parts, directs the hands to those places where the ill may offend them, without being led thither by Reason or Discourse. So when a man falls, or is ready to receive a blowe, the hands by  
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a natural instinct cast themselves presently before the face.

As for the rest, as the Diaphragma is the chief organ of respiration, that must necessarily be made with the same shakes which that part suffers : and afterwards the voice must be interrupted, because the air issues not equally, and the muscles which should form it, start up as the Diaphragma doth. For we said, that all the muscles retired themselves by surprises in a vehement laughter : Whence it happens that the head, the shoulders, and the arms shake themselves in the same fashion as the flanks do. In fine, this general contraction which is made in all the organs of voluntary motion, is the cause that all the body folds up and contracts it self, that it is impossible to swallow any thing, because the muscles which serve for that action, contract and shut up their passages, and that Laughter sometimes causeth the same effects as Medicines do, by the compression of those parts which contain the humours. Now forasmuch as these frequent girds of the Diaphragma hinder the liberty of respiration, and are the cause it cannot contract and enlarge it self as it ought ; thence it comes, that at last  
breath



breath and speech is lost, that the pulse grows irregular; weakness follows, and sometimes death: For respiration is so necessary for life, that when it is hindered, the forces are lost, and the whole economy of Nature changed. For which cause, in this necessity the soul struggles very much to oppose this disorder: sometimes she makes haste to draw a great quantity of air, as if she stole that refreshment from the violence of her passion: sometimes she makes a long breathing, to drive away those fumes which the heat of the heart at every moment produceth, and so forms those precipitated sobs and sighs which mingle themselves with Laughter.

I do not stay particularly to examine why the Pulse beats irregularly, nor why weakness and synopes happen in this encounter: It is well known that the Pulse and Respiration follow one the other, being both destined to one end; and that weakness and faintings come from the disorder which is made in the heart, which cannot suffer a greater, than the hinderance of respiration.

Before we end this enquiry, it will not be amiss to rehearse the opinions which have

have been hitherto held touching the motion of the muscles in Laughter ; because the absurdities in them , will the more confirm the causes we have deduced. All who have spoken thereof, have agreed in this point , that this motion is made out of necessity , and that the Soul is not mistress thereof : But some have believed the Spirits were the cause ; others , that it was the agitation of the heart. The first say that Joy driving the Spirits to the outward parts, it therewithal fills the muscles, which are thereby constrained to shrink up and contract themselves, as it happens in convulsion fits. But if this were true, all the Passions which carry the Spirits outwardly , must move Laughter : Shame , Anger , and Desire would never appear without it ; and a Fever and pain would cause a man to laugh continually , seeing they fill the face with blood and spirits. Others who believe the agitation of the heart is the source of all these motions , say that Joy causing it to move, the Diaphragma which is tied to it, must necessarily do so following its motion , and that after it moves the muscles of the brest and lips , wherewith it hath communication and sympathy,

thy, as it is easie to judge by the convulsion of the lips, which always accompanies the hurts of the Diaphragma. To confirm this, they assure us, that beasts laugh not, because their Diaphragma is tyed to the heart with looser and weaker ligatures than it is to mans, whence it is that the heart cannot shake it whatever commotion Joy make.

But this opinion is no less absurd than the former; for then in all the Passions wherein the heart is extraordinarily agitated, the Diaphragma must be shaken in the same manner, and must move Laughter; and even Laughter could never be without the agitation of the Diaphragma, if it were true that its contraction causeth that of the lips, which are all contrary to experience: And therefore the observation they bring of the ligaments of the Diaphragma is inconsiderable, and serves not at all to prove what they pretend: For if that of men is more strongly tyed to the membrane that covers the heart, than to that of beasts; that comes from that it being inclined downwards, and altogether hanging in the humane body, by reason of its upright figure, it is necessary it should be more strongly  
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ly born up then that of beasts which hath not that situation.

As for the sympathy it hath with the lips, I finde it somewhat doubtful, because besides that it communicates not to them all the dispositions it hath, we have often observed great hurts in that part, which have not excited Laughter; and if that have sometimes happened, I beleieve not that it was an effect of the convulsion; since *Hippocrates* says, that who so receives a wound in that part, laughs from the first of his hurt, and feels no convulsion till the third day after; so that it is likely it was not the convulsion, but rather the raving whereinto he fell, which caused that Laughter after the manner before said.

It is then a most certain thing, that the motion of the muscles which forms Laughter, is a voluntary action made by the souls command, and not by necessity, as tears, sweat, the lustre and the redness of the face are, so that they may be hindered and restrained at first, when the humours and the spirits are not yet much shaken; and thence it comes that oftentimes holding your mouth shut, your breath and voice being constrained to pass through  
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the nostrils, cause an interrupted bel-  
lowing, which is observed in laugh-  
ing.

As for the luster of the eyes, the colour  
and blushness which appears in the face ;  
for the voice which becomes grosser for  
sweat and tears, we have already said they  
come from Joy, which every way disper-  
seth the spirits, dissolves the humours,  
and opens the passages. But I would add  
for what concerns Tears ; that the mo-  
tion of the muscles, which causes the eyes  
and the lids to move, is the principal cause  
thereof. For when they come to close  
themselves, they press and squeeze the  
humors and the spirits, and constrain  
them to issue ; and indeed all those parts  
are soft and moist, and the under-lid is  
situated so, that it easily receives the hu-  
mors which run from the neighbouring  
parts : It seems even that Nature desti-  
ned them to that end ; were it to enter-  
tain the Freshness, and natural humidity  
of the eye, or to discharge it from that  
which might incommode it ? And there  
is a great appearance that the little holes  
which appears on the side of that lid,  
when it begins to quit the corner of

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the eye, was onely made to void those humors; when they are in too great a quantity; which being so, we need not doubt but when that part contracts it self, the humour which is contained therein, must be forced to issue at that little passage, and must render the eyes moist: And what confirms me in this opinion, is, that tears run not in Laughter, as in Joy, and in Grief: it seems that they are forced, and that they issue but by compulsion; and it is easie to judge that their source comes not from so high a place as the others, and that you need go no farther then the neighbourhood to seek it; neither are they ever so abundant as in those Passions, the eyes from whence they come being not capable to contain so much humor as the brain; and even those whom sorrow hath never caused to weep, by reason of their natural driness, finde tears when they laugh, because they come but from the neighbouring parts, no more then those which sore eyes sometimes cause. Let us then conclude that Joy carries the humors, and the spirits to the outward parts, and that the agitation of the muscles stirs them, and sends them

them out, whence comes teares in the eyes, and sweat in the face, and flanks; Because that it is in that place where the Motion is most violent, and the skin most delicate.

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CHAP.

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## CHAP. V.

*The Characters of Desire.*

**I**F the Soul (according to *Socrates*) hath wings, they can onely be in the Desires; it is they which move her wherever she will go: they raise her up to heaven, and make her descend into the abyfs; and by a strange and wonderful kinde of motion, they cause her to go out of her self without dividing her, and transport her everywhere without ever quitting the place wherein she is. And we may say, that Nature was never so wise or ingenious in any of her works, as in this: For, having made the Soul void and unprovided of all things, and having placed all necessary goods without her, she was obliged to furnish her with a vertue which might carry her towards them, and which might nnite them

them together. She must have afforded her, in the prison wherein she hath enclosed her, the use of that liberty which was born with her; and without breaking her chains, she must suffer her to go thorow the Universe, which she hath submitted to her laws and judgements. In fine, after having been drawn from heaven, and been banished from the place of her birth, she must needs give way, at least to her thoughts, to return sometimes thither. And that during her exile she may have some commerce with those Divine things wherewith she is allyed, which at last ought to crown the pains and labours of her banishment; now she hath given her Desires, to draw her to those goods she was without; to set her at liberty, and to raise her up to heaven, which is the place of her nativity, and the source of her felicities.

We must indeed believe that the principal objects which ought to move this fair Passion in us, are not to be found on earth, nor amongst vile & transitory things: our Soul being immortal, needs not corruptible things: And if there are things which conduce to her perfection, they must be more noble and more excellent then she:

she must seek them from above. In a word, God alone should enflame her Desires, since he alone can fill that infinite depth and immense vastness of hers.

Neither did this wise Philosopher who fancied she had wings, think they were for any other use but to carry her towards that primary and sovereign Idea of Good. When he perceived her to descend, and run after corruptible things, he then believed she had lost them; that she rather got a fall, then made a flight; that she was then in the body, not onely as in a Prison, but as in a Tomb: For being sensible of no natural motion therein, nor seeing no agitation of that Divine fire wherewith they say she is clothed, he had reason to believe that she ceased to live, or that she transmigrated into the nature of those Bruits which onely look on the earth, and which according to his opinion are rather shadows then that they have true beings. It is true, that the Senses which are under her conduct, oblige her to seek what is fit for her; that she must provide for the necessities of the body, which serves her in her functions; But Reason hath reduced her cares to such narrow bounds, and Nature hath render'd  
necessary



necessary things so common, that there is scarce a way left to wish them : at least, if we must employ thereabouts a part of our Desires, it ought to be the weakest, and the least.

It were indeed to offend the dignity of the Soul, and the excellency of those Goods whereto she ought to aspire, to destine so many noble desires which she can form, to such vile and useles things; it were even in stead of enriching her, to render her necessitous, since it is certain, that Desire is the measure of Poverty, and that as many things as the Soul desires, so many things doth she stand in need of : So that, in seeking more goods for the body then are needful, she renders it so much the more necessitous, and oppresseth it with the poverty she hath caused.

Lastly, the Desires being as the pawns and earnestes which the Soul gives of her subjection to those things she seeks, if they are conformable to Nature, and her dignity, this subjection is honest and lawfull ; they are her first steps towards vertue and felicity : But if she engageth her self to subjects unworthy of her, she submits her self to her enemies, and opens a door to all vices & mischances which may befall her.

We ought to engage our selves no further in these Considerations which belong to Moral Philosophy ; we will therefore pursue our Designe, and present you with the Characters of this Passion.

It is a bold undertaking, to designe the picture of Desire. It is so subtil and so changeable a Passion, that it is almost impossible to finde colours wherewith to represent it : It is a *Proteus* which assumes as many figures as there are imaginary goods : It incessantly flies like the winds, it everywhere mixeth it self like the air : And Picture cannot have a greater trouble to form bodies for these things, than the Minde to designe the Characters of this Passion.

It is true, there are Desires which may easily be exprest ; that without difficulty we may describe Ambition, Avarice, and Luxury ; that Hunger, and other Appetites of Sense, may easily be exprest. But to touch these differences, is not to form a general Idea of Desire, as we have obliged our selves to do. To follow then the Order we have proposed, we must take off this Passion from all particular objects, and consider onely the effects which are common to all kinds.

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We will then begin by its Moral actions.

Although Desires, as children of Love, make the same advance and growth with Love it self, and that at their birth they are but small sparks which by little and little increas, and afterwards become great flames; yet it often happens that they break out all at once, and that at first they have the same force and vehemency which time useth to give them; you would think them those artificial fires which kindle in an instant, and whose flame no sooner appears, but it devours all the matter which serves for its food, which carries with it all that stops it, and overcomes all that opposeth its course. For at the same time that they take in the Minde, they occupie all its thoughts, they take away its reason, and hurry it towards the desired good thorow all obstacles and hinderances that oppose it. At that time, she flights all counsels, and all danger: Defence kindles her lusts, and difficulty provokes them: Neither doth she believe that her Desires can be noble, unless they are extreme; nor generous, unless they be rash.

In pursuit of these dangerous Maximes,  
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you need not wonder that he who is moved with this Passion, becomes insolent and importunate; he speaks but of what he wishes, he incessantly demands it, neither doth a refusal give him the check; and when his mouth is stopt, his eyes still sollicite for it, and beg more eagerly than his words did before. You may observe a certain impatient ardor, and I know not what urging avidity which seems to pursue the desired good. And when it is presented to them, you would say they throw themselves on it, that they ravish it, and devour it even with their looks.

But if in this encounter his eyes are clear sighted, his judgement is blinded; he neither considers his own nor other mens condition. In his pursuits, there always is either an insolent liberty, or an infamous submission: and all the excuse he hath for his impudence or baseness, is, that he believes he deserves what he desires, and that absolutely he must have it. To obtain it, what cares and what pains he takes! He goes, he comes, he seeks; he adviseth with one, he asks help of another; he threatens, he begs: in fine, he is never at rest, & suffers no body to be so: for even when he is alone, he turns over in  
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his mind all those powers which may serve or traverse him. He hath no thoughts where in some of his friends or of his enemies are not interested : and whoever could see the designs he meditates in his heart, would say that it was there where all the storms were formed, which were to trouble all the world. But indeed, all these tempests commonly are nothing else but a noise ; they vanish in useless and impotent designs ; and all the ill they cause, is that they drive away the tranquillity of the Mind they move in. And truly, whoever desires, is exposed to four Passions, which, as impetuous winds, incessantly agitate him : Audacity and Fear, Hope and Despair, do alternatively shake him, and often so hastily succeed one the other, that they mix and confound themselves together. He fears, he hopes, he despairs at the same time ; he wills, and he will not ; and often, through the violence of desiring, he knows not what he desires.

His irresolution and his disquiet appears even outwardly : for he cannot remain in one place, or in one posture ; he turns from the one side to the other ; he sits, he riseth, he goes with long strides, and



and stops of a sudden. Sometimes he so profoundly doats, that you would think him ravished in an Extasie ; and at that instant he awakes, sending forth, with great sighs, now a sharp, and now a languishing voice. His words are interrupted with sobs and tears, and his discourse is full of long exclamations and passionate accents, which commonly accompany impatience, regret, and languor. He most commonly speaks to himself, interrogates and answers himself : And if others entertain him, his minde is always distracted, his answers confused and entangled, and sometimes even his speech is cut quite off, what endeavour soever he makes to utter it. His mouth is filled with a clear and subtil water ; his tongue trembles by intervals ; and licking his lips, he moistens and whitens them with froth. His face is swelled, and grows red ; his head advanceth it self on the desired object ; his arms extend themselves towards it. Even his heart, as straitned and contracted as it is, darts it self out in great throbs, and raiseth the brest with so much violence, that the ribs sometimes are disjoynted. Appetite and Sleep forsake him. Sometimes he grows Gray in a moment ;

moment; all his radical moisture is consumed; his body grows lean and dry; and nothing but Enjoyment or Death can terminate his languor and his desires.

PART. 2.

Of the Nature of Lust.

~~I will it seem as if there were~~

~~nothing but a dry, barren, and~~

~~sterile, and unproductive~~

~~land, which is the~~

~~state of the soul, when it is~~

~~devoid of all~~

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## PART. 2.

*Of the Nature of Desire.*

**A**T first, it seems as if there were no difficulty to say what desire is ; as it never forms it self, but for those things which we have not, and which we would have, we may easily beleieve that the object which excites it, is an absent good that the Soul endeavours to draw neer unto it, and that the motion it makes towards it, causeth also all the essence of this Passion.

But who ever examines it carefully, will finde more doubts then resolutions, and in pursuit will confess that there are many things to be desired in the common knowledge of the desires ; for besides that we desire the good we possess, and that ill oftentimes is wished ; it is evident that this definition confounds desire

Desire and Love, and makes no essential difference which may distinguish them one from another; for if the good by being absent moves the desire, we must cease to love that good when it is absent from us, or Love and Desire must be but one Passion, although it be an unheard of thing amongst the Philosophers, that two species should be confounded in one, and that we should cease to love good when it is no longer present. Besides that absence seems not to be the true Object of Desire, nor to be any part of it, as some have thought, since there is nothing in it which is able to draw the appetite to it, being rather an ill than a good; & therefore the desire having no other object but goodness, and seeing the motion it makes towards it ought to be like that of Love, it must needs be (against the maxims of the most wholesome Philosophy) that they are not two different Passions; and that Love, Desire, and Joy it self, are but the same thing.

Now this conclusion took its original from that these Passions were defined in too general termes, and that the difference of the motion was not specified, w<sup>ch</sup> was proper to every of them: for since  
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all their essence consists in motion, if they are different amongst themselves, it must be by the diversity of their motions, and their definitions must express the particular agitation which is found in every of them.

To finde that then of Desire, we must suppose that this Passion alwayes follows Love: because we onely Desire the things we beleewe good; and when it excites our desires, it is alwayes under the show and appearance of good: For the death which an unhappy man seeks, seems to him the haven and end of his miseries: danger to men of courage is the fountain of glory and honour. In fine, all the world desires the estrangement of ill, for that it is a good to be delivered from it.

Desire therefore hath good for its object, and consequently it alwayes follows Love, since Love is the first motion the Soul makes after good; in effect altho as the appetite hath received the image, and Idea of good, it moves towards it, and at that instant unites it self to it, because it is presented to it; and this union causeth the Passion of Love, as we have said before: but because this union gives



us not always the perfect possession, whether it be that the good presents it self not alwayes wholly, or whether the things besides that Ideal being which they have in their thoughts, have another true and real one, which also requires a real union; when the Soul hath acknowledged that it hath not wholly enjoyed the good which was presented to it, it is unsatisfied with the first motion it made towards it, not to have been united to its Idea, it seeks it out of it self, and forms this Passion which we call Desire.

This being granted, it is easie to conceive what the motion of the appetite is, when it is agitated in this encounter: for in Love it moves straight forwards to the Idea of good; but in Desire it seems to quit it, and as if it would run out of it self, it darts it self towards the absent object: So that it is very likely these two motions are made one after the other, principally if they are violent; for every of them wholly moving the Soul, and driving it several wayes, it seems as if they could not meet together, and that of necessity the appetite must first unite it self to the imagined good; since it pursues it, when it is absent, and that

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afterwards it takes its first course going from one to the other, after the same manner from time to time; in effect we experiment, that the desires appear not in the Soul, but as lightnings; that they are onely throws and flashes which it gives it self, and that their continuance depends onely from the doubles and frequent reprises they make.

So that they may be exactly defined, in saying, *That they are Motions of the Appetite, by which the Soul darts it self towards the absent good, purposely to draw near and unite it self therewith.*

Yet must you not imagine, that the Appetite in darting it self so, goes beyond its natural bounds, and that as animate bodies it goes from one to another, to advance towards the absent good: all this agitation is made in it self, as we said in the discourse of Love; and although it seems as if it would cast it self out, it onely beats against its bounds, and drives those parts as waves, which beat on the shore without being able to go farther.

But since in effect the Soul goes not out of it self, and that consequently it approacheth not the destined good, we may enquire

enquire to what purpose the motion serves which it makes in this encounter : we must doubtless confess that it is often useless to it , if it penetrates not into the Faculties, which may move the creature towards the good, and give it the possession thereof : For Nature hath given the Appetite the power to move it self thus, onely to inspire the same Motion into those Faculties which are under its direction. The agitation it gives it self, is the Idea of that which the moving qualities ought to have outwardly ; it is like the chalk, and the designe of a work which is to be finished in the Organs ; but if it rest there, they prove vain and useless throws and sallies ; they are imperfect Motions and unformed desires, which in some manner offend Nature, for that she having destined them for action, they destroy the order and commerce which she hath established amongst the Faculties of the Soul, when they drive them not to the end she proposeth.

In effect, there is so great a relation, and so essential an order between the Desire and the enjoyment ; that we never form desires for those things which we beleieve impossible ; because the Soul at  
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that time hath no end nor aim to work, and can produce no action, unless it have a motive to excite it, and which staggers it, since that the end is the first of all causes, and that which gives them efficacy and Motion.

I know that there are several things we unprofitably seek which can never be acquired, what care or pains soever we take: but for that we do not consider the impediments and obstacles, which we ought therein to encounter: And if reason sometimes proposeth them, and that contrary to its advice we continue to wish for them; this disorder comes from the imagination, which most commonly fancies things feasible, which easily persuade the Appetite thereunto, which afterwards causeth those vain and chimerical desires, of which we have now spoken.

It is far a greater difficulty to know how this darting forth may be effected, when Desire mixeth it self with Fear, Grief, and other Passions where the Soul inwardly retires it self, and venter it self sooner then it seems to have gone out.

We may well beleieve that these Motions follow one another, as we said it happens in Love, that after the presence  
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of ill hath made the Appetite retreat, Desire sends it forth again to seek the good, which is to accrew unto it by the absence of the ill; and that there is thus every moment a continual ebbing and flowing of all these Passions; but I beleeve this happens not always so, and that even in flying, the Soul may make the Motion which the Desire asketh, without being obliged to return the same way. As he who flees his enemy, at the same time gets farther from him, and neerer the place of his security; so it is likely the Appetite retiring it self, may at once shun evil and pursue good: and that the same endeavours and the same strivings it makes to hasten its flight, may also serve to form those desires which it hath to possess the good it fancies; and that it seeks to go out of it self in the same manner, as when there is nothing but what is purely good which attracts it; for the Soul is so much disturbed at the presence of ill, that it seems as if it were not enough to flee and estrange herself from it; but that she must even hide and steal her self away from her self, that she may by precipitating her flight go beyond her bounds, and go out of herself, as



she doth in the pursuit of good. But it is an error which the Passions easily inspire in a blind power, which is not guided by Reason; whatsoever endeavour she makes, she remains still within her own limits, and leaves not those places which she believes she hath abandoned: it is true that the Spirits which follow the Motions, in effect retire to the Centre of the Body, and that the Organs cause a real flight in the creature, which is surprised with this Passion; but all this is without the Soul, and we are to speak onely of what is within.

For the full clearing of this definition we have given, there remains onely to be examined, whether the *Absent Good* is the true Object of Desire; for we proposed at the beginning of this discourse two very considerable Objections which seem to prove the contrary, since it is evident we often desire the things we enjoy; and that Absence being an evil, is rather capable to take off the Appetite, then to provoke it thereunto; so that in this case, the Object of Desire cannot be different from that of Love, and so both must be but one Passion.

For the first we have already shewed in  
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the former Discourses, that when we desire the good we possess, we alwayes fancy somewhat which we doe not yet enjoy, whether it be that the most part of goods not presenting themselves to it in the whole, there must still be a part wanting, or whether this possession being to be but of a short continuance we desire its continuation as a good which is still to come.

To the second, we must say, although it be true that absence draws not the Appetite, and that it is goodness onely, it doth not therefore follow, that Love and Desire have the same Motives, nor that both make but one Passion; for besides that it seems that Motion draws not always its species from the end it tends unto; but ever from the middle through which it passeth to reach thither; as we may judge by the circular Motion, which is onely different from the direct, but for that it makes a bent line; and for that cause should these Passions have but one Object, yet they must be of different species, by reason of the different way they take to attain it; it is true, that in moral things the conditions and circumstances which have no relation with the

Object diversifie the Motives of Actions, and that the absence of Good gives another Motion to the Soul then goodness of it self alone gives; for although it always seeks to unite it self to the good it knows, if it be not present, it must add another design to this first inclination, and take care to draw near what is far from it, before it can unite it self, and gain a perfect enjoyment; so that the true Motion of Desire is the Souls drawing neer, and not the union nor enjoyment; that being the Motive of Love, and this of Pleasure, as we have it elsewhere. Wherefore the Appetite is agitated by several Motions in all these Passions; for in this it Parts it self, and gets out of it self; in Love it binds it self to the Idea of Good, and in pleasure pours it self on it.

PART



## PART 3.

*What the Motion of the Hu-  
mours and of the Spirits is  
in Desire.*

**S**INCE the Motion of the Spirits is conformable to that of the Appetite, we may without much difficulty, say how they are agitated in this Passion, after we have showed how the Appetite in some sort diverts it self from the Idea of good, to move towards the absent Object.

For Love which always precedes Desire, having drawn them from the heart, and carried them to the imagination, to unite them to the image of the good it fancied; Desire follows, which retires them and casts them forth, to come neerer the good it thinks far of: And thence it happens, that the face swells and grows red,

red, that the eyes advance themselves, and seem as if they would go out of their place; the spirits which escape drawing with them the most noble parts, and driving those which oppose their issue.

But it may be demanded, if the Appetite effectually goes not out of it self, is it therefore so with the Spirits? is it sufficient they beat against their bounds, and stop after that vain endeavour? certainly the greatest part pass no farther; as they are the first Organs of the Soul, without which she can effect no perfect action, she with-holds them to her power, neither do they separate themselves from her but with great violence; for if as it is likely, they are animated, or if they are of those instruments which will always be united to their principle, they cannot go far from the Soul without losing themselves; and when that happens, it must be against their intention, since every thing endeavours its own preservation; when therefore Desire drives them to the surface of the Body, the Soul which is constrained to keep within its bounds, keeps in also the Spirits; but this hinders not a part of them from  
escap-



escaping, and the impetuosity of their Motion from casting them beyond their prescribed limits. They are fluid bodies, they disperse and steal away with the least agitation, they penetrate everywhere, and no resistance can stop them; and although as they are Organs of the Soul, they love to be always with her; yet as they are subtil and loose bodyes, which have a great affinity with the air, their first inclination is to deliver themselves from the prison wherein they are, and to leave the mixture of those gross and impure things, to unite themselves to their like.

But it is also true, that they often issue by the Soul's command; which because it cannot leave the body it animates, it sends them to execute its designs, and causeth that transport, and that influence of Spirits, of which we have spoken in our Discourse of Love out of Inclination.

Yet we must observe that all desires drive not the Spirits into the outward parts; there are those which move them not, as those which are formed in the supream part of the Soul, whose actions need no Organs. It is true those desires  
cannot

cannot long stay without the Motion of the Spirits : for the Imagination is so neer the Understanding, that at last it always discovers a part of what it doth chuse ; and then working on the Idea's it hath received, the Spirits run to its service, and agitate the body in the most secret actions of the will ; so that in the most Spiritual Passions, which should be hid from inferior powers, we see they bear a part, and sensibly alter the Body.

There are even of these desires, which are formed in the sensitive Appetite, some which crave no assistance from the outward Senses : For when we desire a good which is no more, or is far distant from us, we know that neither the ears, nor the eyes are employed in the inquiry of it. The Soul alone operates, and even then the Spirits it moves arrive not at these Organs: They cast themselves onely on the substance of the brain, and disperse themselves on this and on that side, without causing a change in the outward parts.

In fine, it is an undoubted thing, that the Desire which accompanies Fear, Aversness, and the other Passions, which flee what is harmful, carries not the Spirits

rits outwardly, as those which purely seek the good, or resist the ill. On the contrary, it retires them inwardly, at least if it cause not this Motion, it resists it not, but follows the impetuosity wherewith the Spirits are carried away. But it is also certain, that when these cowardly Passions have brought them back again to the heart, Desire again darts them further out, as if they were to pass beyond it; and that presently after these former, recal them, making thus a long combat of contrary Motions which cause this great trouble, and violent agitation which is at that time felt in the entrails.

Now we should examine whether Desire dilate the Spirits, whether it drives them with equality; lastly whether it stirs onely the purest blood, and the sweetest humours which are in the veins, as we have discovered was done in Love. But since we have observed that Desire mixeth it self with all the Passions, that it is often with Grief and with Fear, which contract the Spirits, and often with Love and Joy, which extend them; that it always accompanies Anger, how turbulent or impetuous soever it be, and in which the most Malignant humours  
are

are agitated we must acknowledge that all these kinds of Motions are indifferent to it, that it fits it self to them all; That sometimes it dilates the Spirits, sometimes it contracts them; and at other times it drives them with confusion and vehemency, otherwhiles with order and moderation, according to the Nature of those Passions with which it allies it self: Yet this takes not of the difficulty; for since Desire presupposeth Love, it seems as if all the Motions which accompany this Passion are to be found in Desire, and that consequently the Spirits are therein agitated in the same before said manner. But besides that we have not spoken in those places of Love in general, but only of that which Beauty inspires, it is evident that the greatest part of the Passions are formed, and that after Love hath dilated the Spirits, others may be raised which may contract them, to which Desire may ally it self. Otherwise as the emotion of the Soul precedes that of the Spirits, it is often formed of those Passions in which the Spirits are not moved; because the Appetite agitates with so much swiftnes, and so nimbly passeth from one Passion to another, that they  
have

have not time to follow its Motions, and so obey onely the last and most vehement. Thus Love may mixe it self with Desire, without giving to the Spirits the Motion it would have, were it alone, or that it longer or more forcibly possesse the Appetite.

But supposing that Love dilates them, and Desire joynes it self with it, will it not cause any change? certainly when the Soul sees the good absent, and that in effect she possesseth it not, she must bate somewhat of the designe she had to open and extend herself, to unite her to its Idea, and she gathers her self together to pursue it the more swiftly: So that it is likely she contracts not the Spirits in this Passion as she doth in Fear; but that she reunites and somewhat regathers them, driving them towards the absent Good. But we will forbear these things which being too subtil, and too obscure, flee from our sight, and tire the minde; that we may seek the causes of the Characters we have marked.





## PART. 4.

*The Causes of the Characters of  
Desire.*

**L**ove and Desire, being the most general Passions of the minde, are also the most fruitful in actions; but if you respect the causes which are nearest their effects, you must confess that Desire is the most active; and that all human actions, although they proceed from Love, as from their original source, seem to draw their origine from Desire, as from their neereſt and moſt ſenſible cauſe: ſo that we may ſay that Love is as it were the ſeed, but that Deſire is the ſtock or trunk which affords life and motion to all the branches. However it be, we have not undertaken to give an account of all the effects which this Paſſion produceth: it will be ſufficient to examine the moſt general

neral and the most ordinary. And first of all to enquire what it is that renders it importunate, impudent, base, and unquiet, why it is boundless, and how difficulties provoke it.

It is true, that who ardently desires a thing renders himself easily *Importunate*, because the violent Passion he hath to obtain it, makes him blindly seek it, without considering the persons, and without examining the time or the place which might favour him in his designe; he pursues it everywhere, he craves it continually, and as if all the world ought to contribute to his pleasure, he solicites, he urgeth, he tires all those whose succour he may have, and which may make him enjoy the good he desires: besides having no other thought but that, and his minde being continually bent on that Object, reason findes no time to be understood, nor power to contain the sallies of this unbridled Passion. She even suffers herself to be thereby carried away, and so abandons the conduct of her actions to blinde and rash powers.

And even from thence, that *Impudence* comes which commonly accompanies Desire; for as it is a certain boldness which

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makes

makes us with pleasure undertake dishonest things, and which makes us scorn the infamy which they may cause; he must necessarily be impudent who is pressing and importunate; seeing he takes a liberty beyond good manners, and that he fears not the blame which his shamelessness deserves.

But if desire cause boldness, how can it then render a man *Base and Timorous*? It may be said 'tis done at several times; That sometimes we fancy the things we desire are easily obtained, and that sometimes there are great obstacles to be overcome; and that as these different thoughts enter the mind, they introduce either Boldness or Fear, Hope or Despair. Now although this be true, it is also evident, that that Boldness which breeds Impudence, is not always incompatible with Baseness; if it apprehend not infamy, it may fear every other thing; and we cannot doubt but those who solicit with so much urgency and submission a person inferior to them, are possessed with a very cowardly Boldness, and a base and servile Impudence.

*Disquiet, Impatience, and Irresolution,* are also inseparable from Desire; for the  
 minde

minde seeing it self deprived of the good she imagined necessary for her, can take no rest til she hath obtained it. The moments which retard its enjoyment seem years and ages, the least impediments appear great obstacles, and all the means she findes to make her the sooner enjoy the desired good, are in her opinion weak and unprofitable: so that forming at every moment new designs, heaping desires upon desires, and increasing difficulties by her irresolutions she uncessantly agitates and disquiets herself, and findes not even in their possession the end of her troubles, as we have shewed in the discourse of Joy.

But whence comes it that *Desires do thus encrease and multiply*, and that like waves they follow and drive one the other that obstacles make them encrease, and that they have no bounds which can contain them? It is true that the greatest part of our desires are of that Nature that they cannot be bounded, and that they become infinite; but there are others also which never pass their just extent.

To know the reason of this difference, you must suppose that there are desires necessary for this life, and others which

are not so ; those are common to all creatures ; and are inspired by Nature, these are proper to man, and proceed from the opinion and choice he makes, not onely of necessity, but also of superfluous things. The first have their certain bounds, because Nature who leads them is determined to a certain end, from which she never straggles, and wherein she findes her rest when she is there arrived ; but the others are infinite ; for asmuch as the will whence they originally come is an Universal power , which is not to be filled but by the possession of all things ; and which being unable to be satisfied by any one, incessantly runs from one to another, and forms as many desires as there are goods whersof she is in want ; it is not that all the desires which part from our choice are infinite ; when they are ruled by right reason, they have also their bounds, and we may also be sure that they are as natural and as necessary as those which serve the necessities of life : For right reason being nothing else but what is convenient for the Nature of man, the Desires which are regulated thereby, are as it were natural, and by so much the more necessary, as they serve the noblest  
part



part which is in him. But this belongs to another Discourse.

Let us now see, why *Difficulty provokes Desire*; it is not that by putting of the Soul further off from the good she thought readily to enjoy, she obligeth her to use the more endeavour to draw nearer unto it, or else the impediments inspiring new designs, give it also new subject for Desire, which uniting it self to the former, make the Passion appear the greater; but these Passions are not Universal; for they suppose we alwayes wish the good, before these impediments present themselves; and in the mean time it is true, that difficulty and resistance doe often breed a desire of certain things which we had never sought, how desirable soever they were, had they not been forbidden us, and difficult. We must then conclude that the first source of this effect proceeds from the natural inclination which is in man for his liberty, and his own proper excellency: for being a creature naturally free and glorious, he beleeves that difficulties reproach him his weakness, and that prohibition wounds his liberty; wherefore when either presents it self, he raiseth himself against it,

and thinks that bearing himself towards the good, against which they contest with him, he presents those advantages which he received from Nature. Thus far in relation to Moral actions: let us now examine the Corporal Characters.

These are of two kinds as is before-said, some by the command of the minde, others purely natural, and happen by necessity. The first are swelling eyes and urgent looks, the trembling of the tongue, watry mouth, several inflections of the voice, talk and silence, the agitation and motion of the Body.

The *Eyes and Looks*, which are proper to desires, are not onely fixed and settled on their objects; for meditation and attention of the minde may procure that; but there is also a certain ardor and vivacity, which makes them come outwards, and seems to throw them on the thing desired; which happens not to those who meditate, whose eyes sink and grow dim, as *Aristotle* teacheth, and as we shall say in its due place. These Looks then which the Latins so happily call *Instantes*, *Proceres*, & *Devorantes*, that is to say, Pressing, Greedy, and Devouring, whence even that vulgar manner of speaking comes, *he feeds*

*feeds on him with his eyes* ; that is to say, he looks on him with ardor. Those looks are the true images of Desire, which being onely a transport and a folly which the Soul makes towards Good, imprint the same darting in the eyes, which are the most mobile and the most obedient parts of the body, casting them out as much as she can, and as much as they can suffer it : Besides, that the spirits which abundantly run thither, and would go out, drive them forward to make themselves way, and fill them with the lustre and vivacity which we perceive in them.

The *trembling of the tongue* and a *watry mouth*, are effects which serve for the appetite of Aliments : for the Soul, which hath a secret knowledge of what is useful for its designs, knowing that tasting cannot be without humidity, and that the motion of the tongue is necessary to send aliments down into the stomach, brings this water into the mouth, and stirs the tongue, when we see the things we desire, or hear them spoken of ; the Fancie in some manner rendring them present, and causing the organs to do the same thing they would do if they were really on the tongue.

But whence comes this *clear und subtil water* ? Doth it not descend from those kirknels which are in the bottom of the mouth, whose chief use is to receive the superfluous humours of the brain, and to disperse them on the tongue to moisten it? It is evident it commonly proves so, and that the motion of the spirits which the Desire brings into those parts, opens the passages, and makes these waters run the more. But it often also happens, that they come from the stomach, either by the means of those wandring spirits which run thither to cause digestion, or by the contraction of its fibers which squeeze the humour wherewith they are watered, and raise it up on high: for in Desires they sometimes contract themselves so much, that they even overthrow the stomach; and principally in fish, who naturally are all gluttonous, and who pursuing their prey too ardently, cause it to run out of its place, and cast it sometimes even into their mouthes. However it be, we must believe that these two effects belong to the desire of Aliments, and that the Soul hath some reason to employ them to that use. But when she makes them serve other desires, as it often happens

pens, it is an error which comes from its blindness and precipitation, and which persuades that that which is necessary for one designe may also be so for another, although indeed it be quite useless.

The *several inflexions of the voice* which are observed in Desire, do not all proceed from it : As it mixeth it self with other Passions, it borrows from them the sounds and the accents which are familiar to them. Sometimes it lifts it up with Boldness and Anger, sometimes it lets it fall with Fear and Languor ; sometimes it cuts it with grief and astonishment, other times it draws it out with admiration and joy. But the change which this alone seems to give, is the precipitation of words, and the long exclamations which commence its discourses : For the force which follows this Passion, causeth the words to go out in a croud ; and the darting forth of the Soul causeth a transport of the voice, which is always made by the strongest vowels, which most of all open the mouth, as if she would make a freer passage, that she might issue out the more readily. In effect, we never finde the I nor the U in the ordinary exclamations of Desire, but onely A, O, and  
E,



**E**, which she also chargeth with vehement aspirations which shew the force she useth in issuing forth.

*Silence, and confusion of discourse*, are the effects of a great distraction of the Minde, which is common to those who ardently desire a thing, when we speak not to them of their Passion, or when they are with persons which cannot serve them therein: For the Soul quitting with regret the thought of the Good she wants, and incessantly seeking the means to possess it, flees the conversation which might trouble her pleasure and her designe; and re-entring in her self, or rather wandering in the pursuit she makes, she hears not what others say, she silenceth her self, or makes disorderly answers. And her transport riseth often to that excess, that it takes away the use of the Senses, and even ravisheth her into an extasie, as we shewed in our Discourse of Love.

For what concerns the *agitation of the body*, it follows the disquiet or the motion which the soul makes towards Good: for when he who is troubled with this Passion changeth every moment his posture and his place, casts about his eyes here and there, turns now on one side, now on the other;

other ; now riseth, now sits ; goes, and stops ever and anon : they are the effects of his irresolutions, and the divers designs which his disquiet proposeth : But if he reacheth out his head, if he stretch out his arms towards the desired object, if he goes and walks with large paces, and runs towards it ; they are endeavours which the Soul causeth the parts to make to draw neer the good which is distant from it. For although they are often useless, in the error she is she still believes she goes forward, and that casting the eyes, the head and hands towards what she desires, it is as much ground gotten, and that at last she shall arrive at the end she tends to.

We have nothing more here to examine, but the necessary effects of Desire. But as the most part of them are to be found in those Passions of which we have already spoken, we shall without difficulty enquire the reasons, and send back the Reader to the place whence we deduced them: For *sighs and extasies, loss of speech, sleep and appetite*, have herein no other causes but as in Love. *The face grows red and swell'd* by the arrival of blood and spirits which cast themselves on the outward parts, as  
is

is already said. *Tears* proceed from grief which the privation of Good too attentively considered, breeds in the Minde.

*The motion of the heart and arteries is great*, because the soul endeavours to open them, to send forth a quantity of spirits; *frequent*, because of the violence and haste it makes to get them out; and *unequal*, by the mixture of other Passions.

*The body grows lean and dry*, because those parts which digest the humours, and those which are to be nourished by them, being weakned by the flight of the spirits, perform it not as they ought and cannot convert them into their substance, as was said in the Discourse of Love.

There remains nothing now but an effect of Desire, which, being extraordinary, deserves a longer examen then the former: It is, that a *too ardent Desire makes a man grow old in a day*, as *Theoricus*; that is to say, makes the hair gray in a short time, according to the ordinary explication of that passage. For my part, I must confess that the observation is particular enough, and I do not remember that I have seen it anywhere but in that Author. But since the same thing happens in *Fear* and in *Despair*, which in a night change the hair,  
and

and that cares and displeasures make a man grow gray before his time, it is impossible but Desire may sometimes cause the same effect : all the difficulty is to know how it may be done.

You must then suppose with *Aristotle*, that hair grows gray for want of heat fit and natural for it; that it then suffers a kind of corruption and rottenness, and that it happens as to all other things that in corrupting it turns white : in effect we cannot deny but that it is the old age of the hair. And since that of all the body happens from the diminution of natural heat, it is likely it proceeds from the same cause ; when this heat then diminisheth it produceth two effects in the hair ; for the aliment which ought to nourish it, digests not but flies, into vapours, and the air fills the place of the Spirits. Now vapours contain much air, and air is the first cause of whiteness, as we see in scum ; and experience teacheth us, that to make the hair white, we must wet and expose it to the air.

And it is true that heat growing weak, either by little and little, or suddenly, indigestion is the chief cause of whiteness of hair, when the heat is consumed by de-  
ly.

grees ; but when it readily dissipates, as it happens in sicknesses and vehement Passions, it is chiefly the air which whitens it sliding into the pores, and taking the place of the retired spirits.

Some will say, If this be true, the hair of dead men should be always white; natural heat being extinct, and the air environing them, might easily insinuate it self into its pores.

To this it must be answered, that after death there remains a natural heat in the hair, as in the bones, which are long preserved after the expiration of the creature whose parts they were. But this heat is immoveable, and incapable of any fruition of life, being deprived of the souls influence, which gave it efficacy and motion : So there are no more crudities made, because the aliments rise no more thither, and the air cannot occupie the place of the spirits which are there fixt and stopt.

Certainly, we cannot but confess that the soul inspires some vertue into those parts, that she takes some care of them, and that she governs them as she pleaseth; otherwise, what should cause that delightful and regular painting in the plumage  
of



of Birds ? what should so justly compass the eye-brows ? what should so carefully regulate the hair of the eye-lids ? lastly, what should cause all that so well measur'd a diversity which is to be observed in the hair of beasts ? As that commonly follows the species of every creature, it must needs be, that the soul wherein it is contained, conduceth also to this work, and that she at her pleasure disposeth of those parts wherein she causeth so many wonders. This being granted, it is not hard to say how Fear, Desire and Cares may change the hair : for, in retiring the spirits, they derive it of the influence it received from them ; they dry up that spring of life which did rise to its roots, and draw away that vital heat which ran thorow its pores.

It is true, this seldom happens, and there must be a great violence and a great disposition to produce this effect. For there are certain actions from which it is very difficult to withdraw Nature ; and what tempest soever happens to it, she but seldom forsakes their rudder and conduct. Such are the functions of the Vegetative soul, which are principally made by the means of the fixt spirits ; and  
being

being not subject to the power of the Imagination, or of the Appetite, remain quiet, whilst the others erre here and there, and are agitated by the several motions which the Passions impress. But yet it sometimes happens, that, by reason of the conjunction which there is between the parts of the soul, the disorders of the one are communicated to the other; and that the Natural faculty is carried away by the Sensitive; principally in those whose spirits are more mobile, and the substance of their parts more soft. So that those persons whose imagination is very strong, and who have the weakest brain, more easily grow gray then other men, by the violence of those Passions which we have spoken of.

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**CHAP.**



## CHAP. VI.

## *The Characters of Hope.*

**H**E who gave away all he had, and reserved onely Hope, made not so ill a bargain as it may be imagined : He took for himself that which is the sweetest in life, the most durable Good which can be found therein. In a word, we may say, that he had for his share all what he had not, and that he truly divided for himself like a King.

Indeed, as there are no other Goods whereof we are sensible, but those which we possess, and those which we hope for; it is certain, that possession affords not a perfect contentment here below, for that it cloyes the Minde, and takes away the knowledge of the good it  
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possesseth, that it even corrupts the Nature of it, and straight begets a distaste. But Hope, which awakens the Minde, and renders it clearer-sighted, represents the Good as it is, shews it in its purity, and gives a far more delicious taste of it then Enjoyment can : For it is so ingenious, that it separates it self from all the Ills which are mixt with it ; it purifies it self from all the defects which accompany it : and as we may say, that it is then the flower of Goodness which it pours into our soul ; we may also say, that the Joy it disperseth therein is the flower of Pleasure, and the most refined sweetness of Delight. Why should we then wonder, finding it so sweet and delightful, if we enter it into all our designs, if we mix it with all our actions, and if it be the last thing we abandon during life ? 'Tis what alone sweetens the sharpness and bitterness thereof, which patiently makes us bear the disgraces thereof ; and of all the good things which may accrue thereunto, this is the onely one which is compatible with those miseries whereunto it is subject : For, should all ills overwhelm a person, should all mischances and calamities which we can imagine fasten on him, he  
yet

yet may have Hope, which perhaps alone may be worth more to him then all other Goods can be without it.

Of a truth, also, it is of all the Passions the most natural to Man : he is sensible of its growth, as he grows in perfection ; and feels it weaken, when he fails in that. He ceaseth to live, when he ceaseth to hope ; and, to speak soberly, there is none but he alone that hopes : for all other creatures have no more but a shadow of Hope, as they have of Reason ; the Intelligences scarce know it : And when Man passeth into their nature, although he still be capable of Love or of Hatred, of Joy or of Grief, of Fear or of Despair, yet is he no longer capable of Hope.

Certainly, since it is that which leads us to felicity, and which gives us the first taste of it, it would be useless to those who are already happy, and to those which cannot be so : And Man, who alone is in the way of felicity, ought also to be onely touched with this Passion. In the tempests wherewith his life is continually agitated, it was necessary that Hope should be his lanthorn, and the star to lead him to his last port ; and that in the length and dangers of his voyage, he might at least



have the satisfaction to see afar off the end he tends to, and to possess in Idea and by way of advance the happiness he aspires to. For Nature, who never suffers things to arrive at once at their last perfection, would have Man here below have some sensibleness of his, that he might as it were make 'say and taste, if we may so speak, of the Sovereign Good, before he should perfectly possess it.

But since that is the true use of Hope, we ought not otherwise to employ nor abuse so noble an help, in pursuit of so many vain things which occupie our Desires, and which are unworthy of the excellency of our Mindes. That which is destined to nourish and breed up Vertue, must not serve for the nourishment and subsistence of Vice; and that which ought to lead us to Felicity, should not estrange us from it, and precipitate us into misery. For it is certain, that if Hope be not regulated by Reason, there are no ill designs formed, nor evil actions performed, neither are there any ill habits which take not their beginning and their growth from it: It is the seed of all the evil which is committed in the world; it is the source of all the miseries which flow thither:  
and

and in Truth, as well as in the Fable, it may pass for one of the greatest mischiefs which befall Mankind. Whatever it be, it is most true, that their weakness is in nothing more discovered, since, as the Wise man says, all their hopes are but a light froth, which the tempest dissipates in a moment; but a smoke, which the wind carrieth away; and but a dream, which troubles our life with fantasies and chimeras. But we must leave these meditations to Divinity, and see whether we can describe the Characters of this Passion.

The Poets had reason to feign that Hope onely remained in the bottom of *Pandora's* box: for it is certainly hid in the very bottom of the soul: It issues not forth as the others do; all its endeavours are secret; and the trouble it causeth may be compared to those tempests which often rise in full sea, without troubling the shore: What violence soever it brings, what stir soever it causeth, nothing appears outwardly; and, did not other Passions mix themselves with it, it would be very hard to discover it. Indeed, he that hopes is always amongst the disquiets of Desire: and the ravishments of Joy, Im-

patience and Satisfaction equally dividing his Minde; and the privation of good, with the imaginary enjoyment he hath thereof, cause a certain mixture of displeasure and delight, which at once almost renders him content and displeased. But this chiefly happens when his Hopes are uncertain: for the difficulties which are then greater, figure unto him the success the more doubtful; mixing Fear with his Desires, and Despair with his Fear: Then all at once relevating his courage, and flattering his designs with a favourable event, all his apprehensions vanish, and give way to Boldness, Joy, and Perseverance: He no more mindes those obstacles which astonished him before; at least, after he hath measured them with his strength, after he hath seen them overcome by others, and that he may be as happy as they have been; he easily believes to compass it, and that it is sufficient to undertake a great matter, to oblige Fortune. He remembers himself of all the graces that ever he received from her; he in the same manner perswades himself that he deserved them, and that he ought not to expect less; and that having now more credit and power then ever he had,  
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he ought not to doubt of the success he hopes for. He esteems all those which may serve him in this occasion : some he believes are obliged to it by duty or interest ; others , by affection or honour. In fine, he promiseth himself the assistance of all those which he hath seen, or heard spoken of. And weaving thus intricacies with intricacies , he imagines his designs infallible , and that they ought to succeed according as he hath projected them : as if he were already master of the Good he seeks , he thinks he hath the absolute disposal thereof : He destines those who shall share in his good success , and marks those who are to be excluded : and thus making whom he will happy or unhappy, he believes himself the dispenser of the favours and disgraces of his fortune , thence he grows presumptuous , rash, insolent ; he fancies there is nothing that can resist him, nothing he ought not to undertake : He despiseth the designs of a jealous man, and the pursuits of a rival ; and, as if they ought no longer to pretend to what they hope for, he scorns their weakness, and laughs at their despair. In this assurance he abandons the care of his affairs , he no longer mindes his own pre-

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servation ; and, without taking heed of the ambushes prepared for him, he by his negligence loseth the good he assured himself of, and often triumphs over an enemy who hath already gotten the victory over him. In fine, he becomes vain, importunate, and ridiculous ; he continually speaks of the services he hath rendered, of the recompences he hath merited, of the means he hath to oblige all the world. If you will believe him, there is none but he can procure graces and favours; they belong to him onely, and he alone also who can revenge himself if he should be refused : Hereupon, imagining that in effect he may meet with a check, he becomes peevish, and grows angry : To some, he reproacheth their negligence, or their ingratitude; to others, their baseness or perfidiousness : and often, not knowing upon what to fall, he accuseth Heaven and Fortune for the mischief which perhaps will never befall him.

Thus far Hope carries us, when it is unbridled. Yet must we not believe that it makes this progress successively without interruption ; suspicion and mistrust traverse it every moment ; Fear at every  
step



step retains it, Despair sometimes stops it all at once; Desire and Boldness succeeding presently after, it findes it self continually carried away, and restrained by contrary motions: and of the calmest of all the Passions, which it is, it appears the most unquiet and the most turbulent. But to speak truth, we ought not to accuse it for these storms; it is the Passions which follow its train: And if there be any thing which it can do alone, it is, that it establissheth the Minde against those difficulties which appear in the search of Good. So that it was not without reason figured with an Anchor, which truly stays ships, but yet hinders them not from being still agitated by waves and tempests. However, Hope hath no outward Character particular to it; and that which accompanies it, is but a confused mixture of touches which the other motions of the Soul imprint on the body. It may be compared to those ingenious Pictures wherein several figures are seen to represent another which is not there painted: For although you may therein observe the marks of Desire, of Joy and Boldness, and often those of Fear, of Despair, and of Grief; yet all that represents nothing  
else

else but Hope. Indeed, when it begins to be felt, it ravisheth the body, lifts up the head, raiseth the brow, the voice grows firm, the looks assured : And in that air which hath somewhat of severe in it, you may perceive a moderate Joy which sweetens the eyes, a certain serenity which sheds it self upon the face, and a blithe vivacity which animates all its actions. But this Calm lasts not long ; from time to time impatience and disquiet disturb it : They cast their looks here and there, sometimes send them up towards heaven ; they sigh at every moment ; they cannot stay in a place : sometimes they grow peevish and doating ; they grow pale, they lose courage : Then, by little and little retaking their first assurance, they feel their forces augment, they finde themselves heated with a new ardor ; they come, they go, they leap ; they are in perpetual agitation. But, to speak home, these later sallies come not from Hope : As it is a Passion which naturally is the most moderate of all, it never riseth to these excesses : All the motions it causeth, are without violence, and without precipitation : It renders the Pulse firm, without being  
vehe-

vehement ; the Respiration strong, without force : It fortifies the actions of all the parts : It awakens languishing Passions ; it retains those which are impetuous. Finally, it is the most useful of them all, for Vertue, and for Health : Let us therefore enquire what its nature is, and how it produceth all these effects.

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PART

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## PART 2.

*Of the nature of Hope.*

**H**ope is so fine and delicate a thing, which forms and ruins it self by such weak means, which so subtilly mixeth it self with other Passions, and which shews it self so little, as we have said, that those who have enquired the nature thereof, are to be excused if they have not encountred it. Indeed, the alliance it hath with Desire and Boldness is so great, that it is very hard to separate them, and to discern the motion which is proper to every of them : For Boldness is never without Hope, nor Hope without Desire. Besides, the action of the Imaginative faculty glitters so much in this Passion, that that of the Appetite scarce appears : and that is the reason some have defined it by *the expectation of good,*

*good*, which is a pure effect of the Imagination, as being nothing but a belief and an opinion which we have of a good to come.

But besides that we may expect Good without hoping for it, as we will shew anon, Hope would not then be a Passion, being no motion of the Appetite. As for those who have placed it in the rank of Passions, some have said that it was the consummation and the perfection of Desire: Others, that it was a certain confidence we had that the desired good would come. But the first confound it with Desire, the others with Boldness: or at least, if Confidence be a kinde of Hope, as it is most likely, it were to define the gender by the species, and an obscure thing by one which is less known. In a word, all the definitions are faulty, being either too much stretched; or too much contracted; and none of them observe the particular motion wherewith the Appetite is agitated in this Passion; which nevertheless alone makes all its essence, and without which it is impossible to know its nature. We must then make it our Ground, that Hope respects but good to come, and that Desire always precedes it,



it, forasmuch as Desire is the first motion which the soul makes towards that kinde of good, and that we never hope for any thing, without having desired it before. But because there are also those which we desire, which we cannot hope for, (for well may we wish for Beauty, Knowledge, Glory, Scepters, and Diadems, which are most commonly beyond our hopes) that makes us judge them two different Passions, and that their objects, motives and motions ought also to be different.

Now it is not enough for the object of Hope, that the things be thought possible, (for they have that of common with Desire, as we have said;) but besides that, we must believe that they will effectually happen. Yet this belief is not most certain and infallible; for we never hope for those things which necessarily are to happen; but they must be doubtful, and we must imagine that there are difficulties to obtain them. But where can the difficulty be? For it is not always to be found in the things we hope for, since there are some which move that Passion, which yet are very easie; not in the means we employ to acquire them, being often without difficulty to be performed.

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We may then say, that in the things we hope, we always imagine we can never enjoy them but by the means of some other man, whether in effect he labour to make us obtain them, or that he no ways hinder us: For it is certain, that if they were wholly in our own power, and did we believe that nothing could hinder us from the possession of them, they could never beget Hope in us; and the Soul would be content to adde to the Desire, which she would then form faith and assurance that it would happen; which is an effect of the Judgement, and not of the Appetite.

The difficulty then in Hope, comes always from a third, which is as the *medium* betwixt him who hopes, and the thing hoped for; in whose liberty we suppose it is, to do or not to do what we hope. For although we should often hope good from those things which do not freely operate, even from those things which are inanimate; as when we hope that Lands will be fertile, and that Seasons will be pleasant; that a beast will delight us, or be serviceable to us: we fancie them to our selves as if they had that liberty; whether it be that there is in beasts  
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an image of true liberty, or for that we have a natural instinct which secretly instructs us that there is a Superiour power in the world, which disposeth thereof at will, and according as it thinks fit: So that what we hope depending from the will of others whose masters we cannot absolutely be, it is impossible but we must esteem it difficult, and but that the success must seem doubtful. It is not but that sometimes the difficulty may be in the thing it self we desire, and the means we use to obtain it: but it is not considerable in this Passion, being not essential to it. However, from what part soever it comes, we must take it for granted that it is necessary to form Hope. Let us now see what its designe is, and what the motion is which it causeth in the Appetite.

All the difficulties presented to the Soul, either in the search of Good, or assault and flight of Ill, appear greater or less then its forces; that is to say, she believes she can overcome them, or that she cannot resist them: If they are the weaker, they beget Hope, Boldness, and Anger; if they are the greater, they cause Despair and Fear. Now it is likely that in difficulties the Soul doth in it self

self what we outwardly do when they present themselves to us : For as we bend our selves against them, if we suppose we can overcome them ; and as we lose strength and courage , if they appear invincible ; it must needs be, since the motions of the body follow those of the soul , and that there is some relation and resemblance between them , that the soul bends or slackens her self as the body doth , in the encounter of the difficulties she fancies. And indeed , it is the onely difference which can distinguish the motions of the Irascible appetite from those of the Concupiscible : For in these the Soul hath no occasion to employ her force or courage , seeing no enemy she ought to assault, or against whom she is obliged to defend her self. Or if she pursue Good, or flee from Ill, it is without bending or slackning her self.

Since it is then a thing common to Hope, Boldness , and Anger , to bend the Soul against difficulties ; let us see wherein they are different ; and chiefly , what Hope hath particularly therein , it being the subject of this Discourse. We must then suppose that in Hope the Soul distinctly observes the Good, but confused-

ly sees the difficulties : on the contrary, in Boldness and Anger it considers the difficulties more then the good. For although in these the soul assaults ill, to enjoy the good she expects by victory, she chiefly fixeth her thoughts on the enemy she fights against, and thinks onely on the good which shall thereby accrue, but as a thing at a distance, which provokes not as the presence of ill doth. But in Hope, she nearly faceth the good which presents it self; she attentively considers it, and sees but by the way the difficulties which besiege her; so that they do not appear so great, and consequently do not oblige her to use such endeavours to resist them as in other Passions.

Indeed in Boldness and Anger she riseth up and assaults the ill, because she thinks it so powerful, that she believes she cannot overcome it without assault or combat : But in Hope it appears not so strong, as that it ought to be assaulted; nor so weak, as to be slighted : She keeps herself in a certain mean betwixt heat and neglect; and, without animating her self against it, she puts herself in safety, & stands upon her guard: which she doth in stiffening and fortifying her self in her self, as it happens



happens to the body, which, its parts being all equally stretched, without changing place, and almost without moving, makes a vigorous motion, which keeps it firm and extended; which for that cause is called in the Schools, *The Tonick motion*; The Soul then doth the same in this Passion; without assaulting or fleeing the ill which might traverse it, she fortifies her self, stands on her guard, and with assurance expects the good she seeks. So that we may define it to be *A motion of the Appetite, in which the Soul, in expectation of the good it desires, strengthens and stiffens her self in her self, to resist the difficulties she may encounter therein.*

Indeed, the whole nature, the properties, and conditions required in Hope, are contained in this definition. Desire and Expectation, which consist in the opinion that the good will come, are marked as the necessary conditions which always precede it; the desired good, as the object which moves it; the appetite, as the subject where it is received; and that firm assurance, as the difference of the emotion which is proper to it, and which distinguisheth it from all other Passions. For although Boldness and Anger stiffen the

soul also, as we have said, yet are they not content to keep it fixed in it self ; they make it rise up, and drive it against the ill, and force it to fight with it.

But this breeds a very reasonable doubt: for, did the soul keep it self stiff & steady in Boldness & Anger, as she doth in Hope, it would follow that Hope must always accompany them : And yet it is true ; a man may cast himself into danger without hope of ever getting out ; and that sometimes we desire to be revenged of an injury whereof we know we shall never have satisfaction : yet it hinders not but that this proposition is most certain , and but that it is true that Boldness and Anger are ever accompanied with Hope: For it is not always the onely good which Boldness proposeth, to get out of the danger which it casts it self into ; honour and glory, which spring from generous actions, are often the Goods it aspires to, and the enjoyment of which it always hopes, what mischance soever happens to it : although it fall under the difficulties it assaults, it still thinks 'twill be to overcome them, if they do but serve to obtain what it pretends to ; as in the Discourse of Boldness we shall more fully shew.

For

For Anger, we will in its place make it appear, that the satisfaction it expects in Revenge, and the principal end Nature hath assigned it, is to hinder the thing which injures us from continuing to do so : so that what can stop the course and continuance of the Ill, appeaseth Anger ; and we are satisfied, when he who hath offended us repents himself of it, when he acknowledgeth that it was not his designe, when he flees, or when he hath been hurt ; for that then it appears that he wants either power or will to mischief us, or else we suppose we have taken them from him. This then is the satisfaction which Anger always promiseth it self: and if it happen that we despair of obtaining it, as, when the things which offend us appear so powerful to us, that they seem beyond our strength and endeavours, and that we have no hope to be able to stop the malice they have to injure us ; we are then no longer capable of Anger, having lost our hope to be avenged, that is to say, to beat back the ill on him who caused it, that he may cease to do us more. If there be then a satisfaction which Revenge is out of hope to obtain, it is not natural to the Passion ; it must be a stranger, as what

comes from the custom of the Country, from the humour of the person, from the weakness of judgement, and the like. But this shall be in its place more carefully examined. Let us betake our selves to our former Discourse.

The Soul then stiffens it self in Hope, and in some sort suffers that Tonick motion which (as we have shewn) happens to the body. But we may say, that what image soever this example may give of the manner wherewith the appetite is moved, it doth not fully satisfie the Mind, and leaves always in it a difficulty to conceive how the Soul can move so : For it is not as of Bodies, which have nerves and muscles, which stretch the parts, and keep them extended, drawing them equally on every side : We can imagine nothing like it in the Soul, which is wholly simple, and which would rather suffer to be compared to subtil and fluid bodies, which this effect cannot reach, then to those who are massive and heavie, where it is commonly performed.

Now although this be true, yet it destroys not our proposition: for it's certain, the Soul stiffens it self aswel as the Body, but that the manner is quite different. It is

is not always necessary that the same motions should be made in the same manner: and we see that creatures bend and stretch out their bodies, although by different means. Amongst those which are perfect, the muscles perform this effect by contracting and loosing themselves: But there are divers in whom these parts are wanting, as in those which are so little, that we can scarce discern them, and in which most likely it is the spirits and the nerves alone perform these actions without the use of other organs. There are a thousand other examples in Nature, which clearly manifest this truth; but were there none, the Schools teach us, that spiritual substances carry themselves from one place to another; that they may occupie more or less room; that they drive and draw bodies; that, in fine, they perform almost all the motions which we observe in animate bodies, although the manner and the means be quite contrary. Which being granted, we ought not to doubt but that the Appetite can stiffen it self as well as living parts; it being needless it should do it in the same manner, or by the same means as they are usually accustomed to do.



But if it were enquired what this manner is, and what particular means the Appetite useth in this motion ; we must confess it to be a bold enquiry , to which it seems the minde of man is not able to give satisfaction : For since its knowledge , how high soever it be , draws its origine from that of the Senses , how can it have any in those things , when the Senses forsake it ? How can it discern the ways Nature takes in the motions of the Soul which are not sensible , when it is ignorant of those it keeps in them of the body , which touch the Senses , and are visible to our eyes ? Indeed , all our Philosophy must confess , that it toucheth but the extremities of motions , and that it almost never speaks of what passeth between both. And we may say , that Nature , which so freely gives all things , seems to be jealous of the art wherewith she doth them , and is unwilling we should see the springs of her works. However it be , I believe more cannot be assured in this matter , then that the soul stiffens it self in exciting and quickning its vigour , and putting it , as the School says , out of the power into act. And truely , since Angelick natures can move and even transport

port bodies from one place to another, it must be granted that they give to themselves, & to them also, a certain impetuosity, which changeth the situation and consistence they had; some particular vertue must disperse it self wheresoever they extend, which renders them stronger & more agile: and this vertue, according to my opinion, is nothing but their Will, w<sup>ch</sup> moves it self; or else their very motion: for things get a force in motion which they have not in rest. The same thing may proportionably be said of the Appetite, which is the first moving power in creatures: For by exciting it self, it agitates & corroborates it self; and being agitated with an equal and uniform motion, which holds it so suspended, without advance or recess; it remains stiff & stedfast, to oppose the difficulties which may present themselves. But, without engaging our selves further in this enquiry, which exceeds the limits of our designe, it will be sufficient to take away a difficulty which springs from what we have already said.

For if this motion of the Appetite be onely an equal and uniform agitation, whereby the soul remains fixt in it self, without advancing or receding; it must  
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follow, that Desire can never be with Hope, since it darts out the soul, and drives it out of it self, and that this restrains it. We must then say, that it is true, Desire is not always with Hope, although it always precedes it. And indeed, when we desire any thing ardently, we perceive that Hope slackens it self; as Desire also diminisheth, when Hope increaseth. Certainly they destroy one the other when they meet; Forasmuch as the Soul, in Desire, considers the Good but as absent, and takes no other care but to draw neer unto it: but in Hope, she fancies it so neer, not seeing any difficulties which it cannot overcome, that she almost thinks it as if it were present, (whence it happens, that Joy is greater in it then in Desire :) So that she makes not therein those sallies and dartings she doth in this, unless she be by some other things forced to it. On the contrary, she stops to receive the Good which seems to be produced and advanced towards her. This truth discovers it self in these ordinary phrases in these Passions: For when we say that the Desire is urgent, ardent, and violent; that it moves it self towards Good; that Hope is fixt and assured; that it upholds those  
who

who hope ; that it expects the desired things ; we unawares manifest how the Soul darts her self out in Desire, and retains her self in Hope. So that these two motions being opposite, it is impossible that they can be performed at the same time, and that those two Passions should be there together, but necessarily they must form themselves the one after the other ; as we said it must happen in those of which we have spoken in the foregoing Discourses.

Yet it is very true, that this is not always so, but that Hope mixeth it self most commonly with Desire, Boldness, and Anger ; in all which, the Soul never fails to cast forth her self : for the stedfastness she keeps in that, is not contrary to the darting out of her self which she makes in this ; the first being a motion of the parts amongst themselves, and the other a motion of the whole thing. And as you see a body may keep it self stiff in it self, and move it self from one place to another, you must conceive the same in the Appetite, and imagine that Hope remains stable, whilst those other Passions transport it out of it self. But, neither doth it then stop, as we have said ; the cause of these fallies

fallies being stronger then that of her restraint ; which , to speak truth, is not essential to Hope, but a pure accident which never meets with it but when it is quite alone.

Let us now observe what moves the Appetite to stiffen thus : for although it have the vertue to move it self as it pleaseth, and that it bends it self to resist difficulties ; yet , being a blinde power , it knows not the difficulties, and the Fancie must necessarily propose them to it ; and consequently, it must be that which gives it the first shake , and teacheth the motion which in this encounter it ought to employ. After it hath then discovered the difficulties which might traverse its designs, and that it believes it may overcome them, it commands the Appetite to stand upon its guard, and hold it self firm, for to make resistance. But whence comes the belief it hath to overcome them ? From the good opinion it hath of its own strength. Whence it is , that those who have many friends , much wealth and honour, those who have suffered no disgraces , and to whom all hath happily succeeded ; those who are young and lusty ; in fine, all those who think themselves potent



tent in the goods of the Body, of the Minde, and of Fortune, easily hope, because they believe they have strength enough to oppose all obstacles, and overcome all difficulties which can happen.

This good opinion is so necessary for Hope, that it makes almost all its kinds and differences : as it is greater or less, it causeth the strength or weakness, the excess or defect of that Passion : It is that which produceth Presumption and Confidence, which renders Hopes either doubtful or certain, good or ill, which augments or enfeebles them. Indeed, *Presumption* is nothing but an immoderate hope, which proceeds from a too-great opinion we have of our own strength. *Confidence* is an assurance we have of an expected help : 'Tis like the faith we give to promises w<sup>ch</sup> the things seem to make in these encounters : [for we say, The season promiseth us fruit, That we promise our selves such and such a success from our courage, forces, and friends. Finally, Hopes are either doubtful or certain, great or little, good or ill, according as we conceive the difficulties strong or weak, or as we suppose them to be more or less easie to be overcome.

Yet I think some distinction were here neces-

necessary : for the most certain hope is not always the greatest; and it is likely it is the greater, the more the soul stiffens itself, since it is the particular motion which forms this Passion. Now she stiffens herself the more, the greater the difficulties are she encounters: But when the hinderances are light, she moves not her self so carefully, & consequently Hope is less, although it be more certain. Our common phrase confounds these things: for we say that we have great, strong, and good hopes, when we would speak them assured; and that they are small, ill, and weak, when they are doubtful. Yet for all this, we ought to observe the distinctions we have made: for it is evident, that there are hopes which are weak and small, not because they are uncertain, but because the success is so sure, and the difficulties so small, that the Soul makes no motion at all for them. And truly we can never call these hopes ill, although vulgarly great and strong ones are esteemed good.

It may be demanded how there may be hopes which are certain, since the belief we have of the event of the things we hope for, is always doubtful. Certainly we must confess that the certainty which

is therein to be found, is not infallible and of necessity; it is onely likely, and moral; And we call those certain and sure hopes, which are the leſs doubtful, and in which there is the leaſt to be feared.

But what? it ſeems then as if Fear were always mixt with Hope, although they are two contrary Paſſions. It is true, there is always ſome cauſe of Fear, there being reaſon always to doubt. But it follows not that Fear therefore forms it ſelf and mingles it ſelf with Hope, although even the Soul were ſurprized therewith. The Paſſions riſe not always up in fight of their objects, whether it be that there are ſtronger which reſtrain them, and ſtifle them at their birth; or whether the Minde conſiders not attentively enough the cauſes which ought to move it. In Hope, the Soul is more attentive to the Good, then to the difficulties which beſiege her: She looks upon them but by the way, and believes ſhe can overcome them. Even then alſo, what ſubject ſoever there be of Fear, without examination ſhe in effect fears it not. But if ſhe conſider the difficulties more then the good, and if ſhe take an opinion that ſhe is unable to overcome them; Hope gives place to Fear, which

which flees in its turn, out of other considerations; causing a flood and ebbe, which is often so swift and rapid, that it seems as if these two Passions mixt and confounded themselves together. But we must review these things in the Discourse of Fear. Let us now consider what the motions of the Spirits and of the Humours are in Hope.

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PART

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## PART 3.

*What the motion of the Spirits is  
in Hope.*

**S**INCE the Spirits move in the Passions conformable to the emotion of the Soul, they must, when she stiffens and confirms her self, in her self when she hopes, in some manner suffer also the same agitation. All the difficulty then is, to know how it may be done : for it is not easie to conceive how those fluid and subtil bodies can get a quality which belongs to those onely which are gross and solid. Neither must you believe they congeal here, as they say it happens in some diseases ; or that they fix, as those Metallick spirits do whereof Chymistry relates such miracles : for, besides that those we speak of are much finer, and perhaps of another kinde then those are, they must at that  
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time become immoveable, and consequently, all the parts whereto they are to run, must remain without action, since they can work onely by their motion : Which yet cannot be true : Experience and Reason shew us, that the organs move freely in this Passion ; and that Desire, which often mixeth with it, as we have shewn, causeth the spirits to move, without ruining the settledness and consistence which Hope gives them. We might perhaps imagine that they contract and gather themselves together, that, by uniting and crowding their parts together, they become stiffer and stronger, and so put themselves in posture the better to resist the assaults might be made against them. And certainly, there is a great likelihood that some such thing is done in this encounter : For the Soul, which knows that what is united is stronger then what is divided, never fails so to fortifie it self when ill appears. Now the difficulties which are always found in Hope, are taken for evils, because they oppose themselves to the possession of good : And it is therefore likely that the Soul contracts the Spirits, the better to defend her self from that enemy which crosseth her designe.

Yet

Yet as in this Passion she is wont but by the way to consider of those difficulties which consequently seem not so great, nor so uneasy to be overcome ; we must not doubt but that, if she contract the Spirits, it is so little, that it is neither considerable, or powerful to confirm them in the manner they ought to be.

And indeed, the Spirits cannot much contract themselves without retiring inwardly, and consequently making the face look pale, forasmuch as they draw the blood along with them, and rob the complexion of the colour it had before. So that Hope having the property to maintain the countenance equal, and not to change its colour ; if it renders them so firm as we have said, it must be by some other means then by contracting or reuniting them together.

To conceive then how this is done, we must observe that the Soul can hope for nothing but what she first loved and desired: it is necessary that the Spirits should move conformably to these two Passions, before Hope can agitate them. Now they dilate and open themselves in Love, to embrace the good ; and in Desire they commonly recoil a little, that they may

the more easily dart themselves towards it. Being in this state then, if Hope intervene, it changeth nothing in the situation of their parts, it retains them onely in the proportion they had together, and from free and wandering, as they were, they subject themselves to a certain order which they keep amongst themselves as long as Hope lasts; which is made by the souls intermission, which hath an absolute command over them, placing them as she will, stopping them as she pleaseth, and holding them as it were by the hand in the rank she had placed them: And for that time, they remain firm and stable, without confounding themselves with others, or inwardly retreating, or advancing outwardly; which is the particular motion of the spirits in this Passion.

Some perhaps will say, that if these parts remain firm and stable, they will not move, and consequently, that the Spirits would have no motion in Hope. But there are things, which, although they do not change place, forbear not to move. Thus Elementary bodies which are not in their centre, although they are retained and seem immoveable, yet they make a kinde of an endeavour to return to their  
natural

natural place, which makes them seem either light or heavie. We may say the same of the Spirits, which being retained by a strange violence, are not truly at rest, but suffer a secret agitation which holds them in continual suspense.

Now although the Spirits remain thus firm and stable in Hope, it hinders not but that at the same time they may be agitated by other Passions which mix themselves with it. So Desire and Boldness may cast them forth without mixing their stedfastness, because it consists but in the order of their parts, which this darting forth destroys not, as we have said, seeing we may move a thing from one place to another, without disturbing the order and motion which those parts may have amongst themselves.

It is also true, that as Desire grows weak when Hope is strong, if the Spirits are very stable, their darting forth cannot be so great, because they are not so free, nor so easie to move as they would be were they not restrained : That if Passions rise whose motion quite destroys that of Hope, as Joy and Despair; then we may be sure that Hope ceaseth for a time, to give place to those others; and that

the Spirits lose their firmness, to disperse or slacken themselves, afterwards resuming their first consistence, if the Soul sees new subjects of Hope; which sometimes happens so readily, that it seems as if it were done in an instant, and that these motions confound themselves the one with the other.

I see nothing more here to stop us, but that some may chance to imagine, that if it were true that in Hope the soul and the spirits did bend themselves to resist difficulties, somewhat must appear on the outward parts, and they also must bend themselves for the same purpose; since that in Laughter we see the muscles retire as the soul doth, that in Desire and in Anger they cast themselves out as she doth; that they slacken in Joy, and that all other Passions make the same impression on the Body, as the Objects do in the Appetite. But we must consider, that the organs of a voluntary motion move not in the Passions, but through the strength and efficacy of the object, which urgeth the soul, and obligeth it to employ all the means she hath to attain the end she proposed herself, as we see it happens in all violent Passions; or else out of a particular designe



signe she hath to shew outwardly what she inwardly resents, as she doth in Laughter and in Caresses. So that there being none of those motives in Hope, she needs move none of those outward parts, and contents her self with the agitation she gives the spirits; not considering the ill but by the by, she esteems it not so great, as to employ all her endeavours against it: so that she commonly agitates but the most mobile parts, as are the spirits, the eyes, the brows, and some other parts, as it happens in all other Passions which are weak or moderate.

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PART



## PART 4.

*The causes of the Characters of  
Hope.*

**B**Ut since we have spoken sufficiently of the secret tempests, let us now see whence those come which appear outwardly, and examine why Hope renders men bold, presumptuous, temerous, insolent, credulous, negligent in their affairs, and impatient in their actions; although it be the most moderate and the calmest of all the Passions of the Minde.

It is easie to discover the cause of its *moderation*, after having shewed how it moves the Soul and the Spirits: for it is impossible it should keep them stiff and stable as it doth, and that it should be subject to those agitations which are observable in other Passions: On the contrary, those languish-

languishing and impetuous ones which mix with it, assume a conformable mediocrity to that kinde of motion which suspends the soul between ardor and neglect, as we have already said; wherefore it enfeebles the Desire when it is too ardent; and stirs it up when it is remiss; it is a spur to Laziness; and a bridle to Violence; it hinders Boldness from being rash; and takes off the transports of Joy: and if it chance to be with Fear, and with Grief, it so moderates them, that they fail not of their courage, and refuse not to admit of the sweetest Passions.

But whence comes it then, that it renders men rash, vain, and impatient? How can Anger and Fury be compatible with it? And if it excite and animate the Courage and the Desires; how doth it beget Negligence and Idleness? And yet we cannot doubt but that in some sort it is the cause of all these effects. But they also who will consider the manner of their production; will confess, that it is neither the nearest, nor even the true cause: For Hope indeed begets Boldness; but afterwards Boldness runs to Temerity: it excites and awakens the Desires; but these bring Disquiet and Impatience with them:  
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it brings Joy with it ; but afterwards Joy flees into raptures and extasies : it inspires the Appetite with Revenge ; which is afterwards converted into Fury : Finally, it gives Confidence, and that begets Presumption, vanity, and the scorn of all things which may traverse our designs ; whence, after, Negligence and Laziness are bred. So that all these defects come not immediately from Hope, but from the other Passions which accompany it. And it is clear, that when these are raised to this excess, it quite vanisheth, or becomes extremely weak : For when we are sensible of a great Joy, at that very moment we have no sense of Hope : it scarce appears in violent Desires, nor in the transports of Anger ; the soul suffering her self to be born away by the particular motions of those Passions : And Presumption it self, which seems nothing but an excess of Hope, wholly ruins it ; imagining that there are no difficulties which can oppose its designs : for, where there is no more a difficulty, there remains no Hope.

However it be, *Boldness* is easily joyned with Hope, because the Soul having confirmed her self by this to the resistance  
of

of difficulties, is already in state to assault them if they appear very strong, and if she betake her self to consider the danger wherein they may cast her, for want of fighting and overcoming them: Besides that the good opinion she hath of her strength, heightens her Courage, and perswades her that it is not enough to maintain the defensive part, but we must pursue and assault our enemy. If her forces are not proportionable to this good opinion, and that she believes them greater then in effect they are, thence ariseth *Presumption*; which, joyned with Boldness, reacheth to *Temerity*; and thence grows *Insolence*: in the same manner as with Joy she begets *Vanity*, *Prattle*, and *Importunity*, as in its place we shall further shew.

*Impatience* reigns powerfully in this Passion. Forasmuch as it commonly accompanies Joy, Desire, and Fear, there is always somewhat of these three mixt with Hope; and even they are often found all together. So that we must not wonder if we are unquiet when we hope, whether it be from the apprehension we have that we shall not soon enough possess the good we expect, or from the urgency of pres-



pressing desires, or from the sparkling which accompanies pleasure.

There is no Passion so *credulous* as Hope: for others give credence onely to the Good or Ill proposed, but this equally gives in Both. Indeed, pleasing things onely perswade Joy, Love, and Desire: those which are troublesome make no impression on them, without destroying them. On the contrary, Ill onely is resented by Grief, Fear, and Despair; Good hath neither audience nor admittance among them. But Hope hearkens to both of them, forasmuch as being in the midst between both, it easily inclines towards those extremities: and she no sooner believes what favours her designes, but she hearkens to what renders them impossible.

The Corporal characters which are found in this Passion, are of two kinds, as in all the rest; The one by the command of the Soul, the others by Necessity. The motions of the head, brows, eyes, and voice, and of all the body, are of the first rank: The rest are in the form of ordinary effects.

The body sets it self upright, the head is lifted up, the brows are raised, for the  
same

same intention. For the Soul, which would obtain the good, and resist the difficulties which oppose it, puts it self in posture to do both. Now besides that this posture is advantageous for to see afar off what may happen, it is so also in pursuance of Good, or in defence of Ill, if one be assaulted by it; it is the most natural situation which bodies require for action; it is the motion which begins all other actions of creatures; whether to pursue pleasing things, or to flee or assault ill ones, the first thing they do is to lift up the head and the body. The Soul now putting her self in posture of defence, disposeth thus of those organs, that she may not be surprised; and raiseth them, to make them the firmer; as in Despair, and in Fear, where she slackens her self, she bows the body, hangs the head, and casts down the eyes and brows.

An *assured countenance* is made by a wide opening of the eye-lids with vivacity. A fixt and stedfast look, it is common to Anger, Impudence, Boldness, and Hope; yet with this difference, that in Anger the eyes are too ardent; too open in Impudence; and too rude in Boldness. But in Hope they have none of these defaults;  
all

all is therein moderate ; and it seems as if sweetness and severity were confounded together in all its motions. The eyes then are more open then ordinary , the better to see the good, and the difficulties which present themselves. The steadfastness of the looks, is a signe that impediments astonish not the Minde , and that it believes it shall overcome them. The vivacity of the eyes comes from the Spirits which Desire hath driven to these parts , or which Joy hath there dispersed. In fine, sweetness and severity are therein mixt together, because that at the same time the soul sees the Good and the Ill, and is touched both with the one and the other , and is not so sure to obtain what she pretends to , but that she still hath cause to doubt of it.

This Passion often also makes a man *turn up his eyes* , for that having need of the help of others to acquire what he seeks , it casts his eyes towards heaven, as to the fountain of all good things , and the common helper of all Nature ; and hath recourse to superiour causes , being not always assured of the assistance it promised it self from others.

But when the looks are *urgent and un-*  
*quiet,*

*quiet*, they are effects of Desire and Fear, which mix with it ; in the same manner as Joy often causeth its transports, sparklings, and agitations.

To conclude, *the voice and the speech are firm*, that is to say, strong, without vehemency or inequality, neither heightning nor falling, neither trembling nor precipitated : For the Soul, which bends it self to resist difficulties, is in no condition to fear : but because also she will not assault them, she makes no great endeavour. Wherefore, the voice falls not, because there is no weakness in the Minde ; it riseth not also, there being no violence therein ; neither is it trembling, being without fear ; nor precipitate, being without impetuosity : but strong and equal, the air being beaten strongly and equally by the Soul, which hath assured and confirmed her self against difficulties.

There remains now onely the Necessary Characters which follow the agitation of the Humours and of the Spirits. The first, and that which seems the most proper for Hope, is, *that the colour of the face changeth not* ; the reason whereof we touched at the begining of this Discourse :

course : For the Spirits, which become stable, stop also the blood, and hinder it from retiring inwardly, or dispersing it self outwardly. So that if sometimes we grow pale, it is an effect of Fear, as blushing is of Love, Desire, Joy, and the rest of the Passions which drive the blood into the outward parts.

*Sighs* follow Love and Desire also. It is Fear that cools and makes us lose *Courage*; it is Boldness heats and re-animates it. Finally, *Disquiet* chiefly comes from Desire and from Fear, which are augmented by tediousness and delays, which retard the possession of the desired Good. But these Characters are strangers to Hope, whose examen is not here to be made: Let us onely consider those which seem fit and natural to it.

It renders the *Pulse steadfast*, without being vehement: for the heart and the arteries, which confirm themselves as well as the spirits, make the Pulse appear somewhat harder then it was; and by the touch you may perceive a steadiness which it had not before. But this is without vehemency, forasmuch as the soul makes no great endeavour to assault, as we said; and the heat is temperate,  
which



which require a moderate and equal motion. It is true, if Hope fall into some cold and weak nature, it causeth a higher and greater Pulse then it had usually, forasmuch as the Soul, which knows her weakness, and whose designe is to fortifie her self, somewhat augments the heat, which hath afterwards need of the greater refreshment. But at that time the Pulse is nothing quicker; the heat being not so increased, that the Soul had need to trouble her self to temper the ardor it might cause; she contents her self to enlarge the heart and the arteries, to receive the greater quantity of air. For it is the order which Nature holds when heat increaseth, that first she makes the Pulse greater and higher; after, she makes it quick; and, at last, renders it thick: imitating herein what she makes beasts do, who, to go to a place, begin to march with great paces; which, if urged, they double; and at last betake themselves to run. Howsoever, what we said of the Pulse, happens in respiration, excepting the hardness, which the Sense therein cannot be sensible of; although it be likely that the substance of the Lungs may therein harden, as *Hippocrates* saith it happens in

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Anger,



Anger, because it is almost impossible that the Spirits, which run thorow all the parts, should not imprint the quality they have, in those which are soft and obedient, as the Lungs are.

In a word, Hope *fortifies all the parts*, because the spirits therein are more vigorous : and as it stops, and in a manner retains them, that they cannot dissipate, nor make any violent motion, it is not to be disputed, that of all the Passions it is the most advantageous for Health, for Length of life, for Vertue it self, which with so great a care seeks Moderation, which naturally is to be found with Hope. I say again, It is advantageous for the Length of life : for, what serves for a great Health, is not always good to render Life long : Active and vehement heat produceth strong actions, but shortens our days, because the Spirits easily dissipate, and suddenly consume the natural moisture. So that, to live long, heat should be moderate, the spirits ought not to be violently agitated, nor also should they be languishing. Now if Nature give them not this justness, then it seems there is onely Hope which can acquire it us, being the onely one which  
retains

retains it, and secures it, without suffering excessive heat, or irregular motion. And therefore we must not wonder, if those who feed themselves with good hopes, live longer than other Men : And if death often follows high successes, it is because it makes us lose Hope, which is the true Anchor which holds fast our Soul, our Lives, and our Yeers.

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FINIS.

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